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SUMMARY 
Defining international terrorism has been an unsolved problem of 
international law for quite some time. All those who aspire to the 
promotion of international criminal justice and the fight against 
impunity agree that the formulation of a universal definition for 
international terrorism will further enhance the fight against 
terrorism and offer a universally acceptable legal framework within 
which this fight can be conducted. In light of this, this thesis is an 
attempt to approach the issue of defining international terrorism, 
proposing that the most workable way to this direction is to achieve 
due balance between the two principle driving forces of 
international law developments: State sovereignty and cosmopolitan 
ideals. These dynamics, which often conflict, have been playing a 
key role in the formation of international law in general and the 
formulation of definitions for international crimes in particular. As 
such, the quest for a definition of international terrorism will be 
based on the argument that its effectiveness relies on the extent to 
which it manages due balance between these two antithetical poles. 
As a complement to this argument, the definition of the crime of 
aggression for the purposes of the Rome Statute will be used as a 
paradigm of whether and to what extent this desired balance 
between State sovereignty considerations and cosmopolitan 
purposes can be achieved and whether there are lessons to be learnt 
from this process for the purpose of defining international terrorism. 
It is the author’s view that achieving due balance in formulating a 
definition for international terrorism can be a realistic prospect, not 
as a compromise between these two opposing dynamics but as a 
common effort of the international community to develop 
international law in this field. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thesis Statement1 
International criminal law is composed of several elements, the 
interrelation of which is what ultimately determines its 
effectiveness: international criminal law bodies (such as 
international criminal tribunals and more recently the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)),2 the commitment of their States Parties to 
the application of the law as well as the degree of cooperation of 
non-Parties and finally, the very content and scope of the field of 
law these bodies are meant to apply. The most recent embodiment 
of this content and scope of international criminal law is the Rome 
Statute for an ICC (Rome Statute),3 entailing definitions of the 
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and the crime of aggression.4 In this respect, effectiveness 
consists of, among other things,5 the drafting and application of 
definitions which can enhance the principles enshrined in the 
Preamble of the Rome Statute: international accountability, fight 
against impunity, respect for the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations (UN) Charter,6 prohibition of the use of force and 
respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all 
States. The purpose of this thesis is to argue in favour of a definition 
                                                             
1 The thesis is up to date to 1 July 2015. 
2 UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Rome 15 June–17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF 
183/13. 
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (Rome Statute). 
4 Rome Statute arts 5-8. The crime of aggression was added as a placeholder in 
the Rome Statute and it was agreed to decide upon a definition and the conditions 
for the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction at a later stage. These issues concerning 
the crime of aggression were finalised in Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, 
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the 
Crime of Aggression (11 June 2010) (Kampala Resolution). 
5 See eg Mirjan Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ 
(2008) 83 Chicago Kent Law Review 329; Steven Freeland, ‘The “Effectiveness” 
of International Criminal Justice’ [2008] ALTA Law Research Series 16 
<www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ALRS/2008/16.html> accessed 3 July 2015. 
6 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
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for international terrorism in the context of international criminal 
law, under the prism of two parameters: i) the modalities of the 
drafting of the definition of the crime of aggression in Resolution 6 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the 
Crime of Aggression (Kampala Resolution) and ii) the achievement 
of due balance between the two, mostly antithetical, poles of State 
sovereignty and international criminal justice or cosmopolitan 
purposes.7 These two poles represent two, often conflicting, 
dynamics that have influenced the development of international 
criminal law in general and the formulation of definitions for 
international crimes in particular: on the one hand, a State 
sovereignty-oriented approach gives primacy to the protection of 
State interests over the need to promote international criminal 
justice purposes, whereas a cosmopolitan approach8 prioritises 
international criminal justice over State sovereign interests and 
prerogatives. It is the author’s view that, for an international 
terrorism definition to achieve its maximum effectiveness and 
ensure accountability without disregarding State sovereign 
prerogatives, both dynamics should be reflected in such a manner so 
as to push forward the development of international law and the 
protection it affords without ignoring sovereignty-related 
considerations. 
                                                             
7 For the purposes of this thesis, ‘international criminal justice’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ 
purposes can be summarised as the protection of all human beings, respect for 
human rights, fight against impunity and the prevention of grave crimes that 
‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’ (See Rome Statute 
Preamble para 3). The Preamble also reaffirms the Purposes and Principles as 
enshrined in the UN Charter, meaning that there is substantial convergence 
between the purposes of these two international institutions. 
8 Generally speaking, the cosmopolitan theory or cosmopolitanism holds that 
‘universal standards applicable to humankind should take priority in international 
affairs’. Current developments that can be considered as cosmopolitan steps are 
the emergence of an international human rights regime and international law, 
which should aim at the prevalence of universal rights and justice ‘over other 
competing values reflecting particular cultural, religious, social, historical, ethnic 
or economic perspectives’ of States (in Page Wilson, Aggression, Crime and 
International Security: Moral, Political and Legal Dimensions of International 
Relations (Routledge 2009) 2, 6). 
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Turning to extant international criminal law definitions, the 
definitions for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
had already been provided in international law9 long before the 
drafting of the Rome Statute. However, the recent definition of the 
crime of aggression was the product of long and laborious 
negotiations, from the time of the Nuremberg trials10 and the 
definition of crimes against peace11 until the Kampala Resolution in 
June 2010. From this long drafting process, there are lessons to be 
learnt on how a definition of an international crime with strong 
implications for State sovereignty should be approached. Due to the 
challenges presented by State sovereignty and eventually, by the 
need for balance between Security Council powers under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and the ICC’s potential jurisdiction over 
aggression, the definition of aggression took more than 50 years 
since the precedent of the Nuremberg Trials in order to be drafted 
                                                             
9 The definition of genocide is provided in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into 
force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 227, art 2. War crimes and crimes against 
humanity were defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
(adopted and entered into force 8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 279 (Nuremberg 
Charter) and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(adopted and entered into force 19 January 1946) (Tokyo Charter) in Articles 6 
and 5 respectively. All these three international crimes were also defined in the 
Statutes of the International Military Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia UN Doc 
S/RES/827 (arts 3-5) and of the International Military Tribunal for Rwanda UN 
Doc S/RES/955 (arts 2-4). However crimes against humanity lacked a widely 
accepted international law definition until the adoption of the Rome Statute 
(William Schabas, ‘International Criminal Law’ Encyclopaedia Britannica in 
<www.britannica.com/topic/international-criminal-law> accessed 27 July 2015).  
War crimes, referred to also as ‘grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949’, were also specified in the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (entered into force 21 October 1950) and in the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 
December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (Additional Protocol I) arts 11 and 85. 
Nonetheless, the Rome Statute does not always adopt these definitions verbatim. 
See Antonio Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some 
Preliminary Reflections’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 144, 
149-150. 
10 For an analysis of the historical account on the definition of aggression see 
Chapter II. 
11 Nuremberg Charter art 6; Tokyo Charter art 5. Before the definition of ‘crimes 
against peace’, the renunciation of war as a means of national policy was already 
established by Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty between the United 
States and other Powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of 
national policy (adopted 27 August 1928, entered into force 24 July 1929) 94 
LNTS 57). 
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and firmly established in an international criminal law context. The 
long negotiations that took place and the analysis of the opposing 
dynamics that finally shaped the definition can serve as a guidance 
of how another international crime which evinces similar challenges 
for State sovereignty can be ultimately defined: international 
terrorism.  
For the purposes of this thesis, ‘international terrorism’ will refer 
to any type of conduct as already specified by the anti-terrorist or 
‘suppression’ conventions12 but not strictly limited to them, which is 
committed by either State or non-State actors, bears international 
dimensions in terms of perpetrators, victims and means used, and 
takes place only in time of peace.13 In this respect, the focus of this 
thesis will lie on the question of how to define international 
terrorism in an international criminal law context, departing from 
the approach followed so far by the anti-terrorist conventions, which 
                                                             
12 For the purpose of this thesis, as anti-terrorist or ‘suppression’ conventions are 
considered the conventions that oblige States to criminalise particular conducts 
related to terrorism, eg Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft (entered into force 14 October 1971) 860 UNTS 105; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (entered into 
force 26 January 1973) 974 UNTS 177; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (entered into 
force 20 February 1977) 1035 UNTS 167; International Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages (entered into force 3 June 1983) 1316 UNTS 205; Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (entered into force 8 February 
1987) 1456 UNTS 246; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (entered into force 6 August 1989) 1589 UNTS 474; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (entered 
into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 201; Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental 
Shelf (entered into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 304; International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 
December 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (entered into force 23 
March 2001) 2149 UNTS 256; International Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (adopted on 13 April 2005, entered into force 7 July 
2007) UN Doc A/RES/59/290.88. 
13 Terrorism as a war crime is already regulated by the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols: Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 1949 (entered into force 21 October 
1950) 75 UNTS 287, art 33; Additional Protocol I art 51(2); Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into 
force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609, art 4(2). 
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oblige States to criminalise particular criminal conducts related to 
terrorism and which, most of the time, avoid the mere use of the 
term. The approach followed by these conventions results in the 
obligation for States to criminalise (but not in the criminalisation 
per se of) a list of criminal acts that relate to terrorism (but do not 
constitute terrorism per se).14 Thus, criminal conducts related to 
terrorism are considered as transnational offences whose 
criminalisation and prosecution are matters of domestic concern 
only. Instead, this thesis will attempt to address the question of 
defining international terrorism by treating it as a crime which is 
much more than the sum of all the prohibited acts provided by the 
anti-terrorist conventions. Precisely because defining terrorism for 
international criminal justice purposes will have implications on 
State sovereignty, this thesis will approach the issue of definition by 
addressing first and foremost the need to achieve due balance 
between the State sovereignty and cosmopolitan concerns that come 
into play. The ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ debate 
that will form the theoretical framework of this thesis is part of a 
much wider debate between politics and law and perhaps the most 
representative continuations of politics and law respectively in the 
context of international criminal justice.  
The relevance of this debate to the formulation of international 
crimes definitions has already been evinced in the drafting of the 
definition of the crime of aggression in Kampala. Unlike the other 
international crimes definitions of the Rome Statute, which were 
either treaty-based or defined in the statutes of international criminal 
tribunals, the definition of aggression was the product of many years 
of deliberations that had started before the establishment of the ICC. 
After its establishment, the work of the Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) demonstrated that the Kampala 
                                                             
14 Neil Boister, ‘Treaty Crimes, International Criminal Court?’ (2009) 12 New 
Criminal Law Review 341, 348. More generally see Neil Boister, ‘Transnational 
Criminal Law?’ (2003) 14 (5) European Journal of International Law 953. 
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Resolution was the outcome of a long effort to accommodate both 
State-centred and international criminal justice concerns in a single 
definition. Therefore, this thesis will argue that the examination of 
how State sovereignty and cosmopolitan concerns interacted in the 
definition of aggression will serve as an example of how they 
should interact in the quest for a definition of international terrorism 
in order to ensure that such a definition will promote international 
law in the field with due consideration of any occurring sovereignty-
related implications on States. 
Thus, this introductory Chapter will first offer a brief explanation 
of the reasons why terrorism should be defined for international 
criminal law purposes (Section I) and secondly why, despite these 
reasons, terrorism was not ultimately included into the Rome Statute 
(Section II). Section III will provide an overview of the two theories 
that advocate either the predominance of State sovereignty concerns 
over international law (the State-centric theory) or the priority that is 
due to cosmopolitan concerns related to international criminal 
justice over State sovereign interests (the cosmopolitan theory). It 
will be also shown how these theories are relevant in the context of 
the ICC project: on the one hand the establishment of the ICC is 
based on quasi-universal jurisdiction15 - generally a cosmopolitan 
ideal - while on the other hand, its complementary jurisdiction is a 
manifestation of the protection afforded to the sovereign interests of 
its States Parties regarding the adjudication of international crimes. 
                                                             
15 According to the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 41-44, ‘universal jurisdiction’, as a term used 
in the context of an international treaty, is a misnomer for ‘an obligatory territorial 
jurisdiction over persons…for extraterritorial events’. For an opposing view see 
Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 735, who claims that universal 
jurisdiction can be grounded in treaty law. Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute 
provides that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction when the territorial State or the 
State of nationality of the accused (or both) are Parties to the Statute or have 
accepted its jurisdiction ad hoc. However, this jurisdictional link with the 
territorial or nationality State does not apply in case of a Security Council referral 
of a situation to the ICC Prosecutor under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Rome 
Statute arts 12 and 13). 
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Finally, Section IV will present the architecture of this thesis, 
providing a brief description of the Chapters that are going to 
follow. 
I. Why do we need a definition for terrorism? 
The questions of why there is a need for an international 
definition for terrorism and why terrorism should be also prosecuted 
at an international level (and not only domestically) are the two 
sides of the same coin. Presumably, the issue of promoting 
accountability for terrorism can be addressed by what Boister calls 
‘transnational criminal law’,16 namely the framework provided by 
the anti-terrorist conventions which oblige States to criminalise 
particular terrorist conducts for the purpose of national prosecutions. 
However, it will be demonstrated herein that there is a separate need 
for an international definition for terrorism to be used in an 
international criminal law context. 
Firstly, the attribution of individual criminal responsibility for 
terrorist acts will, in some respects, support and protect State 
sovereignty. Terrorism has been viewed as a crime against the State, 
‘its security and stability, sovereignty and integrity, institutions and 
structures, or economy and development’.17 Having an international 
mechanism in place to ensure that no terrorist offenders go 
unpunished strengthens the respect for State sovereignty at an 
international level, especially that of those States which are not 
sufficiently powerful to prosecute the offenders themselves. 
Although international anti-terrorist treaties oblige States to 
prosecute or extradite alleged terrorist offenders,18 it cannot be taken 
                                                             
16 Boister (n 14) ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’. 
17 Ben Saul, ‘Defining Terrorism to Protect Human Rights’ [2008] Sydney Law 
School Research Paper No 08/125, 3 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292059> accessed 19 
January 2015. 
18 For example see: International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art 
10; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
art 9(2); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art 
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for granted that decisions to extradite or prosecute are always taken 
with due consideration of criminal justice purposes. Some decisions 
are bound to be shaped by the political dynamics involved in a 
particular case. Thus, for example, a State might refuse to extradite 
an alleged offender to the requesting State due to political or 
diplomatic reasons or for fear of having its foreign relations 
disturbed or of appearing weak if it gives in to an extradition 
request.19 In the current state of affairs, it is likely that a terrorist 
offender can escape prosecution if he or she flees to a State that 
would deny his or her extradition or prosecution on grounds 
irrelevant to international criminal justice but relevant to political 
considerations such as opposing ideology, adverse relations or 
distrust towards the requesting State.20 In such cases, the existence 
of an international mechanism with jurisdiction to prosecute terrorist 
cases when States are ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’21 to do so, 
could, arguably, eliminate States’ discretion in prosecuting alleged 
terrorists and bring to the fore terrorist cases that deserve 
international attention. It could also encourage States to harmonise22 
their domestic law definitions for terrorism with the international 
                                                                                                                                                                              
9; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism art 
11(1). 
19 In the Lockerbie case, Libya insisted that the suspects be prosecuted by the 
Libyan authorities. However, the Security Council required the extradition of the 
suspects, due to evidence that implicated Libya in the commission of the crime 
(UNSC Res 748 (31 March 1992) UN Doc S/RES/748). 
20 Todd M Sailer, ‘The International Criminal Court: An Argument to Extend its 
Jurisdiction to Terrorism and a Dismissal of U.S. Objections’ (1999) 13 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal 311, 338. See also Mohammed Cherif 
Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (3rd edn, 
Oceana Publications 1996) 581; Steven W Krohne, ‘The United States and the 
World Need an International Criminal Court as an Ally in the War Against 
Terrorism’ (1997) 8 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 159.  
21 Genuine unwillingness and inability for prosecution are two of the conditions of 
admissibility of a case before the ICC under the complementarity regime and 
according to Article 17 of the Rome Statute. For an analysis regarding States’ 
unwillingness or inability to try terrorist cases see Erin Creegan, ‘A Permanent 
Hybrid Court for Terrorism’ (2010-11) 26 American University International Law 
Review 237, 257-61. 
22 Cassese argues that the ICC ‘was conceived as an instrument for harmonizing 
national and international criminal justice’, in Antonio Cassese, ‘A Big Step 
Forward for International Justice’ [2003] Crimes of War Project in 
<www.crimesofwar.org> accessed 14 April 2013. 
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one and, at least to some extent, minimise the role of politics in the 
administration of international criminal justice for terrorist cases.23 
Secondly, the need to agree upon an international definition for 
terrorism is also imperative for reasons of clarity. Though the 
formulation of a definition for terrorism does not, and cannot, fully 
guarantee that the term will not be open to political abuse, States 
will be more restricted in their discretion to label political opponents 
as terrorists in order to exclude any possibility of political dialogue 
with them and ‘as a justification to crush any dissent’.24 For reasons 
of ‘self-defense’, ‘[national] security’, ‘law and order’, terrorism can 
be used as a weapon in the hands of those who participate in the 
‘fight against terrorism’.25 Without any outer legal criteria of 
reference, at least as to what ‘international terrorism’ consists of, 
States have full discretion to determine what terrorism is and what it 
is not, something which results in the prevalence of the allegation 
that terrorism is a tactic mostly used against a State and not by a 
State against any opposing groups or individuals.26 
Furthermore, incidents such as the Lockerbie case,27 the 1998 
embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
the 2001 9/11 attack in the United States, the 2002 and 2005 Bali 
bombings, the 2005 7/7 London bombings, etc have shown that 
terrorism can be of such gravity so as to qualify as a threat to 
                                                             
23 Though one cannot rule out entirely the role of politics in some of the current 
cases under the ICC’s jurisdiction (eg the Darfur situation and the apparent US 
support to the ICC based on political motives, see Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘The 
International Criminal Court and the Warrant of Arrest for Sudan’s President Al-
Bashir: A Crucial Step Towards Challenging Impunity or a Political Decision?’ 
(2009) 78 Nordic Journal of International Law 397), it is the author’s view that 
the political influences on the ICC’s mandate, if any, constitute a general 
functional weakness that relates to all Article 5 crimes and will not be exclusively 
manifest in terrorist cases.  
24 Sami Zeidan, ‘Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community’s 
Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism’ (2004) 36 Cornell International 
Law Journal 491, 495. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid. 
27
 Libya v United Kingdom [1992] ICJ Rep 114. 
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international peace and security.28 This qualification is explicitly 
declared in several Security Council Resolutions29 and clearly 
contradicts the argument made during the Rome negotiations that 
terrorism is not of sufficient gravity in order to be included into the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. If a terrorist incident can reach the threshold 
of being a threat to international peace and security, it is difficult to 
see why incidents of such a gravity cannot reach the threshold 
articulated in the Rome Statute of being one of the ‘most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’.30 
Last, but not least, the adjudication of terrorist cases by the ICC 
will contribute to the improvement of the current extradition system, 
which is in place for countering terrorism in many anti-terrorist 
treaties. The weaknesses of this system are analysed elsewhere in 
the thesis.31 In summary, in the current state of affairs, decisions for 
extradition are driven mostly by political and foreign relations 
considerations rather than international criminal justice purposes, 
meaning that the punishment of perpetrators can be foreclosed 
despite the existence of a system of State cooperation and 
extradition treaties. In such cases, the ICC can offer an alternative 
forum for prosecution in the absence of an extradition treaty or in 
cases of concurrent State jurisdictions over a particular terrorist 
incident and thus help minimise the role of politics in extradition 
decision-making.32 However, the role of politics is not as yet 
                                                             
28 The Security Council has used the term ‘threat to the peace’ broadly, in 
situations varying from mass violations of international humanitarian or human 
rights law to economic and ecological disasters. See generally Robert Cryer, ‘The 
Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to Coherence?’ (1996) 1 Journal of 
Armed Conflict Law 161. 
29 See indicatively UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373; 
UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/; UNSC Res 1269 (19 
October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1269.  
30 Rome Statute art 5(1). 
31 See Chapter IV. 
32 In the Lockerbie case, an internationalised Scottish court sitting in the 
Netherlands functioned as an alternative forum for prosecution when the 
‘extradite or prosecute’ principle did not solve the conflict between Libya and the 
UK/US. See also Michael Plachta, ‘The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security 
Council in Enforcing the Principle aut dedere aut judicare’ (2001) 12 (1) 
European Journal of International Law 125. 
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minimised with respect to whether or how terrorism should be 
defined for international criminal law purposes and will be analysed 
in the following section. 
II. Terrorism and the ICC: why terrorism was not 
included into the Rome Statute 
a) Efforts to include terrorism into the Rome Statute 
 
In the Final Act of the Rome Conference in 1998, it was 
recognised that ‘terrorist acts, by whomever and wherever 
perpetrated and whatever their forms, methods or motives, are 
serious crimes of concern to the international community’ and that it 
is regrettable that ‘no generally acceptable definition of the crimes 
of terrorism and drug crimes could be agreed upon for the inclusion 
within the jurisdiction of the Court’.33 The jurisdiction of the newly 
established ICC included the so-called core or international crimes 
or international crimes stricto sensu34 (or Article 5 crimes as will be 
                                                             
33 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) UN Doc 
A/CONF.183/10 (Final Act). 
34 For the purposes of this thesis, as international crimes are considered the crimes 
punished under the Rome Statute, whose distinctive feature is, as Fletcher 
suggests, that they are ‘wrong in themselves - not wrong by force of the 
international treaty that defines them’ (George P Fletcher, ‘Parochial versus 
Universal Criminal Law’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 20, 
22-23). For a distinction between ‘international’ or ‘core’ crimes or ‘international 
crimes stricto sensu’ and ‘transnational’, ‘treaty’, ‘treaty-based’ crimes or ‘crimes 
of international concern’ see indicatively: Mohammed Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The 
Source and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework’, in 
Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law Vol I: Crimes (2nd edn, Ardsley on 
Hudson Transnational 1999) 4 (where he makes a distinction between ‘crimes of 
international concern’ or ‘common crimes against internationally protected 
interests’ and ‘international crimes’ or ‘core crimes’); Claus Kress, ‘International 
Criminal Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (online edn, OUP 2008) (distinction between transnational and 
supranational international criminal law stricto sensu); Robert Cryer and 
Elizabeth Wilmhurst, ‘Introduction: What is international criminal law?’ in Cryer 
and ors (eds), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 
(CUP 2010) 4-5 (transnational and international crimes); Paola Gaeta, 
‘International criminalization of prohibited conduct’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP 2009) 63, 69 
(international crimes proper and treaty-based crimes). Cassese extends the list of 
international crimes to include, apart from the Article 5 crimes, torture and 
international terrorism (in Kai Ambos and Anina Timmermann, ‘Terrorism and 
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referred to in this thesis), namely genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as a placeholder, 
for which it was decided that the definition and conditions of the 
exercise of jurisdiction will be agreed upon at a later stage.35 It was 
further provided that the jurisdiction of the ICC can be expanded in 
the future by a review mechanism.36 In an international politics 
context, the Security Council has issued a number of Resolutions 
denouncing terrorist acts as ‘threats to international peace and 
security’. Specifically, after the event of 9/11, the UN established 
two expert bodies, the ‘Policy Working Group on the United 
Nations and Terrorism’, in October 200137 and the ‘High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change’ in 2003, which made it 
clear that the fight against terrorism needs a comprehensive strategy 
that should include but not be limited to, coercive measures.38 In 
particular, the High-Level Panel recommended that the fight against 
terrorism be conducted ‘within a legal framework that is respectful 
of civil liberties and human rights, including in the area of law 
enforcement’39 and also that the UN General Assembly should 
conclude the negotiations over a universally agreed upon definition 
of terrorism and make terrorism an international crime.40 Finally, 
the Policy Working Group recommended that the most serious 
terrorist crimes should be prosecuted by the ICC.41 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Customary International Law’ in Ben Saul (ed), Research Handbook on 
International Law and Terrorism (Edward Elgar 2014) 24). Neil Boister also 
makes a detailed analysis between international crimes stricto sensu and 
transnational crimes in Boister (n 14) ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’. 
35 Rome Statute art 5(1) and (2). 
36 Final Act (n 33) Resolution E para 6. 
37 ‘Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism’ (6 
August 2002) Annex to UN Doc S/2002/875 (A/57/273) 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2002/un-wrkng-grp-
terrorism.htm> accessed 11 April 2014 (Report of the Policy Working Group). 
38 Secretary-General, ‘Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change: A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility’ (December 2004) UN 
Doc A/59/565 para 148.  
39 ibid. 
40 ibid paras 163-64. 
41 Report of the Policy Working Group (n 37) para 26. 
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More recently, and before the 2010 Review Conference, the 
Netherlands submitted a proposal to include terrorism into the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, stating that terrorism is a threat to international peace 
and security and that international prosecution of terrorist offenders 
is imperative when States with jurisdiction are unwilling or unable 
to carry out domestic proceedings.42 It further proposed that a 
similar approach to that followed for the crime of aggression could 
be adopted for the crime of terrorism as well, namely that terrorism 
be included in the list of Article 5 crimes with a postponement of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, while at the same time, an informal working 
group should be established with the task of examining to what 
extent the Rome Statute needs to be adapted for that purpose.  
While most delegations acknowledged the importance of the 
issue, concerns were expressed about the lack of a legal definition 
for the crime of terrorism. Some delegations suggested that this 
proposal should be considered at a later time taking into account the 
result of the discussions on a UN draft convention on terrorism.43 It 
was also suggested that the approach of adding terrorism as a 
placeholder in the Rome Statute, as happened with the crime of 
aggression, might not be desirable.  It would be more time-
consuming for States to consider first whether or not to include 
terrorism into the Rome Statute and then to start negotiations about 
its definition. Besides, it was argued that it would be more practical 
to consider one set of amendments at once, concerning both the 
incorporation of terrorism into Article 5 together with its definition 
and conditions for the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction.44 
In light of the discussions in the context of a UN draft 
comprehensive convention on terrorism, delegations suggested that 
                                                             
42 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference, 8th Sess ICC Doc ICC-
ASP/8/43 (November 2009) (Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference) 
para 41. 
43 ibid paras 42-45. 
44 ibid para 46. 
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it was not proper for the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to start 
discussions related to terrorism. Instead, it seemed more fruitful that 
the Review Conference ‘be invested in issues that have greater 
probability in proving acceptable’.45 The existence of several 
multilateral conventions addressing the issue of terrorism,46 though 
most of them do not use the term per se, indicated that the need to 
establish a legal definition was not yet deemed urgent47 and the 
issue was put on hold to be considered at a more opportune time. 
Finally, during the 12th session of the ASP, the Netherlands 
withdrew its proposal to amend Article 5 and extend the ICC’s 
jurisdiction to the crime of terrorism. None of the other delegations 
raised this issue.48 
b) Why terrorism was not included into the Rome Statute 
 
Looking back at the early negotiations phase, some States 
(Algeria, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey) proposed to include 
terrorism into the Rome Statute as a crime against humanity.49 Their 
proposal was met with opposition by some delegations, the US 
included, mainly for the following reasons: i) the lack of a 
universally accepted definition,50 ii) the fact that not all acts of 
terrorism can meet the ‘sufficient gravity’ threshold posed by 
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute, iii) the general conviction that 
prosecution and punishment in terrorist cases is more efficient when 
carried out by national authorities rather than international tribunals 
and iv) the risk of politicising the ICC.51 Although the 
                                                             
45 ibid paras 20-21. 
46 Text to n 12. 
47 Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference (n 42) para 22. 
48 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, 12th Sess ICC Doc ICC-
ASP/12/44 (November 2013) para 4. 
49 Proposal submitted by Algeria, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey on Article 5, UN 
Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.27 (29 June 1998). 
50 See also Final Act (n 33). Resolution E states that it is regrettable that ‘no 
generally acceptable definition of the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes could 
be agreed upon for the inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Court…’ 
51 Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism is also Disrupting some Legal Categories of 
International Law’ (2001) 12 (5) European Journal of International Law 993, 994. 
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abovementioned argumentation has some merit, most of the reasons 
presented cannot go entirely unopposed. Regarding the issue of 
finding a definition, a question one could ask is not whether the 
non-inclusion of terrorism to the Rome Statute was due to the lack 
of an international definition but whether the lack of an international 
definition for terrorism was the consequence of its non-inclusion 
into the ICC’s jurisdiction. Arguably, one could suggest that, as 
occurred with aggression whose definition was not finalised during 
the drafting process of the Rome Statute or with crimes against 
humanity which, strictly speaking, did not have an international 
treaty definition, the Rome negotiations could be seen as an 
opportunity to put terrorism under the ICC’s jurisdiction without a 
definition, with a postponement of jurisdiction over the crime until a 
future drafting of it. Besides, the lack of a universally agreed upon 
definition for the crime of aggression52 did not obstruct its inclusion 
into the Rome Statute, even though the prospects of reaching an 
agreement were, at that time, quite uncertain. In the case of 
aggression, it seemed that the need to establish individual liability 
for its commission was deemed of such an importance that the ASP 
was willing to start lengthy, and possibly unfruitful, negotiations on 
its definition. In the case of terrorism however, the fact that 
negotiations would be lengthy and possibly unfruitful constituted 
per se a reason why terrorism should not be included into the Rome 
Statute - an argument which might have some merit if coupled with 
the rest of the arguments for its non-inclusion but not when standing 
alone. Moreover, and as it will be shown in Chapter IV referring to 
several international and regional treaties and national legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                              
For an analysis of the reasons as difficulties in expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over treaty crimes see also Neil Boister (n 14) ‘Treaty Crimes, International 
Criminal Court?’ 345-54; Fiona de Londras, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’ 
in William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds), Routledge International Book of 
Criminal Law (Routledge 2010) 175 (arguing that the main reasons were the 
definitional difficulties and the fact that terrorism at that time was not considered 
as one of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community). 
52 However, it was already considered as an international crime of customary law 
status. See R v Jones (Appellant) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division)) [2006] UKHL 16 para 12. 
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relating to or defining terrorism, there is a certain common ground 
to be found among these definitions (and obviously points of 
contention) which could have been used as a starting point for the 
formulation of an international criminal law definition of terrorism.  
Furthermore and regarding the argument that terrorism should 
not be included into the ICC’s jurisdiction because not all terrorist 
acts are of sufficient gravity, the answer is to be found in Article 1 
of the Rome Statute itself: Article 1 imposes the threshold for 
crimes to fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction,53 and as already happens 
with crimes against humanity and aggression,54 further thresholds 
can be introduced into the definitions themselves in order to ensure 
that only terrorist acts of particular gravity can fall into the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. Specific incidents of terrorism can amount to a threat to 
international peace and security and as such, they can reach the 
threshold of sufficient gravity required by Article 5(1) of the Rome 
Statute. 
Thirdly, concerning the argument that all terrorist cases -
including those that fall into the ambit of international anti-terrorist 
treaties - are being more effectively dealt with by national 
authorities, one key point is worth making: as will be discussed in 
Chapter IV, this argument takes for granted that the regime 
established by the anti-terrorist conventions on the suppression of 
terrorism and the aut dedere aut judicare (‘extradite or prosecute’) 
principle that these conventions often embody, always works for the 
benefit of international criminal justice; this argument presupposes 
that States act in good faith and are driven by a sentiment of 
                                                             
53 Rome Statute art 1: ‘[The ICC]… shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern…’ 
54 According to Article 7 of the Rome Statute on crimes against humanity, there 
are three thresholds to be applied: there has to be i) an attack which is ii) 
widespread and iii) systematic. According to the definition of aggression in 
Article 8bis of the Kampala Resolution an act of aggression should ‘…by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitute[s] a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations’. These inner thresholds play the role of a jurisdictional filter for 
the ICC.  
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commitment to the anti-terrorist conventions or to any extradition 
treaties they are parties to, which is not always the case (if ever at 
all). Also, the anti-terrorist conventions that allow States wide 
discretion in dealing with terrorist offences in their national realm, 
take for granted the existence of fully developed domestic penal law 
systems (where in reality, they might be poorly developed)55 and 
appear to have an implicit faith in how domestic criminal law 
systems operate.56 It will be argued in Chapter IV that this State-
centric system of dealing with transnational crimes does not always 
work in the best interest of international criminal justice. States’ 
decisions to conform to anti-terrorist treaties or to the ‘extradite or 
prosecute’ principle are sometimes made on grounds irrelevant to 
international criminal justice purposes but relevant to political, 
diplomatic or foreign relations considerations. This state of affairs 
does not favour an effective operation of the State-based system of 
transnational cooperation in dealing with terrorist cases but, instead, 
allows too much room for political considerations to influence 
States’ decisions for prosecution or extradition of terrorist 
offenders.57 
The last reason for the non-inclusion of terrorism seems to be the 
only one that is sustainable. Politicisation of the ICC means that 
                                                             
55 Boister (n 14) ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’ 958. Boister sees this reliance of 
transnational criminal law (as he calls the regime established by international 
treaties relating to the suppression of transnational crimes) on national criminal 
law systems as an inherent doctrinal weakness of the anti-terrorist conventions. 
His view is also shared by Bassiouni in ‘An Appraisal of the Growth and 
Developing Trends of International Criminal Law’ (1974) 45 Revue 
Internationale de Droit Penal 405, who, even before the drafting of many of the 
international anti-terrorist conventions, he was of the view that the main weakness 
of the suppression of treaty crimes is its State-based system. 
56 It can be said that the establishment of the ICC as a complementary judicial 
authority with jurisdiction over international crimes is based on similar arguments 
of flawed or absent domestic criminal proceedings. 
57 Arguably, the ICC might be also influenced by political considerations when 
deciding the admissibility of cases and has been accused of functioning as a neo-
colonial court, eg in the Darfur situation (see Ssenyonjo (n 23)). For an opposite 
view see Frédéric Mégret, ‘Cour pénale internationale et colonialism: au‐delà des 
évidences’ (‘The International Criminal Court and Colonialism: Beyond the 
Obvious’) [2013] <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221424> accessed 28 September 
2013. 
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implications for State sovereignty are at stake when an international 
court is authorised to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism. 
These sovereignty-related implications perhaps best explain why the 
inclusion of terrorism into the ICC’s jurisdiction has been 
obstructed so far.  
An illustrative example of this wary attitude of States towards the 
inclusion of terrorism into the jurisdiction of the ICC can be found 
in the ministerial reply to a question posed to the UK Secretary of 
State for the Home Department in 1998, concerning whether the 
ICC should have jurisdiction over terrorist crimes. A minister 
replied that: 
There are several reasons for the view that the Court [ICC] 
should not be able to deal with terrorism. Paramount among 
them is the need to protect confidential sources, which would 
be compromised if an international body were to investigate 
and prosecute terrorist incidents. In practical terms it would be 
very difficult for the Court to act in terrorist cases, countries 
naturally having a predilection not to volunteer sensitive 
national security information.  
In any event, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court in this area is unnecessary given the range of terrorist 
conventions in place, including the recently concluded United 
Nations Terrorist Bombing Convention. These require their 
parties to co-operate against terrorism and, in some cases, to 
take extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist crimes. Indeed, 
the involvement of the Court could even undermine or set 
back progress in combating terrorism, on which there is 
increasingly effective international co-operation.58 
                                                             
58 HC Deb 23 June 1998, vol 314, col 441W. 
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It is apparent from the above that the UK was against the 
prosecution of terrorism by an international body not for reasons 
relating either to the lack of a universal definition for terrorism or to 
the lack of the necessary gravity threshold. Instead, the ministerial 
argument against the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute 
focuses, on the one hand, on the sensitivity of national security 
issues that have to be protected in case of having an international 
body adjudicating over terrorist cases and, on the other hand, on the 
conviction that the current regime of the anti-terrorist conventions 
and State cooperation works properly. Regarding the second part of 
the argument, it has been already mentioned and will also be 
examined in detail in this thesis that the State-based system of 
combatting international terrorism through the anti-terrorist 
conventions does not always work for the benefit of international 
criminal justice, since it relies too much on State sovereignty 
considerations. However, the first part of the argument, namely the 
protection of national security interests, is closely related to the 
political dimension of relinquishing jurisdiction for international 
terrorism to the ICC and evinces the distrust of States towards an 
international institution59 (or its States Parties) whose aim, one 
could argue, extends to the protection of State interests through the 
anti-impunity mechanisms it establishes. 
Lastly and closely connected to this feeling of distrust towards an 
international court with jurisdiction over terrorism, there is also the 
question of whether the latter can be seen as an appropriate forum of 
prosecution.60 For a State to delegate its adjudicative jurisdiction to 
an international institution to try terrorist cases means that there will 
be implications for its sovereignty regardless of whether the 
concerned State is the victim State or the State whose nationals are 
                                                             
59 Madeleine Morris, ‘Terrorism: The Politics of Prosecution’ (2004-2005) 5 
Chicago Journal of International Law 405, 409. 
60 See generally Susan Tiefenbrun, ‘A Semiotic Approach to a legal definition of 
Terrorism’ (2002-2003) 9 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 
357, 386. 
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being accused. In the latter case, the objections on the part of the 
State whose nationals are being accused are obvious: that State 
could question the neutrality of an international court, as has 
happened with Libya and the ‘internationalised’ Scottish court 
established to prosecute the offenders in the Lockerbie case61 or 
question the fact that the conduct did indeed constitute terrorism. 
Similarly, though less obviously, it is still possible that the victim 
State would have objections in conferring its adjudicative 
jurisdiction to an international court for terrorist cases. A victim 
State may hold that its sovereignty is being interfered with if it finds 
that the international court does not share the same view on the law 
in the field or that it has different priorities on the matter or that it is 
not similarly situated in issues of terrorism62 (or might even 
consider the ICC sentencing as being too lenient). Thus, even on 
judicial grounds, States might view that their sovereign interests are 
being interfered with, if international terrorism is to be included into 
the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
So far it has been examined i) why terrorism needs a universally 
agreed definition for international criminal law purposes, ii) why 
efforts to include terrorism into the ICC’s jurisdiction have been 
unsuccessful so far and finally iii) how implications on State 
sovereignty have obstructed the inclusion of terrorism into the 
ICC’s jurisdiction. However, before going deeper into the 
architecture of this thesis, it is essential to present a brief overview 
of the two theories that reflect views that, on the one hand, prioritise 
the respect for State sovereignty over international criminal justice 
                                                             
61 Morris (n 59) 408. 
62 ibid. For example, in Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo, the first case that was made 
admissible through self-referral by the DRC, the Pre-Trial Chamber, although it 
recognised that the Congolese judicial system ‘had undergone certain changes’ 
and was ‘able’ to prosecute the case under Article 17, declared the case 
admissible because the accused was not being prosecuted by the national 
authorities for the same offences as were to be charged by the ICC Prosecutor. 
Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Under Seal Decision of the Prosecutor's Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58) ICC-01/04-01/06-8Pr T Ch I (10 February 
2006) paras 35-37. 
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purposes and on the other, promote cosmopolitan purposes 
notwithstanding concerns related to State sovereign interests. As the 
focus on these theories will endure through the thesis, the analysis 
of their relationship with international law will contribute to our 
understanding of the role they have played in the shaping of 
international law, and in this respect, in influencing the drafting of 
definitions for international crimes. 
III. State sovereignty theories and international law 
a) State-centric theory and cosmopolitanism in international law 
The complicated relationship between State sovereignty and 
international law stems from the fact that the two concepts 
incorporate conflicting interests. International law developments are 
often hampered by sovereignty-related State interests,63 but it is also 
equally true that no international law would exist without sovereign 
States.64 The traditional definition of sovereignty comprises such 
concepts as claim and control over a State’s territory, State freedom 
of action towards its citizenry (internal sovereignty) and towards 
other States (external sovereignty),65 and political independence.66 
                                                             
63 Robert Cryer, ‘International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another 
Round?’ (2005) 16 (5) European Journal of International Law 979, 981. Antonio 
Cassese also views that State sovereignty and international rule of law are 
incompatible and sees international criminal law as a limit to State sovereignty. 
On the other hand, when States retain some crucial aspects of their sovereignty 
and fail to cooperate with international criminal tribunals in international criminal 
prosecutions, then it is international criminal law’s impact that is limited by 
international politics. See Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards 
Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian 
Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 2, 11-17; Bruce Broomhall, 
International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty 
and the Rule of Law (OUP 2003) 57. 
64 Karima Bennoune, ‘ “Sovereignty vs Suffering” ? Re-Examining Human Rights 
through the Lens of Iraq’ (2002) 13 (1) European Journal of International Law 
243, 244. See also Jan Klabbers, ‘Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty: 
Wimbledon Redux’ (1998) 3 Austrian Review of International and European Law 
345.  
65 Kenneth Henley, ‘Sovereignty’ in Deen K Chatterjee (ed), Encyclopedia of 
Global Justice (Springer Science and Business Media B V 2011) 1025. See also 
Austro-German Customs Union Case [1931] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 41, 57-8. 
66 Bennoune (n 64) 245 who also argues that sovereignty can mean the ‘will of 
people’, namely popular sovereignty. See also Louis Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: 
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A State, under the Westphalian system, sees international law more 
as a means of interaction and coexistence between sovereign States 
rather than a means of cooperation to achieve a common end.67 
However, this horizontal regime of international law in relation to 
State sovereignty has changed over the years to a more vertical 
system. Under an ‘international order rationale’,68 international law 
has gradually strengthened - in the aftermath of World War II 
(WWII) and through the establishment of the UN - as a result of 
State aspirations to promote international peace and security through 
the regulation of individual State conduct. The role that international 
law has played in regulating State conduct in the international arena 
has given rise to two theories, one defending the primacy of 
sovereignty over international law and the other viewing 
sovereignty as a State right, sometimes limited and sometimes 
protected, but definitely afforded by international law.  
According to the traditional State-centric theory, sovereignty is 
seen as a ‘pre-legal, (…) monolithic entity of clearly determinate 
content’69 which has arisen ‘apart from and prior to its existence as 
part of international law’.70 The primacy of sovereignty over 
international law stems from the fact that international law becomes 
a part of national law after a State’s express or tacit recognition of 
it.71 According to Kelsen, who under his monistic theory72 equates 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera’ (1999-2000) 68 
Fordham Law Review 1, 2.  
67 Wolfgang Friedmann in Cryer (n 63) 983. 
68 It is the author’s view that the ‘international order rationale’ - which prioritises 
the international order over the national one - is a manifestation of 
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan theory, in the context of international criminal 
law. Thus, for the purpose of the thesis, the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ or 
‘cosmopolitan theory’ will reflect the supremacy of international law over the 
national legal orders and, more generally, over State sovereignty interests and 
considerations. 
69 Cryer (n 63) 981. 
70 Broomhall (n 63) 59. 
71 Hans Kelsen, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ (1959-1960) 48 (4) The 
Georgetown Law Journal 627, 630.  
72 ibid 629. Under Kelsen’s monistic theory, ‘international law and national law 
form a unity’. This unity can be achieved with the primacy of the one over the 
other. In contrast, the dualistic or pluralistic theory of Kelsen, argues that 
international law and national law are ‘independent of each other in their validity’ 
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the primacy of sovereignty with the primacy of national law over 
the international, a State is sovereign only when its national legal 
order is a supreme order.73 In this sense, international law can 
become part of this order only when it has as reason of its validity 
the ‘will’ of that State.74 
The cosmopolitan theory views sovereignty as ‘a product of the 
recognition conferred by the international system itself and not a 
pre-existing trait inherent in States.’75 Sovereignty becomes a more 
flexible concept, ‘constitutive of the international legal order’ and 
comprising the rights and duties of States.76 Under this theory, 
international law appears as a supreme order, which contains all 
national legal orders, the latter gaining their validity from their 
recognition by international law.77 In this sense, State sovereignty 
corresponds to State independence from other States but not from 
international law.78 
Past and current trends in the development of international law 
and in State practice at times reflect both theories. For example, the 
practice of colonisation was a flagrant manifestation of the State-
centric theory, in that States were trying to promote and establish 
their sovereign interests in other lands, while at the same time, 
internally, States would become increasingly democratic (a political 
system whose principles converge with cosmopolitan ideals).79 
Moreover, a more recent and indicative example of State practice 
that favours State sovereignty considerations at the expense of 
cosmopolitan ideals is the adoption of counter-terrorism legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and therefore can be valid simultaneously. He dismissed the second theory due to 
logical contradictions. 
73 ibid 631 ‘[Sovereignty] is a presupposition, viz., the presupposed assumption of 
a system of norms as a supreme normative order whose validity is not to be 
derived from a superior order.’ 
74 ibid. 
75 Broomhall (n 63) 59. 
76 Cryer (n 63) 982. 
77 Kelsen (n 71) 632. 
78 ibid. 
79 Henley (n 65) 1025. 
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(especially after the events of 9/11) with a human rights-oppressive 
character (for example, the government of Chile used its Anti-
terrorist Law to suppress an indigenous dissident group)80 or the 
adoption of restrictive immigration and asylum legislation by States 
and the European Union, as a response to Security Council anti-
terrorist resolutions.81 On the other hand, the establishment of an 
international human rights regime through the creation of 
international human rights treaties, the establishment of 
international or regional human rights institutions such as the 
European Court of Human Rights or the UN Human Rights 
Committee, and finally the creation of the ICC can be seen as steps 
towards implementing cosmopolitan ideals, since their aim is to 
offer protection, first and foremost, to individuals rather than States.  
Be that as it may, these two mostly antithetical approaches 
should not be seen as totally incompatible. The assumption of 
international legal obligations may put constraints on some aspects 
relating to the sovereignty of the consenting States but that does not 
obviously result in the total erosion of their sovereignty.82 States, 
acting in free will, may subject themselves to international law 
when they recognize its nature as binding but they are still regarded 
as sovereign with respect to one another.83 However, complications 
are still present and depend, as Clapham suggests, on what one 
chooses to understand as sovereignty.84 As Cryer rightly puts it, the 
absolutist view of the State-centric theory that sovereignty ought to 
have primacy over international law ‘derive[s] an “ought” from an 
                                                             
80 Luz E Nagle, ‘Should Terrorism Be Subject to Universal Jurisdiction?’ (2010) 8 
Santa Clara Journal of International Criminal Law 87, 97. 
81 Naomi Norberg, ‘Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects 
for a Future Together’ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11, 12. 
82 Broomhall (n 63) 59. 
83 Kelsen (n 71) 633. Sovereign equality, according to Kelsen, is a principle that 
‘cannot be maintained on the basis of primacy of national law.’ Kelsen presents a 
very interesting scheme where national law in the narrower sense is equal to the 
national legal order and national law in the wider sense is composed of the 
national law in the narrower sense and international law. Under this scheme, 
international law has primacy over national law in the narrower sense but not over 
national law in the wider sense (ibid 632-634). 
84 Andrew Clapham in Cryer (n 63) 982. 
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“is”, or more accurately a “was”’.85 In other words, while it is true 
that States gave life to international law, international law has 
gradually acquired a life of its own, making a sharp distinction 
between ‘State authority to rule over a territory and State autonomy 
to behave inside and outside that territory’.86 However, States often 
use sovereignty as a synonym for immunity,87 an interpretation 
which, when followed by States, unavoidably leads to a totally 
symbolic significance of international law. This is perhaps most 
evident with respect to international criminal law, whose main goal, 
the fight against impunity,88 will be severely undermined if 
international criminal law provisions were to be based exclusively 
upon State sovereignty considerations. 
b) Procedural and substantive issues of the relationship between 
State sovereignty and international criminal law 
The interplay between State sovereignty and international 
criminal law is first and foremost present in the technical-procedural 
aspects of the function of the ICC. On the one hand, the 
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC might indicate that States do 
not wish to limit their State-centric prerogatives and go too far with 
respect to prosecutions of international crimes.89 At a first glance, 
the ICC’s complementarity regime is strong evidence that States 
desire to move away from developing international criminal law in 
substantive terms towards a more ‘adjective (complementary) 
international criminal law’.90 In this respect, Bassiouni is right in 
viewing the ICC ‘as an extension of national criminal jurisdictions’ 
                                                             
85 ibid 981. 
86 Broomhall (n 63) 59. 
87 Henkin (n 66) 13: ‘…immunity from law, immunity from scrutiny, immunity 
from justice…’ 
88 Rome Statute Preamble paras 4-5. 
89 Broomhall (n 63) 31. 
90 Bartram S Brown, ‘Depoliticizing Individual Criminal Responsibility’ in Leila 
N Sadat and Michael P Scharf (eds), Theory and Practice of International 
Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 
84. 
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which does not infringe on State sovereignty.91 On the same 
grounds, Cryer holds that the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC 
actually encourages the legislative and adjudicative sovereignty of 
States by rendering their national courts capable fora for the 
promotion of international criminal law.92 
On the other hand, it is clear that the ICC will exercise external 
oversight over the judicial processes of its States Parties93 with the 
risk that their legitimacy be called into question. It will affect State 
sovereignty of both States Parties and non-Parties especially in case 
of a Security Council referral94 or a proprio motu investigation of 
the Prosecutor. Moreover, and judging from its current practice, the 
ICC seems to follow a rather interventionist and dynamic approach 
in adjudicating for international crimes. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter I, the ICC tends to prioritise the international prosecution of 
offenders rather than encourage its States Parties to conduct national 
prosecutions. Therefore, it becomes evident that the legislative and 
adjudicative sovereignty of States Parties as well as the sovereignty 
of non-Parties (in case of a Security Council referral or a proprio 
motu investigation by the ICC Prosecutor) is affected by the ICC, 
which, despite its complementary function, is definitely much more 
than a mere extension of national criminal jurisdictions. 
The fact that the ICC is not meant to function as a mere substitute 
of national criminal jurisdictions is also obvious from the interplay 
                                                             
91 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Permanent International Criminal Court’ in 
Mark Lattimer and Philippe Sands (eds), Justice for Crimes Against Humanity 
(Hart 2003) 181. 
92 Cryer (n 63) 986. 
93 ibid 985. See Articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute; Prosecutor v Muthaura 
and ors (Situation in the Republic of Kenya) ICC-01/09-02/11 OA (30 August 
2011); Prosecutor v Katanga and ors (Reasons for the Oral Decision on the 
Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case) ICC‐01/04‐01/07 (16 June 
2009). 
94 See UNSC Res 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593, adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with which the Security Council referred the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor. While Sudan signed the Rome Statute 
on September 2000, it has not yet ratified it and cannot be considered as a State 
Party. However, Sudan has been treated as such, not by its consent but as a result 
of UN Res 1593, which is binding to all UN Members. 
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between State sovereignty and international criminal law in terms of 
substance. While the authority of the ICC to prosecute international 
crimes is granted by its States Parties, which, by their consent, 
declare that in the name of a common end, they are willing to confer 
a part of their adjudicative jurisdiction to the ICC, States Parties 
appear unwilling to show the same vigor in maximising the 
effectiveness of international criminal law by formulating 
definitions that give due weight to State sovereignty as well as 
cosmopolitan concerns. This becomes apparent from the 
negotiations in Rome regarding the definitions of international 
crimes. On the one hand, it could be argued that the inclusion of the 
crime of genocide as well as the crimes against humanity into the 
jurisdiction of a permanent international criminal court results in 
delimiting State sovereignty with respect to how a State should 
behave towards its citizens within the boundaries of its own 
territory.95 Sadat goes even further and argues that ‘the Rome 
Conference represented a Constitutional Moment in international 
law…suggest[ing] an important shift in the substructure of 
international law’96 and that the definition process at Rome was a 
‘quasi-legislative event that produced a criminal code for the 
world’.97 In the Furundžija case of the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, the Trial Chamber opined that 
the Rome Statute reflects ‘the opinio juris of a great number of 
States’ and constitutes an ‘authoritative expression of [their] legal 
views…’.98 However, and while recognising the comprehensive and 
authoritative character of the definitions of crimes as given in the 
Rome Statute, it is hard to overlook that the detailed definitions also 
serve ‘ulterior purposes’ in the name of the nullum crimen sine lege 
                                                             
95 Cryer (n 63) 985. 
96 Leila N Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of 
International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (Transnational 2002) 279. 
97 ibid 263. 
98 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgement) ICTY-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) 
para 227. 
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principle.99 The specificity of definitions, especially where such 
definitions are complemented by lists of prohibited acts,100 leaves 
‘as little discretion as possible in the interpretation and application 
of substantive criminal law’ to the ICC.101 Even Sadat admits that 
the lists of crimes in the Rome Statute were ‘the lowest common 
denominator’102 of acts acceptable by States that can be prosecuted 
by an international criminal court. Recognising that the nullum 
crimen principle is a fundamental element of the rule of law, in 
international criminal law it can constitute a serious limitation in the 
suppression of future criminal conduct.103 In this respect, Pellet 
questions the strict application of the nullum crimen principle in 
international criminal law seeing it as an obstacle in the 
administration of international criminal justice: 
Unfortunately, men’s criminal imagination appears unlimited 
and, by enclosing the definition of the crimes in narrow, 
punctilious formulations, they have forbidden the judges in 
advance to suppress future malevolent inventions of the 
human spirit; all the more so, and this is undoubtedly the most 
serious weakness of the Statute, because, in practice, they 
have excluded any realistic prospect of amendment.104 
Therefore, the relationship between State sovereignty and 
international criminal law is not limited to procedural issues of ‘who 
can have jurisdiction over what’ but also extends to substantive 
issues of what it is exactly that the ICC should have jurisdiction 
                                                             
99 Cryer (n 63) 990. 
100 Rome Statute arts 7-8 provide lists of prohibited acts considered as crimes 
against humanity and war crimes respectively.  
101 Brown (n 90) 113. 
102 Sadat (n 96) 267. 
103 Mohammed Shahabuddeen argues that ‘the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege does not bar development of the law’ provided however that ‘the resultant 
development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be 
foreseen.’ (‘Does the principle of legality stand in the way of progressive 
development of law?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1007, 
1017).  
104 Alain Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ in Antonio Cassese and ors (eds), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, A Commentary, vol 2 (OUP 2002) 
1058-59. 
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over. Moreover, the tenuous and sometimes conflicted relationship 
between the State-centric and the cosmopolitan theory is not only 
reflected into the definitions of crimes included into the Rome 
Statute but also in the omission of certain crimes from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. Aggression and terrorism, the former included into the 
Statute but not defined in Rome and the latter neither the one nor the 
other, are both crimes with strong implications for State 
sovereignty. Thus, it is exactly these implications that have caused 
(and still cause) so much debate about whether these crimes should 
fall into the ICC’s jurisdiction and be defined for international 
criminal law purposes.  
IV. The architecture of the thesis: the interplay of 
State sovereignty theories and cosmopolitanism on the 
criminalisation and definition of aggression and 
terrorism  
Before examining the interplay between State sovereignty 
considerations and cosmopolitanism in the criminalisation and 
definition of aggression and terrorism, it is important first to become 
familiar with the content and scope of these two poles. To this end, 
Chapter I will provide an analysis of the State-centric and 
cosmopolitan theories and will show how these theories interact 
with international law in general and the function of the ICC in 
particular. Firstly, the content and scope of these theories will be 
examined in order to highlight their relevance and influence in the 
field of international law. After putting the theories in context, it 
will be shown how they are both reflected into the ICC project: the 
idea behind its establishment was based on universal jurisdiction, 
which is consistent with cosmopolitan goals. On the other hand, the 
complementary nature of the ICC reflects the fact that State 
sovereignty considerations have to be taken into account with 
respect to the adjudication of international crimes. To this end, the 
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third section of Chapter I examines the details of the interaction of 
the complementarity regime with State sovereignty considerations. 
It will analyse how complementarity should work in principle 
according to the Rome Statute provisions, how it has worked in 
practice so far and how it will work with respect to the crime of 
aggression. The analysis of the interplay between State sovereignty 
considerations and cosmopolitanism in the context of the function of 
the ICC is important in order to comprehend the role these two 
theories have played and still play in the development of 
international criminal law and the adjudication of international 
crimes.  
Moving on to Chapter II, the process of defining and 
criminalising aggression reveals the need for balance between State 
sovereignty considerations and cosmopolitan theory in order to push 
forward the development of international criminal law. Therefore, 
Chapter II will first demonstrate that State-centric and cosmopolitan 
ideals have been of relevance throughout the history of outlawing, 
criminalising and defining aggression, from the League of Nations 
period until the adoption of the Rome Statute. Chapter III will 
further discuss the outcome reached in Kampala under the light of 
State sovereignty and cosmopolitan considerations, in an attempt to 
show whether a desired balance between the two has been achieved. 
The conclusions of this analysis will serve as lessons to be learnt in 
the process of defining and criminalising international terrorism, 
which is what constitutes one of the overarching purposes of this 
thesis. 
After having examined how the crime of aggression was shaped 
for international criminal law purposes under the light of both State 
sovereignty considerations and cosmopolitanism, Chapter IV will 
shift the centre of attention to the concept of terrorism. Specifically, 
it will firstly analyse further i) how the inclusion of terrorism into 
the ICC’s jurisdiction can contribute to the improvement of the 
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current extradition system which is provided for by many 
international anti-terrorist instruments and fill gaps in its 
implementation and ii) why its transnational character does not and 
should not automatically impede its international criminalisation 
and inclusion into the ICC’s jurisdiction. However, even if terrorism 
is to be characterised as an international crime, it needs to be 
defined; therefore, Chapter IV will subsequently analyse how some 
recent definitional frameworks for terrorism have been influenced 
by the two theories under examination. The definitional frameworks 
chosen for this analysis reflect either the State-centric theory and 
thus, prioritise the respect for State sovereignty over international 
criminal justice purposes, or the cosmopolitan theory and the need 
to serve cosmopolitan purposes despite State sovereignty 
considerations. Both approaches however, as it will be shown, are 
bound to have weaknesses and ultimately be ineffective, since they 
fail to achieve the delicate synthesis required between the theories 
they advocate. 
Finally, Chapter V will focus on the question of how to achieve 
this delicate balance in the search of an international definition for 
terrorism. It will look into existing definitions of terrorism provided 
by international, regional and domestic instruments as well as the 
UN Draft definition as provided for in the UN Draft Convention on 
Terrorism105 and the recent Appeals Chamber’s decision of the UN 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon.106 This comparative analysis will 
reveal the common ground on which definitions of terrorism are 
based as well as the points of contention between the 
abovementioned instruments. The conclusions drawn by this 
analysis will lead to the second section of the Chapter, which will 
examine the most commonly accepted elements of international 
                                                             
105 UNGA ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA Res 51/210 of 
17 December 1996’, 6th Session (28 January – 1 February 2002) UN Doc Supp 
No 37 (A/57/37). 
106
 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging STL-11-01/1 Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (16 February 2011). 
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terrorism in the context of State sovereignty considerations and 
cosmopolitan purposes and propose how this context will help 
resolve the major definitional problems surrounding terrorism. It is 
the author’s opinion that not only can defining terrorism be a 
realistic prospect but also that it can be effectuated in such a manner 
so as to meaningfully develop international law in the field and 
eliminate impunity without disregarding respect to State 
sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, COSMOPOLITANISM 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
Introduction 
As was noted in the Introduction, the overarching argument of 
this thesis is that a definition of international terrorism in an 
international criminal law context will not be functional nor serve 
the purposes of international criminal justice unless it balances 
properly State sovereignty considerations and cosmopolitan ideals. 
However, the State-centric theory of international law on the one 
hand, and cosmopolitanism on the other, treat the concept of State 
sovereignty from different perspectives, with the former 
emphasising sovereignty, sometimes at the expense of international 
criminal justice purposes, and the latter prioritising cosmopolitan 
aspirations over the respect for State sovereignty. The crime of 
aggression and international terrorism, both of which will be 
granted a thorough examination in this thesis under the light of the 
State-centric and cosmopolitan theories, present aspects that can be 
addressed in either a pro-State sovereignty or a pro-cosmopolitan 
context. This Chapter will focus at this differentiation of the 
treatment of State sovereignty in the context of the UN Charter1 and 
the Rome Statute2 frameworks, focusing on the regime of 
complementarity enshrined in the latter and contributing thus to our 
understanding of the differentiated approaches that the Security 
                                                             
1 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002) UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (Rome Statute). 
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Council and the ICC3 follow in issues that touch upon State 
sovereignty. This preliminary analysis will pave the way for the 
subsequent Chapters that will show how the differentiated 
approaches regarding the concept of sovereignty are reflected in 
both the Security Council practice relating to issues of 
aggression/use of force and also in the definition of the crime of 
aggression adopted for the purposes of the ICC.4 Similarly, the pro-
sovereignty approach is reflected into the practice of the Security 
Council in issues related to terrorism whereas a definition of 
international terrorism in an international criminal law context is 
expected to reflect the pro-cosmopolitan approach.  Since the 
overall purpose of this thesis is to argue in favour of a balanced 
approach in defining and criminalising international terrorism 
drawing lessons from the paradigm of aggression, this examination 
of the State-centric and cosmopolitan theories in the context of the 
UN Charter and the Rome Statute frameworks is necessary in order 
to understand how these theories interact with international law in 
general and with the ICC in particular in light of its 
complementarity regime. The examination of these theories will 
shed light on the influence they have exerted on the process of 
defining and criminalising aggression (an issue treated in Chapters 
II and III) and the influence they can potentially exert on the 
process of defining and/or criminalising international terrorism 
(addressed in Chapters IV and V). The effectiveness of the 
definitions of international crimes as provided into the Rome 
Statute, and for the purposes of this thesis, the definition of the 
crime of aggression and possibly terrorism, will ultimately be 
determined by whether they will be successful in promoting the 
cosmopolitan ethos that the ICC represents in an international 
system of sovereign States which might feel threatened by that 
                                                             
3 UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Rome 15 June–17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF 
183/13. 
4 Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression (11 June 2010) 
(Kampala Resolution). 
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ethos. Thus, before going deeper into the analysis of the interaction 
between these theories and the definition and criminalisation of 
aggression and international terrorism, it is necessary to examine 
first how the concept of State sovereignty is treated by the UN 
Charter and the Rome Statute provisions, and whether the 
complementarity regime enshrined therein can strike some degree 
of balance between the two theories under examination.  
Therefore, Chapter I will first discuss the relationship between 
State sovereignty and international law in light of the State-centric 
and cosmopolitan theories. It will analyse the position that 
sovereignty holds in these theories, highlighting the role they have 
played in the development of the concept of sovereignty in 
international law. The analysis of these theories will be 
complemented by an examination of how the UN Charter, as the 
most fundamental international law instrument, treats State 
sovereignty and balances it with the international rule of law. While 
the UN Charter enshrines cosmopolitan aspirations, such as the 
respect for human rights, the promotion of peace and the 
prohibition of the use of force, the function of the UN up to date has 
shown a particular sensitivity to State sovereign interests, mainly 
those of the Members of the Security Council and consequently 
their allies. In the subsequent Chapters, it will be shown that 
situations pertaining to aggression/use of force and international 
terrorism, have been addressed by the Security Council in a way 
that prioritised national security interests (at least those of the most 
powerful States) often at the expense of cosmopolitan purposes, the 
promotion of international criminal justice included. For the 
purposes of this Chapter, it will suffice to highlight this 
contradistinction between the preference the Security Council has 
shown to the State-centric theory, with the pro-cosmopolitan basis 
on which the ICC is meant to function. The establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court can be viewed as an offset to 
the sovereignty-based concessions the Security Council has made in 
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this respect and can constitute a genuine cosmopolitan effort in the 
fight against impunity, even despite State sovereign concerns. 
However, and since the overarching argument of this thesis focuses 
on the need for balance, the final part of this Chapter will examine 
to what extent the complementarity regime of the ICC can achieve a 
desired balance between its cosmopolitan ethos and the sovereign 
priorities of its States Parties. While there is no explicit obligation 
for the States Parties to adopt the Rome Statute definitions verbatim 
in their national law, the current practice of the ICC has shown that 
possible differentiation between the range of offences as charged 
against an individual accused by national courts and the ICC 
Prosecutor might result in a case being admissible before the ICC, 
something that is not strictly envisioned by the Rome Statute. Thus, 
the Chapter will finally conclude with an analysis of the 
complementarity regime of the ICC, looking at different but 
interrelated aspects of it: i) how complementarity interacts with 
State sovereignty under Article 17 of the Rome Statute5 which 
provides for the criteria of inadmissibility of a case before the ICC, 
and notably with the concept of State inability to prosecute, ii) what 
the current practice of the ICC has shown with respect to whether 
States have the implicit obligation to adopt the Rome Statute 
definitions in order to avoid being considered unable to conduct 
national proceedings and finally iii) to what extent complementarity 
will allow the ICC to achieve the required balance, when it 
confronts cases of aggression and, perhaps, terrorism. 
 
 
                                                             
5 The conditions of inadmissibility of a case as provided by Article 17(1) of the 
Rome Statute are: ‘(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the 
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability 
of the State genuinely to prosecute;…’ 
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I. The two theories 
a) The traditional State-centric theory about the relationship 
between sovereignty and international law 
The traditional State-centric theory rests upon the original and 
etymological meaning of the word sovereignty, that of supremacy.6 
A State being sovereign means it is supreme and, legally speaking, 
that its legal authority (or national order) is superior to any other.7 
In this sense, if a State recognises international law as binding for 
its organs, then international law becomes part of its national legal 
order.8 Thus, one can regard sovereignty as a system of norms that 
does not derive its validity from any other supreme order,9 whereas 
international law is a system of norms which gains validity only 
when recognized by the sovereign State. Complementing this idea, 
Brus views sovereign States as the backbone of world order, as 
‘creators and enforcers’ of international law.10 This view is also to 
be found in the Grotian tradition of international law which holds 
that international order should be regulated through States; either by 
creating State responsibility mechanisms or by rendering States the 
enforcement arm of international law.11 Finally, according to Bodin, 
the essential manifestation of sovereignty is the law-making power, 
suggesting that those who make laws (the sovereign States) cannot 
be bound by the laws they create and consequently, they are above 
                                                             
6 Hans Kelsen, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ (1959-1960) 48 (4) The 
Georgetown Law Journal 627. 
7 For an elaboration on the concept of sovereignty and its historical development 
see Kenneth Henley, ‘Sovereignty’ in Deen K Chatterjee (ed), Encyclopedia of 
Global Justice (Springer Science and Business Media B V 2011) 1025-1027. 
8 This is also in accord with Kelsen’s monistic theory, where he argues that 
‘international law and national law form a unity’ which can be achieved with the 
primacy of the one over the other (Kelsen (n 6) 629). See also text to n 79. 
9 ibid 630. 
10 Marcel Brus, ‘Bridging the Gap between State Sovereignty and International 
Governance: The Authority of Law’ in Gerard Kreijen (ed), State, Sovereignty 
and International Governance (OUP 2002) 3. 
11 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Epilogue to an Endless Debate: The International Criminal 
Court’s Third Party Jurisdiction and the Looming Revolution of International 
Law’ (2001) 12 (2) European Journal of International Law 247, 257. 
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the (international) law.12 This theory, or rather this attitude towards 
sovereignty views the surrender of sovereignty as a necessary 
precondition for the development of international law. 
As a result, it becomes obvious that the State-centric theory 
views sovereignty as a system of norms incompatible with the idea 
of subjection to another superior normative order.13 Being 
sovereign means to have no other supreme order to account to, and 
thus, Cassese contends that ‘either one supports the international 
rule of law or one supports State sovereignty’.14 However, the 
gradual developments of the post-World War II (WWII) period, the 
emergence of new, decolonised States and the end of the Cold War 
era changed the centre of gravity of the concept of sovereignty. 
Instead of the State, sovereignty moved towards the people; it took 
the new dimension of self-determination of peoples and became a 
synonym of sovereign independence from the colonial State who 
exercised territorial sovereignty.15 This notion is also manifest in 
the UN Charter, which starts with the phrase ‘We the Peoples of the 
United Nations determined…’.16 Sovereignty as self-determination 
means that the people are the ultimate source of sovereignty, who 
authorise the State, as their organ, to exercise sovereign powers.17 
Thus, the newly-developed idea was that State sovereignty has to 
include authority derived from the people of that State, in the 
                                                             
12 Sir Robert Jennings, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ in Kreijen (n 10) 27. 
13 Kelsen (n 6) 627. 
14 Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the ICC: Between Sovereignty and 
the Rule of Law (OUP 2003) 56 commenting on Antonio Cassese, ‘On the 
Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 
2, 11-17.  
15 Jennings (n 12) 29. 
16 UN Charter Preamble. See also arts 1(2) and 55. 
17 Winston P Nagan and Craig Hammer, ‘The Changing Character of Sovereignty 
in International Law and International Relations’ (2004) 43 Columbia Journal of 
International Law 141, 171. While the principle of national self-determination as 
a manifestation of the sovereignty of the people was asserted from the French 
revolution, it lost ground during the Cold War era but regained its validity after 
the demise of the bi-polar model of balance of power (in Aleksandar Pavković 
and Peter Radan, ‘In Pursuit of Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Peoples, 
States and Secession in the International Order’ (2003) 3 Macquarie Law Journal 
1, 4). 
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absence of which this new ‘people’s sovereignty’ remains 
incomplete or even violated.18 In this sense, the modern, post-WWII 
manifestations of sovereignty come in tension with the traditional 
State-centric ideas,19 and this tension could not but be reflected in 
the relationship between State sovereignty and international law 
that was to be formed with the establishment of the UN and the 
emergence of decolonised States gradually leading to the further 
development of the international legal order. 
b) Cosmopolitan theory and international law 
While it can be argued that cosmopolitan thinking was born 
together with the idea of democracy, the cosmopolitan tradition in 
international law can be traced back into the Enlightment era and in 
particular into the ideas of Kant,20 whose theory will be briefly 
analysed as an example of traditional cosmopolitanism; by the same 
token, the views of some modern cosmopolitan theorists will be 
examined and compared with the views of Kant, in an attempt to 
demonstrate the development of cosmopolitan thought in 
international law. Taking Kant’s cosmopolitanism as the point of 
departure, Kant’s vision of a cosmopolitan society moves into a 
middle passage between ‘a world State’ model and the traditional, 
sovereignty-based Westphalian model.21 Kant was critical of both 
the absolute State sovereignty supremacy on the international plane 
and the creation of a world republic, in which States would have 
lost all their sovereign prerogatives and would have to surrender 
their sovereignty to coercive international institutions.22 Instead, he 
                                                             
18 That a State exercises public powers within a territory does not necessarily 
mean that these powers are sovereign if this happens contrary to the will of the 
people. In this case, one can talk about violation of the sovereignty of the people. 
See also Dan Sarooshi, International Organisation and their exercise of 
Sovereign Powers (OUP 2005) 9-10. 
19 Broomhall (n 14) 52. 
20 Louis Cabrera, ‘Cosmopolitanism’ in Chatterjee (n 7) 209. 
21 Garrett W Brown, ‘State Sovereignty, Federation and Kantian 
Cosmopolitanism’ (2005) 11 (4) European Journal of International Relations 495, 
497-98. 
22 ibid 501. 
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envisaged a model that would mostly resemble a federation of 
States which would be bound by ‘a commonly accepted 
international right.’23 While he supported the establishment of 
international institutions, he was against their interference in States’ 
constitution and government24 and viewed the domestic 
administration of justice as the first necessary step for the creation 
of a cosmopolitan order.25 
Kant’s approach of the interrelationship between States and 
international law can be summarised in the following statement: 
States have a central role to play in international institutions, there 
are systems of checks and balances developed in order to limit State 
sovereignty according to the conditions prescribed by international 
law instruments, while, at the same time, there is no international 
sovereign to enforce any duties on States or to oblige them to 
participate in international organisations and sign international 
treaties.26 The Kantian approach of the structure of international law 
bears significant resemblances with the structure that general 
international law took after the establishment of the UN and that of 
international criminal law after the establishment of the ICC. 
Therefore, one could argue that the ICC seems to bring Kantian 
cosmopolitanism in its modernity: cosmopolitanism is no more an 
‘intellectual ethos’ but ‘a vision of global political 
consciousness…generated and sustained by international 
institutions’,27 the ICC included. 
While Kant’s vision of cosmopolitanism seems reconcilable with 
the current ICC system, the same cannot be said for the modern 
version of cosmopolitanism, at least as envisaged by some 
                                                             
23 Immanuel Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it 
does not Apply in Practice’ (1793) in Hans S Reiss (ed), Kant’s Political 
Writings (CUP 1970) 61-87. 
24 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) in Mary J Gregor (ed), 
(CUP 1996) 96. 
25 Brown (n 21) 501. 
26 Fernando R Teson, ‘The Kantian Theory of International Law’ (1992) 92 
Columbia Law Review 53, 86-7. 
27 Pheng Cheah, ‘Cosmopolitanism’ (2006) 23 Theory, Culture & Society 486. 
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cosmopolitan theorists. For example, Jürgen Habermas and Hans 
Kelsen radicalise the Kantian vision of cosmopolitanism in a 
manner incompatible with the current structure and function of the 
ICC. While in the Kantian system States do not lose their place in 
the international plane, both Habermas and Kelsen envisage an 
international system where a ‘world State’ would have absorbed all 
State sovereign prerogatives and separate national legal systems and 
where the centralisation of power would be the only means to 
secure a peaceful international order.28 Similarly, according to 
Pogge’s idea of what he calls ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’, State 
sovereignty should not be concentrated at a single level (the State) 
but should be dispersed in a vertical manner among several units - 
at least domestically - which will be ‘sovereign’ on their own right 
and manifest the traditional characteristics of State.29 That does not 
mean that Pogge is in favour of the establishment of a world State, 
which he sees as a repetition of the ‘State sovereignty model’ only 
at a global level.30 However, he is in favour of this vertical 
distribution of sovereignty in some fields of international law, such 
as international peace and security, for which he proposes a central 
decision-making mechanism, whose function would not depend on 
State voluntary cooperation and which would have the ability to 
enforce its decisions to States and thus, to violate their 
sovereignty.31 
Despite the differences between the Kantian theory of 
cosmopolitanism and the modern ones, a concept of relevance to 
international law that is strongly attached to all, is the concept of 
morality. For Kant, morality becomes of relevance for international 
                                                             
28 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Kants Idee des Ewigen Friedens. Aus dem historischen 
Abstand von 200 Jahren’ [1995] KritischeJustiz 28, 317 in Danilo Zolo, ‘A 
Cosmopolitan Philosophy of International Law? A Realist Approach’ (1999) 12 
(4) Ratio Juris 429, 437; Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souvärinität und die 
Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer Reinen Rechtslehre (Mohr 1920) in 
Danilo Zolo, ‘Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law’ 
(1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 306, 310. 
29 Thomas Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’ (1992) 103 Ethics 48, 58. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid 61-62. 
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law because he views it as a means to promote moral behaviour 
through legal institutions which would impose penalties for conduct 
falling outside the scope of that morality.32 More recent theorists 
like Archibugi held that cosmopolitan law is not based on coercion 
but rather on moral authority,33 something that is also underpinned 
by Finch’s assertion that, before WWII, the weaknesses of 
international law were not based on the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms but on the absence of ‘an international moral sense’.34 
Concerning international law developments in general and the ICC 
in particular, Koller has argued that international lawyers believe 
that any development of international law will bring us closer to the 
establishment of ‘first an international community and then a 
cosmopolitan community’ in which ‘all individuals are accorded 
equal moral status’.35 
Therefore, the concept of morality is not far from the essence of 
law, and in particular from international law. The recognition of 
diversity between States constitutes a legal innovation which allows 
States to apply their own understanding to judge international 
events, promoting thus the ultimate goal of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, the perpetual peace.36 Thus, States have a place in 
the moral discourse, firstly as central actors in international 
relations and secondly through their domestic legal systems37 which 
regulate the lives of their citizens through coercive mechanisms 
requiring a moral justification.38 
                                                             
32 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal 
Theory (OUP 2005) in Shahrzad Fouladvand, ‘Complementarity and Cultural 
Sensitivity: Decision-Making by the ICC Prosecutor in relation to the Situations 
in the Darfur region of the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC)’ (DPhil thesis, University of Sussex 2012) 30 <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/> 
accessed 14 April 2013. 
33 Daniele Archibugi, ‘Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace’ (1995) 1 
European Journal of International Relations 4, 443. 
34 John D Finch, Introduction to Legal Theory (Sweet & Maxwell 1979) 37. 
35 David Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’ (2008) 40 NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics 1019, 1050. 
36 Archibugi (n 33) 443. 
37 Fouladvand (n 32) 40. 
38 Noah Feldman, ‘Cosmopolitan Law?’ (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1022, 
1045. 
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Therefore, for a coercive legal system, be it national or 
international, to be legitimate, there has to be a moral justification 
as a basis for its establishment. In the case of the ICC, its moral 
justification is already declared in the Preamble of the Rome 
Statute, when it affirms that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished’ 
and when it makes reference to the millions of victims of 
‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity’.39 This moral basis of the ICC’s establishment is actually 
the door that, it can be argued, potentially opens the transition from 
international law to cosmopolitan law, in the sense that the rights of 
an individual are now protected irrespective of his or her nationality 
or the territory they happened to be in, an idea equivalent to Kant’s 
cosmopolitan right. By the same token, the ICC’s moral basis also 
justifies the applicability of coercive international criminal law to 
persons that violate that cosmopolitan right irrespective of their 
nationality or the place where the conduct happens to occur. This 
cosmopolitan model - called by Feldman minimalist legal 
cosmopolitanism - aims at eliminating any ‘law-free’ zones, any 
chance where an individual could evade prosecution either because 
no jurisdiction could reach him or her or because the applied 
jurisdiction would fall short of the basic moral standards that the 
ICC is meant to promote.40 
However, the model of minimal legal cosmopolitanism is not to 
be performed solely by an international institution - the ICC in this 
case - but instead, it holds a central place for States. It is not meant 
to erode the concept of State sovereignty; to the contrary, it is 
meant to give primacy to domestic legal systems to protect the 
cosmopolitan right not just of their own nationals but of everyone 
whose cosmopolitan right is violated. The essence of that model is 
not that universal jurisdiction should apply everywhere but that 
                                                             
39 Rome Statute Preamble paras 2, 4. 
40 Feldman (n 38) 1065-1069. 
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some jurisdiction should be applicable everywhere to avoid the 
creation of legal vacuums.41 This concept matches perfectly the 
complementarity regime of the ICC, which attempts to reconcile 
cosmopolitan morality, legitimate coercive international criminal 
law mechanisms and respect for State sovereignty.  
Before moving on to examine the interplay between the concept 
of State sovereignty and the Rome Statute, it will be important to 
examine first to what extent the UN Charter, as the most 
fundamental international legal instrument, has laid the legal basis 
on which State sovereignty and international law can co-exist. As it 
will be argued in Chapter IV, the Security Council has taken a 
rather pro-sovereignty approach in addressing issues that relate to 
the use of force/aggression and international terrorism. This pro-
sovereignty response to conducts whose definitions are the main 
focus of this thesis, is founded on UN Charter provisions which 
clearly favour sovereign prerogatives - at least of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council and their allies - over 
cosmopolitan purposes. Instead, the definition of aggression for the 
purposes of the ICC and the formulation of a definition for 
international terrorism for international criminal law purposes 
focus, or will focus, primarily on the cosmopolitan aspirations 
enshrined by international criminal law. Therefore, it is important to 
show this antithesis of the treatment of State sovereignty in the 
context of firsly, the UN Charter and subsequently, the Rome 
Statute frameworks. This differentiation of approaches towards 
State sovereignty will help understand the Security Council’s pro-
sovereignty practice in addressing use of force/aggression and 
international terrorism issues and the ICC’s pro-cosmopolitan 
mandate in responding to the commission of the crime of 
aggression, and hopefully international terrorism.   
 
                                                             
41 ibid 1067. 
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II.  Sovereignty and International Law: The UN 
Charter Provisions 
According to Kelsen’s theory42 concerning the primacy of 
international law over national legal orders, there is a distinction 
between the concept of sovereignty that is excluded under 
international law and the concept of sovereignty that can be limited 
or controlled by international law. The type of sovereignty that is 
excluded by international law is the one advocated by the traditional 
State-centric theory, namely the absolute supremacy of national law 
over the international. On the other hand, the type of sovereignty 
that can be regulated by international law is that of sovereignty as 
freedom of action by the State, namely unlimited competence of its 
legal order. The latter is not automatically rejected by international 
law but can be subject to regulations and norms, prescribed by an 
international organisation.43 Whether one views international law as 
superior to national legal orders or as a body of law that is part of 
that order and thus, inferior to it, sovereignty can still be subject to 
international normative regulations. 
In this respect, when a State recognises international law when 
adhering to an international organisation or becoming a party to an 
international treaty, it becomes bound to international legal 
regulations, irrespective of which legal order it regards as superior, 
the national or the international. International law is valid in both 
cases, either as supreme to a national legal order or as a part of that 
legal order which binds the sovereign State. In both cases, State 
sovereignty can be restricted and regulated and thus, an 
international organisation which will have the competence of 
                                                             
42 Kelsen (n 6) 636. 
43 ibid. However, it is obvious that these two types of sovereignty, the absolute 
supremacy of national order and the unlimited competence of a State to act 
(inside or outside its territory) are two sides of the same coin. What Kelsen is 
trying to argue with this distinction is that, although the absolutist view about 
sovereignty is in any respect antithetical to international law, a State’s freedom of 
action is not, if conditioned upon certain rules. 
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regulating a State’s sovereignty is always possible. The extent to 
which a State’s sovereignty can be restricted and regulated by 
international law, according to Kelsen, has always to do with the 
content of international law and not with the concept of sovereignty 
itself.44 
It can be said that State sovereignty is the fundamental principle 
upon which the UN system is based; the UN is composed of 
sovereign States. Whether it can function only as a sum of 
sovereign States or it can have a broader capacity that surpasses the 
boundary of the accumulation of several State sovereignties is a 
question of politics. However, the provisions of the UN Charter can 
provide some insight of how the principle of State sovereignty is 
understood and tackled at an international level and how its concept 
has been formed by the State-centric and the cosmopolitan theory. 
In the first place, being a sovereign State is the sine qua non 
condition of membership to the UN.45 This precondition alone is 
indicative of the fact that a State’s capacity of sovereignty pre-
exists or exists independently of its membership to an international 
organisation. In this sense, a State does not need the recognition of 
its sovereignty to be conferred by a supreme authority but this State 
quality exists a priori. Furthermore, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 
provides for the non-interference in the internal affairs of a Member 
State,46 a provision that can be said to formulate a statement very 
close to a definition of State sovereignty.47 Ultimately, one of the 
core articles of the UN Charter, Article 2(4), protects in an 
unequivocal way the territorial integrity and the political 
                                                             
44 ibid 637. 
45 UN Charter art 3. 
46 ibid art 2(7): ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’. 
47 Nagan and Hammer (n 17) 25. 
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independence of its Member States.48 In this respect, the UN 
Charter appears to respect at least the core aspects of State 
sovereignty and to recognise and protect a State’s ruling and 
behavioural autonomy within its own territory.  
However, this conclusion, which is in harmony with the 
traditional State-centric theory of the concept of sovereignty, is not 
fully supported by other provisions of the UN Charter which refer 
to the obligations of its Member States and to the authority of the 
UN organs over them. Article 1 of the UN Charter states that the 
Members of the UN should honour their Charter obligations and 
should always seek pacific means for the settlement of their 
disputes.49 Article 4 continues by adding another precondition for 
acquiring a UN membership status, namely that a State should be 
‘peace-loving’ and willing and able to accept all Charter 
obligations.50 Regarding the scope of authority of the UN organs 
over their Member States, the decision-making mechanisms of the 
UN Charter give the General Assembly the competence to give rise 
to any issue that falls within the scope of the Charter and make it a 
matter of international discussion.51 
Despite these cosmopolitan elements in the function of the UN 
and the formulation of some UN Charter provisions, the UN cannot 
in any case be characterised as a pro-cosmopolitan institution. The 
competences and prerogatives that its primary organ, the Security 
Council, enjoys, go far beyond the individual State sovereign 
prerogatives of the other Member States of the UN and have been 
characterised by some as super sovereign powers.52 The power of 
                                                             
48 UN Charter art 2(4). 
49 ibid art 1. 
50 ibid art 4. 
51 ibid art 10. 
52 Nagan and Hammer (n 17) 26; Leland M Goodrich and ors, Charter of the 
United Nations; commentary and documents (3rd edn, Columbia University Press 
1969) 290-309.  
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veto of the five permanent members of the Security Council,53 the 
competence of the Security Council to enforce its decisions even by 
the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,54 its primary 
responsibility for the protection of international peace and security55 
and its power to determine the existence of threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace or acts of aggression56 constitute powers that 
severely favour the most powerful States (and their allies) 
sometimes at the expense of other, smaller States’ sovereign 
interests or at the expense of cosmopolitan purposes. Moreover, the 
Security Council, when acting under Chapter VII, is not bound by 
any international legal obligations, apart from respecting the UN 
Charter.57 Consequently, the Members of the Security Council 
enjoy a latitute that can possibly be used to serve political 
exigencies without due regard to cosmopolitan considerations 
enshrined in the UN Charter, such as protection and respect for 
human rights, promotion of peace or the prohibition of the use of 
force. In the subsequent Chapters, it will be shown that more often 
than not, at least with respect to the use of force/aggression and 
international terrorism, the Security Council has mostly prioritised 
State-centric concerns pertaining to these issues rather than 
cosmopolitan aspirations.   
Turning now to the relationship between sovereignty and the UN 
Charter, it seems that, under the UN Charter provisions, the concept 
of sovereignty is transformed into meaning independence in the 
                                                             
53 UN Charter art 27(3). The power of veto is not explicitly mentioned in the UN 
Charter, however Article 27(3) requires the concurring votes of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council for the adoption of resolutions that 
concern non-procedural matters (regulated by art 27(2)), permitting thus any 
permanent Member to block the proceedings.  
54 ibid art 42. 
55 ibid art 24. 
56 ibid art 39. 
57 UN Charter art 24(2): ‘In discharging these duties [concerning its responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security] the Security Council 
shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations…’. See also Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical 
Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd 1950) 294-
95. 
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sense of non-interference.58 Sovereignty has retained its external 
characteristics under Article 2(7) referring to the domestic 
jurisdiction of Member States but has been subject to restrictions 
and control by the UN Charter and its organs. The international 
legal order established by the UN requires a transfer of aspects of 
sovereignty in areas such as international security and the use of 
force to the UN organs as well as a convergence of the individual 
interests of the Member States.59 By the same token, the 
development of international criminal law, as reflected in the 
establishment of the ICC, requires from States the relinquishment to 
it, even if only on a subsidiary basis, of legal-judicial aspects of 
sovereignty in the area of prosecution of international crimes. 
However, it has to be noted that compliance with the international 
legal order is often mostly determined by factors that are little 
related to the cosmopolitan principles promoted by the UN or 
international criminal justice, but related to political pressure or 
national interests.60 If one looks at the examples of the ad hoc 
military tribunals of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and 
ICTR respectively), one will draw the conclusion that the political 
context in each of these examples played a significant role in 
whether the affected States would cooperate with the tribunals.61 In 
                                                             
58 Brus (n 10) 8. 
59 Broomhall (n 14) 58. 
60 ibid 61. 
61 Broomhall (n 14) 152-54. In the case of the ICTR, two incidents are worth 
noticing: in the first one, while the newly-formed Rwandan government invited 
the Security Council to establish the tribunal and engaged to cooperate, it then 
voted against the resolution adopting its Statute, on the basis of the temporal 
jurisdiction of the tribunal (post-genocide revenge killings by the Tutsis would 
fall into its jurisdiction) and of its failure to apply the death penalty. The second 
one involves an order of the ICTR Appeals Chamber to release a suspect whose 
rights of fair trial had been violated. In response, the Rwandan government 
promised to suspend its cooperation with the tribunal. The Prosecutor applied for 
a review of the decision for release and finally the Chamber reversed its initial 
decision. In the case of the ICTY, Croatia was mostly unwilling to extradite its 
nationals to the tribunal or to provide evidence. It finally agreed to surrender to 
the tribunal Tihomir Blaskić and Zlatko Aleksovski, after the US’s threats to 
block international loans. In the ‘Report of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991’ (25 August 1999) UN Doc A/54/187, the ICTY stated that there was ‘a 
pattern of non-compliance, including the failure to defer to the competence of the 
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principle, there is no reason to believe that this will not be the case 
as far as the ICC is concerned. Despite the existence of a sufficient 
framework of obligations for cooperation in the Rome Statute,62 the 
ICC will not be able to function effectively without the goodwill 
and favourable legislative frameworks of its States Parties. The 
extent to which States will respond (if at all) to violations of 
international criminal law or decide to cooperate with the ICC 
depends highly on politics and any enhanced normative 
infrastructure promoted by the ICC in terms of State obligations 
will only temper, but not replace, the role international politics play 
in the enforcement of international law.63 Therefore, adhering to a 
treaty regime and to the definitions of crimes contained therein will 
have consequences that pertain to sovereignty. 
What follows next is an assessment of how the ICC deals with 
the concept of State sovereignty. The ICC has given flesh and blood 
to some extent to the principle of universal jurisdiction64 for 
international crimes and the Rome Statute constitutes a body of 
international law the violation of which bears severe consequences 
for its States Parties. The introduction of a permanent international 
criminal law enforcement mechanism into the international legal 
order constitutes a novelty for the community of sovereign States, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Tribunal, failure to execute warrants, failure to provide evidence and information 
and the refusal to permit the Prosecutor and her investigators into Kosovo’, paras 
91-99. 
62 Rome Statute arts 86-102. 
63 Broomhall (n 14) 61. 
64 It is more accurate to speak of a qualified or quasi-universal jurisdiction. 
Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC may exercise its 
jurisdiction when the territorial State or the State of nationality of the accused (or 
both) are Parties to the Statute or have accepted its jurisdiction ad hoc. However, 
this jurisdictional link with the territorial or nationality State is not required in 
case of a Security Council referral of a situation to the ICC Prosecutor under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Rome Statute arts 12 and 13). Besides, some of 
the crimes of the Rome Statute, such as the grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions (Rome Statute art 8(2a)), are subject to universal jurisdiction 
anyway. On the other hand, some national legislations relating to the 
implementation of the Rome Statute provisions either adopt the jurisdictional 
bases explicitly referred to in the Rome Statute or clearly establish universal 
jurisdiction. On national implementation of the Rome Statute substantive law see 
Jann Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of 
Substantive Criminal Law’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86. 
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which might feel threatened by it due to its more direct effect on - at 
least the judicial - aspects of their sovereignty. As was noted above, 
in contrast to the Security Council, whose function and approach 
towards international security matters relies heavily on State-centric 
considerations (at least of its Member States and its allies), the ICC 
is meant to function on a more pro-cosmopolitan basis, prioritising 
cosmopolitan concerns despite State considerations in the 
adjudication of international crimes, including those that pertain to 
international security matters, such as aggression. Eventually, the 
success of the Rome Statute definitions will highly rely on their 
ability to promote and defend cosmopolitan ideals in a system of 
States which might be very distrustful or even hostile towards those 
ideas. As such, the complementarity regime of the ICC is meant to 
work towards this direction.65 
 
III. Sovereignty and International Law: The Rome 
Statute and the Principle of Complementarity 
 
If, for the reasons analysed above, one views the Security 
Council as a mostly State-centric organ driven by political 
exigencies and State sovereignty concerns, the ICC can be seen as 
an offset, an international criminal justice mechanism whose 
principal purposes rely on cosmopolitanism, the respect for the rule 
of law and the fight against impunity. While a definition for 
aggression, and aggression as an international crime in its own 
right, have ultimately found their place among the other crimes of 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute,66 the same cannot be said with 
respect to international terrorism and it may take a long time before 
international criminal justice is allowed to have a role in such cases. 
                                                             
65 Xavier Philippe, ‘The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: 
how do the two principles intermesh?’ (2006) 88 (862) International Review of 
the Red Cross 375, where he argues that the principle of complementarity is the 
means through which to enforce universal jurisdiction for international crimes. 
66 As was also noted in the Introduction, the international crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of 
aggression) will be hereinafter referred to as Article 5 crimes. 
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However, since the purpose of this thesis is to argue in favour of a 
definition for international terrorism used for international criminal 
law purposes, the paradigm of the ICC as a permanent international 
court that could potentially exercise jurisdiction, cannot go without 
examination as to the extent to which it can achieve the desired 
balance between State sovereignty and cosmopolitanism in the 
adjudication of international crimes. Therefore, this section is going 
to focus on the ICC’s complementary mandate by examining i) 
whether the criterion of State inability as a ground of admissibility 
of cases before the ICC, can be seen as an implied obligation for 
States to adopt the Rome Statute definitions in national legislations, 
ii) whether the current practice of the ICC manifests that States are 
compelled to follow the Rome Statute definitions even if there is no 
explicit obligation under the Rome Statute to do so and iii) how the 
complementarity regime in general might work when the ICC 
confronts a case of aggression and possibly, terrorim. While in 
principle, complementarity strikes a certain degree of balance 
between the respect for State sovereignty and the cosmopolitan goal 
of fighting impunity in the adjudication of international crimes, 
complementarity in practice has revealed an ICC which sometimes 
appear to be pro-cosmopolitan, in the sense of stepping in in 
circumstances not clearly envisioned by the Rome Statute. Since the 
author’s view is that the balance between State sovereingty 
concerns and cosmopolitan ideals should not be limited to the 
definitions of international crimes but should extend to their 
criminalisation and modalities of prosecution, it has to be noted 
early on that an ICC with an overly pro-cosmopolitan orientation 
might constitute a disincentive for States to eventually extend its 
jurisdiction over a crime of international terrorism or define it for 
that purpose.  
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a) Complementarity in principle 
i) Conditions of inadmissibility: Article 17 
According to Article 17(1), there are four conditions that have to 
be met for a case to be declared inadmissible before the ICC:67 i) 
the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, ii) the case has been investigated by a State with 
jurisdiction but that State decided not to prosecute the individual 
concerned, iii) the individual concerned has already been tried for 
the same conduct by a State68 and iv) the case is not of sufficient 
gravity in order to fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. In this respect, 
it has to be noted that the fourth condition is a condition of 
admissibility as well as one of jurisdiction, according to the Article 
1 formulation of ‘the most serious crimes of concern’. If a case is 
not of sufficient gravity, it will not fall into the ICC’s jurisdiction 
anyway, even if the State of jurisdiction is not investigating or has 
not investigated the case or prosecuted the concerned individual(s). 
On the other hand, if a case is of sufficient gravity, it still needs to 
be checked whether any of the other three conditions is not met, 
before a case is declared admissible. In other words, for a case to be 
admissible before the ICC the condition of sufficient gravity does 
not suffice on its own but it has to be coupled with the absence of 
any of the other conditions mentioned in the provision.  
However, even if one of the first three conditions is met, a case 
may still be deemed admissible before the ICC. Article 17 provides 
some exceptions regarding the first three conditions of 
inadmissibility. For conditions (i) and (ii), a case can still be 
declared admissible if the State of jurisdiction is ‘unwilling’ or 
‘unable’ to ‘genuinely’ carry out proceedings against a concerned 
                                                             
67 Rome Statute art 17. 
68 This third condition complements Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute, 
concerning the ne bis in idem principle.  
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individual.69 For the third condition, a similar exception also applies 
and it is formulated in Article 20(3), where it states that the 
proceedings conducted by the State of jurisdiction should not have 
had as their purpose to ‘shield’ the accused from justice and that 
they should have been carried out independently and impartially ‘in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognised by 
international law’.70 Article 17(2) gives some further guidelines 
regarding the context of the terms ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ as 
used in the provision: namely, for a State to be deemed unwilling to 
‘genuinely’ carry out proceedings it has to be shown that the 
national proceedings were carried out with the purpose of shielding 
the accused from justice or carried out with unjustified delay 
‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice’ 
or that they are not or have not been carried out independently or 
impartially, again ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice’.71 Concerning the term ‘inability’, a State is 
unable to carry out proceedings when its national judicial system is 
partly or totally collapsed or unavailable and thus, the State cannot 
‘obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or [is] 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.’72 
ii) ‘Inability’ as lack of compatible domestic legislation  
The language of the above-mentioned provisions is meant to 
cover two possible situations that the ICC wishes to avoid with 
respect to the administration of international justice: firstly, to avoid 
the possibility that a State conducts sham trials, a problem foreseen 
when the ICTY was established and secondly, to avoid the 
possibility that a State will not conduct any proceedings at all due to 
                                                             
69 Rome Statute art 17(1): ‘(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been 
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided 
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;…’ 
70 Rome Statute art 20(3). 
71 ibid art 17(2). 
72 ibid art 17(3). 
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the unavailability of its national judicial system, as was the case 
with the ICTR’s creation.73 The criterion of ‘unwillingness’, 
contrary to that of ‘inability’, raised a number of objections from 
States during the negotiations74 due to its subjectivity. In particular, 
it was feared that the ICC gains too much discretion in deciding in 
which cases a State is unwilling to try an alleged offender, with the 
risk of functioning as a court of appeal and potentially overruling 
judgments of national judicial systems.75 Moreover, since a State’s 
unwillingness shall be measured by ‘the principles of due process 
recognised by international law’,76 this can be said to give an extra 
discretion to the ICC to also determine what these principles of due 
process are and if they are complied with by the concerned State. 
However, most States at the negotiation conference seemed willing 
enough to give priority to the promotion of international criminal 
justice over their need to protect their judicial sovereignty, at least 
in this respect, and the criterion of ‘unwillingness’ was finally 
introduced. 
As an objective criterion, inability presumably applies to States 
which suffer from a breakdown of their national institutions or are 
plagued by chaos due to civil war or any other public disorder.77 All 
                                                             
73 Jennifer Trahan, ‘Is Complementarity the right approach for the International 
Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression?’ (2012) 45 Cornell International Law 
Journal 569, 581-82. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. See also Jimmy Gurulé, ‘United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome 
Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction 
Truly Complementary to National Jurisdictions?’ (2001-2002) 35 Cornell 
International Law Journal 1, 30. 
76 Rome Statute art 17(2): ‘In order to determine unwillingness in a particular 
case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process 
recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as 
applicable…’. 
77 Markus Benzing, ‘The Complementarity Regime and the International 
Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the 
Fight Against Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Ybk UN Law 591, 613. According 
to Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, inability is determined by three factors: 
whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system the State is i) unable to obtain the accused, ii) unable to obtain the 
necessary evidence and testimony or iii) otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings.In the Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, 
(Decision on the admissibility of a case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi) ICC-
01/11-01/11-344-Conf (31 May 2013) (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) para 
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the three deficiencies mentioned in Article 17(3), the inability to 
obtain the accused, necessary evidence and testimony and the 
inability to otherwise carry out the proceedings, have to be a result 
of collapse or unavailability of the national judicial system.78 In this 
respect, it is unclear whether a State can be deemed unable to carry 
out national proceedings in cases where the national legislation 
either does not include the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC 
or does not penalise them to the same extent as the Rome Statute. 
As is the case with the rest of the Article 5 crimes, it is always 
questionable whether an eventual inclusion, and for this reason, 
formulation of a definition for international terrorism for the 
purposes of the Rome Statute, will equal to a subsequent obligation 
for States to enshrine this same definition into their national legal 
frameworks.  
It has to be noted at first that the Rome Statute creates criminal 
liability for the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC only at an 
international and not at a national level. Thus, an act committed by 
an individual that can be categorised as an international crime under 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute does not automatically fall into the 
same category for the national criminal justice system concerned, 
unless the State has introduced in its domestic penal legislation the 
definitions of the Article 5 crimes of the Rome Statute.79 In the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
200, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that the ability of a State to genuinely carry out 
proceedings ‘must be assessed in the context of the relevant national system and 
procedures… [and] in accordance with the substantive and procedural criminal 
law applicable in Libya’. 
78 Rome Statute art 17(3). 
79 The relationship between national and international legal orders has been 
divided into three, principal theories: i) the monistic view which advocates the 
supremacy of national law over the international, ii) the dualistic view which 
advocate that international law and national law are ‘independent of each other in 
their validity’ (Kelsen (n 6) 629) and therefore can be valid simultaneously and 
iii) the monistic view which places international law above the various national 
legal systems. The dualistic theory started to lose ground after the second half of 
the 20th century and in its place, the monistic theory of international law 
supremacy over national legal systems started to emerge. The 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, under Article 27, provides that a State party 
to a treaty cannot invoke national legislation as justification for non-compliance 
with its treaty obligations. Also, Article 88 of the Rome Statute provides that the 
national legal systems of its States Parties shall have in place procedures which 
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opposite case, it is possible that such an act might be prosecuted 
and punished as an ‘ordinary crime’.80 To the extent that the scope 
of ‘unavailability of the national judicial system’ includes the 
absence of compatible penal legislation from domestic judicial 
systems, a State can be seen as ‘otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings’ if it has not incorporated the definitions of Article 5 
crimes.81 
However, even when such legislation exists, a State can be still 
deemed ‘unable’ if the national legislation is assessed as inadequate 
by the ICC Prosecutor.82 In the context of definitions of crimes, 
inadequacy might entail the recategorisation of a conduct being an 
international offence under the Rome Statute, to an ordinary offence 
under a State’s national legislation.83 Thus, provided that 
international terrorism becomes an offence under the Rome Statute, 
a State Party with absent or incompatible national legislation 
concerning terrorist offences might not satisfy the complementarity 
requirements of Article 17, increasing the number of cases related 
to terrorism that can be found admissible before the ICC. This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
allow all forms of cooperation, as envisaged by Part 9 of the Rome Statute, for 
the purposes of the ICC. The incorporation in domestic legislations of 
international rules as such is also another manifestation of the monistic theory of 
the primacy of international law over national legal orders. For a thorough 
analysis of these theories see Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2005) 213-237. 
80 Benzing (n 77) 614. 
81 Katherine L Doherty and Timothy L H McCormack, ‘“Complementarity” as a 
Catalyst for Comprehensive Domestic Penal Legislation’ (1999) 5 U C Davis 
Journal of International Law and Policy 147, 152; Kleffner (n 64) 89. However, 
Colombia opposed to this interpretation. See Colombian Declaration upon 
ratification of the Rome Statute that ‘the word “otherwise” […] refers to the 
obvious absence of objective conditions necessary to the conduct of trial’ and that 
‘none of the provisions of the Rome Statute alters the domestic law applied by 
the Colombian judicial authorities in exercise of their domestic jurisdiction 
within the territory of the Republic of Colombia’ in 
<www.icrc.org/ihl/NORM/909EEAAE157FBD43412566E100542BDE?OpenDo
cument> accessed 15 May 2015. 
82 ibid. 
83Kleffner (n 64) 95. In the Gaddafi Admissibility Decision, para 88, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber held that domestic prosecutions under the category of ordinary crimes 
can be considered sufficient provided though that the case covers the same 
conduct as the one to be charged by the ICC Prosecutor. A discussion on the 
‘same person, same conduct’ test as has been applied by the ICC will follow in the 
next section. 
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interpretation of unavailability might provide an additional reason 
for States to be wary of any extension of the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
a crime of international terrorism and consequently, of the 
formulation of an international criminal law definition. While 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute clearly shows a preference for 
domestic prosecutions of international crimes, State sovereignty has 
been rendered conditional,84 in that (and as it will also be shown in 
the next section) the ICC is provided with the pro-cosmopolitan 
competence of exercising external oversight over the national 
proceedings for the commission of international crimes of its States 
Parties.  
While there are views which support that in this case State 
sovereignty is undermined under the Rome Statute,85 it should be 
pointed out that one of the aims of complementarity is to urge 
States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction for the commission of 
international crimes and remind them that it is first and foremost 
their duty to enforce international law.86 If an obligation to 
introduce compatible penal legislation to domestic laws would 
undermine aspects of State sovereignty, then the absence of this 
obligation would clearly undermine the overall purpose of the 
complementarity principle, as the ICC would not be able to rely on 
national prosecutions for international crimes.87 While not explicitly 
required by the Rome Statute, the harmonisation of national 
legislation concerning international crimes with the Rome Statute 
definitions seems to be the only way that allows the ICC to really 
function on a complementary basis and not as a replacement of 
national judicial systems.88 An opposite interpretation of 
                                                             
84 Pádraig McAuliffe, ‘From Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the Emergence 
of the ICC’s Burden-Sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping 
Cosmopolitanism’ (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law 259, 273; 
Darryl Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’ (2010) 
21 (1) Criminal Law Forum 67, 96. 
85 Benzing (n 77) 616. 
86 Rome Statute Preamble paras 4, 6. 
87 Kleffner (n 64) 93. 
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complementarity would mean that States Parties would be free to 
define international offences according to their own understanding, 
categorising them as ordinary offences or define them more 
narrowly than the Rome Statute. The legislative gaps resulting from 
differentiated international and national definitions would most 
probably increase the number of cases before the ICC, as States 
Parties would fail to establish their jurisdiction over an Article 5 
crime for the purpose of conducting national prosecutions.89 
As Newton suggests, the reasons why States should criminalise 
Article 5 crimes and thus, harmonise their national criminal justice 
systems with ICC standards, are: i) to ensure the primacy of 
national jurisdictions over the ICC, ii) to ensure that the ICC is not 
overburdened with cases, iii) to eliminate the creation of safe 
havens for international criminals trying to flee prosecution and iv) 
to strengthen the international criminal justice system by rendering 
States the ‘enforcement arms’ of international law, ensuring that 
there will be no impunity for the commission of international 
crimes.90 However, there are several scenarios that can take place in 
the effort of States to harmonise their domestic penal legislation 
with the ICC provisions. The first one, which was already 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, involves the national 
prosecution of an Article 5 crime under a different criminal 
formulation, categorised as the ‘ordinary crime’ of murder for 
example, a scenario that will most probably result in finding the 
State of jurisdiction ‘unable’ to carry out the proceedings. A second 
scenario would be the verbatim adoption of Article 5 definitions, 
such as is the case of the UK, with the adoption of the UK 
International Criminal Court Act 2001.91 In this case, the mirroring 
of the ICC provisions into domestic legislation would preclude the 
                                                             
89 ibid 94. 
90 Michael A Newton, ‘The quest of constructive complementarity’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, vol 1 (CUP 2011) 320. 
91 International Criminal Court Act 2001 c 17. 
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finding that a State is unable to carry out national proceedings. 
However, if the national prosecutor decides to charge the alleged 
offenders for different crimes than the ones the ICC Prosecutor 
would charge, should the trial be conducted before the ICC, then 
there is the risk that the jurisdictional State be found ‘unwilling’ to 
prosecute the perpetrators92 or that it conducts proceedings for a 
different range of crimes than the one envisaged by the ICC 
Prosecutor.93 
Other practices followed by States in their effort of 
harmonisation are the adoption of narrower definitions of 
international crimes or of definitions taken by other international 
law instruments than the Rome Statute. The example of the Swiss 
Penal Code is indicative of the first practice. Whereas the reformed 
Swiss Penal Code includes more precise definitions for war crimes, 
so far sanctioned only by general reference to international 
humanitarian law,94 provisions concerning the crime of genocide 
and the responsibility of senior officials are less broad than in the 
Rome Statute.95 On the other hand, the Extraordinary Chambers of 
Cambodia, a hybrid international court, which was established 
however ‘within’ the Cambodian courts,96 operates under the 2001 
                                                             
92 Newton (n 90) 321. 
93 As was the case with Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06-8, which 
will be commented below. 
94 Hirondelle News Agency, ‘Swiss prepares bill to harmonise laws with ICC’ (9 
May 2008) <www.hirondellenews.com/fr/icc/320-collaboration-with-
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icc1092810928> accessed at 19 May 2013. 
95 Article 259(1bis) of the Swiss Criminal Code, 21 December 1937 (status as of 
1 May 2013) provides that public provocation to commit genocide is prosecutable 
only when genocide has taken place in whole or in part in Switzerland without 
criminalising incitement to commit genocide abroad. Also Article 264k(1) 
provides that a superior could be held responsible only for crimes he was aware 
that a subordinate has committed or will commit and failed to act. The Rome 
Statute establishes liability for superiors also in cases where a superior ‘should 
have known’ that the forces under his or her command have committed or will 
commit Article 5 crimes (art 28(a) (i)). 
96 Report of International Federation of Human Rights, ‘International Criminal 
Court, Implementation of the Rome Statute in Cambodian Law’ (March 2006) 
No 443/2, 22 (Report of IFHR). 
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Law on establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers97 which 
reproduces in part the provisions of the Rome Statute. In particular, 
some formulations for crimes against humanity have been taken 
from the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda,98 other acts of crimes against humanity are omitted99 
whereas some others are only mentioned by reference and without 
definitions.100 
This selectivity of approaches concerning the harmonisation of 
definitions under international criminal law with domestic 
legislation can be paradoxically interpreted to be either in 
conformity or in conflict with the complementarity regime. On the 
one hand, a vision of complementarity, based on identical criminal 
definitions between the Rome Statute and domestic legislations of 
States Parties, suggests that the main concern of the ICC is not 
simply whether international criminal justice can be administered 
by States, but also if it is administered according to the ICC’s own 
standards of what best constitutes international criminal justice.101 
This universalist approach of complementarity, namely that national 
prosecutions should be conducted following the definitions 
provided in the Rome Statute, does not leave much room for 
tolerance to the pluralism of the national judicial systems of States 
Parties and suggests that the means of administering international 
criminal justice matter as much as the end. In fact, it is argued that 
                                                             
97 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, 10 August 2001 (2001 Law). 
98 The chapeau of the definition of crimes against humanity (Article 5 of 2001 
Law) is taken from the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) 
UN Doc S/RES/955 art 3. 
99 Report of IFHR (n 96) 21. Article 5 of the 2001 Law omits some material acts 
included in Article 7 of the Rome Statute: enforced disappearances, sexual 
violence other than rape and the crime of apartheid.  
100 ibid. Article 5(2) of 2001 Law includes extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, persecutions and other inhumane acts as constitutive elements of 
crimes against humanity without any definition of these terms. The crime of 
torture is defined, not according to Article 7 of the Rome Statute but according to 
Article 500 of the 1955 Cambodian Criminal Code (Article 3 of the 2001 Law). 
101 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Too much of a good thing? Implementation and the uses of 
complementarity’ in Stahn (n 90) 363. 
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this approach runs counter to the very essence of the 
complementarity regime,102 which dictates primacy of national 
jurisdictions and the respective national definitions they entail. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that States Parties have an 
implied obligation, arising from the Rome Statute, to include 
Article 5 crimes into domestic legislation. This obligation can be 
derived from both a contextual and a teleological interpretation of 
the Preamble of the Rome Statute. According to the preambular 
paragraph 6,103 States Parties have a duty to prosecute international 
crimes, meaning that they cannot impede the administration of 
international justice for any reason, including the lack of 
appropriate legislation or non-criminalisation of a particular 
conduct which is criminalised under the Rome Statute. A 
teleological interpretation would support that conclusion, in that the 
ultimate purpose of the ICC, the fight against impunity, will not be 
achieved if States Parties have not fully criminalised the conduct 
which is punishable under the Rome Statute, weakening thus the 
deterrent effect of national prosecutions.104 Since i) the object and 
purpose behind the establishment of the ICC is the fight against 
impunity, ii) preambular paragraph 4 provides that effective 
prosecutions ‘must be ensured by taking measures at the national 
level’105 and iii) practically, not all cases concerning international 
crimes can be prosecuted by the ICC, the harmonisation of 
domestic definitions for international crimes with the international 
ones is necessary, in order to both prevent States from being 
exposed to the ICC and, at the same time, promote a common 
understanding regarding the content and scope of international 
crimes recognised by, at least, the States Parties to the Rome 
Statute. 
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All in all, the applicability of the test of a State’s unwillingness 
and inability is characterised as a judicial tightrope,106 since the 
balance between a too narrow and a too broad interpretation of the 
terms is quite tenuous. On the one hand, too broad an interpretation 
may lead to criticisms that the ICC exceeds its powers in being too 
intrusive into national judicial systems. On the other hand, if the 
ICC follows too narrow an approach for the concepts of 
‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’, it may attract criticism for being too 
lenient towards State sovereign prerogatives. The term ‘genuinely’ 
tries to strike that balance by adding a standard, that of genuine 
State action to investigate or prosecute, in order to assess its 
unwillingness or inability. However, the practice of the ICC has not 
offered any further elaboration of these terms in its current case 
law; on the contrary, it seems that it has taken a different, broader 
approach with respect to the admissibility of cases. This broader 
approach, while in line with a pro-cosmopolitan model of 
international criminal justice, might have an adverse effect on the 
degree of States willingness towards an eventual definition and 
criminalisation of international terrorism for the purposes of the 
Rome Statute. The following section will show to what extent the 
ICC, as it has been revealed by its practice to date, has walked away 
from a strict application of the complementarity regime, risking the 
delicate balance achieved by the Rome Statute provisions between 
the respect for State sovereignty and the ICC’s cosmopolitan 
aspirations. 
b) Complementarity in practice 
Turning now to the current practice of the ICC relating to the 
complementarity regime, there is not so far much development in 
case-law concerning further elaboration of the terms of 
unwillingness or inability on the part of a concerned State; from the 
nine situations that have reached the ICC at the time of writing, five 
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of them have reached it through self-referrals, two through Security 
Council referrals and two situations have been brought before the 
ICC through investigations conducted proprio motu.107 So far, the 
role of the ICC seems to go beyond the one prescribed in the Rome 
Statute at least for the five self-referred situations, in that the vision 
of a complementarity regime which would strengthen and 
encourage States to conduct national prosecutions is far from 
reality.108 Instead, the concepts of unwillingness and inability seem 
to have been replaced in practice by unavailability or inactivity.109 
So far, it has been shown that, in most cases, the ICC has intervened 
where the concerned State showed no intention to prosecute.110 This 
lack of intention for national prosecutions does not indicate that 
there is genuine unwillingness on the part of the State (if the 
situation is referred to the ICC by the concerned State itself) or 
genuine inability (because the national judicial system might be 
perfectly in place) but it shows State unavailability or inaction. 
However, according to the Preamble of the Rome Statute, it is the 
duty of States Parties primarily to prosecute international crimes 
and only in cases of unwillingness and inability, can jurisdiction be 
relinquished. Having the ICC conducting trials for international 
crimes in cases where the jurisdictional States are both willing (in 
the sense that they wish that justice be done) and able to do so, does 
not equal to a proper use of complementarity but rather to a waiver 
of it. This pro-cosmopolitan interventionist policy, which 
circumvents aspects of the concerned State’s judicial sovereignty, 
seems to prioritise the goal of ending impunity in The Hague over 
the goal of encouraging States to conduct national prosecutions, a 
function that goes beyond the initial vision of complementarity as 
                                                             
107<www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cas
es.aspx> accessed 26 September 2014. 
108 Pádraig McAuliffe, Transitional Justice and Rule of Law Reconstruction 
(Routledge 2013) 215. 
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envisaged by the States Parties.111 The ICC’s judicial dynamism, 
though in conformity with a cosmopolitan model of international 
criminal justice, might have adverse effects with respect to States’ 
willingness to potentially expand the ICC’s jurisdiction over an 
international crime of terrorism (and define it for that purpose), 
should the ICC continues to follow this broader approach with 
respect to the admissibility of cases. 
i) The Lubanga and Katanga precedents: an intrusive ICC? 
Examples from the current practice of the ICC have 
demonstrated that the ICC avails itself of a more interventionist 
approach to initiate proceedings even in circumstances not 
necessarily envisioned by the drafters of the Rome Statute. The 
Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo was the first case that was made 
admissible through self-referral by the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). Although the Pre-Trial Chamber recognised that the 
Congolese judicial system ‘had undergone certain changes’ and was 
‘able’ to prosecute the case under Article 17, admissibility was 
granted on grounds that the accused was not being prosecuted by 
the national authorities for the same offences as were to be charged 
with by the ICC Prosecutor.112 When the ICC Prosecutor sought an 
arrest warrant against Lubanga in January 2006, the accused was 
already in the custody of the DRC since March 2005, being charged 
with, among other things, genocide and crimes against humanity.113 
The Prosecutor based his application for arrest on allegations that 
the accused committed the war crimes of recruiting, conscripting, 
and enlisting child soldiers114 and argued that the case should be 
declared admissible, because the DRC government had stated that it 
was not able to prosecute crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
                                                             
111 McAuliffe (n 108) 215. 
112
 Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Under Seal Decision of the Prosecutor's 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest) Article 58, ICC-01/04-01/06-8 (10 February 
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and thus, it was deemed ‘unable’ under Article 17.115 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber I rejected inability as a ground of admissibility but 
declared the case admissible, because ‘for a case arising from the 
investigation of a situation to be inadmissible, national proceedings 
must encompass both the person and the conduct which is the 
subject of the case before the Court’.116 The Congolese authorities 
were conducting proceedings against Lubanga for a different range 
of offences than those presented by the ICC Prosecutor, thus the 
case, according to a strict interpretation of Article 17(1a), which 
should involve both the same person and the same criminal 
conduct, was not being prosecuted at all. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber I introduced a third ground of 
admissiblity of a case before the ICC: apart from a genuine State 
‘unwillingness’ or inability’, State inactivity can constitute a ground 
of admissibility. The Pre-Trial Chamber found that ‘the DRC 
cannot be said to be acting in relation to the specific case before the 
Court’117 and held that the ‘case would be admissible only if those 
States with jurisdiction over it have remained inactive in relation to 
that case or are unwilling or unable’ under Article 17.118 While this 
holding went unchallenged by the defence,119 this irregular 
application of Article 17 gave rise to criticism that the ICC 
sidestepped the complementarity spirit of the Rome Statute. Instead 
of supporting the national primacy of the DRC to conduct 
proceedings against the accused and encouraged confidence in the 
Congolese criminal justice system to enforce implementation of the 
Rome Statute provisions,120 it preferred to supersede a national trial 
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and rushed to assume as much responsibility as possible.121 This 
type of judicial activism walks away from the initial vision of 
complementarity which was destined to protect the judicial aspects 
of State sovereignty from a court which would intervene on grounds 
other than unwillingness and inability.122 In this particular case, it 
also had the awkward effect of the ICC’s conducting its first trial 
for offences less serious than the ones pursued by the authorities of 
the DRC.123 
Similarly, in Prosecutor v Katanga,124 the ICC took a broader 
approach with respect to the admissibility of cases than the one 
provided in the Rome Statute. In June 2005, the Prosecutor sought 
an arrest warrant against Germain Katanga on grounds that he was 
allegedly responsible for a number of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in February 2003 in a village in the DRC.125 
The arrest warrant was granted by the Pre-Trial Chamber, even 
though the accused had already been arrested and detained since 
March 2005 by the authorities of the DRC.126 However, the Pre-
Trial Chamber found the case admissible because, as in the 
Lubanga case, the domestic proceedings against Katanga did not 
‘encompass the same conduct’ as the Prosecutor’s application for 
arrest. The defence challenged the validity of the so-called ‘same 
conduct’ test, arguing that it was a flawed precedent and that it 
departed from a proper interpretation of Article 17.127 The Trial 
Chamber rejected the defence motion without however providing 
any elaboration on the proper applicability of the ‘same conduct’ 
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test; rather, it held that the case was admissible before the ICC 
because the DRC was deemed ‘unwilling’ to prosecute the accused 
under Article 17. According to the Trial Chamber’s decision, an 
‘unwilling’ State can be also a State 
which may not want to protect an individual, but, for a variety 
of reasons, may not wish to exercise its jurisdiction over him 
or her…[t]he Chamber considers that a State which chooses 
not to investigate or prosecute a person before its own courts, 
but has nevertheless every intention of seeing that justice is 
done, must be considered as lacking the will referred to in 
Article 17.128 
This pro-cosmopolitan attitude of the ICC in the implementation 
of the ‘same conduct’ test might send the message to its States 
Parties that it interprets its mandate in a way that it is much more 
than a complementary international court. In the context of defining 
and making international terrorism an offence under the Rome 
Statute, a potential differentiation between the range or content of 
the offence as charged by a State against an individual accused and 
the ICC Prosecutor might equal to a sufficient ground on which a 
case can be made admissible before the ICC. While a textual 
approach of the complementarity regime seems to privilege State 
sovereignty129 in that the jurisdiction of the ICC is only subsidiary 
and is exercised only when a State’s unwillingness or inability 
becomes manifest, in practice it seems that the ICC has applied the 
‘same conduct’ test in a self-serving way.130 It remains to be seen 
whether this self-serving use of complementarity is explained by 
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the urgency that the ICC might have felt in the early days of its 
establishment to pursue cases131 and thus justify its existence or is 
meant to be its standard practice in the future. What remains true 
however, is that the more sovereignty-conscious States, which have 
already opposed to the idea of international terrorism’s inclusion 
into the Rome Statute based on sovereignty-based concerns as was 
shown in the Introduction, will have an additional reason to remain 
opposed, should this pro-cosmopolitan understanding of the 
complementarity regime predominates over the pro-sovereignty 
one.  
So far, it has been shown that, while on paper the 
complementarity regime seems to be able to do justice to both State 
sovereignty concerns relating to their judicial primacy and to 
cosmopolitan purposes relating to the fight against impunity, in 
practice the ICC has departed - at least in part - from this vision of 
complementarity which regards States and international law as 
mutually constituted.132 As such, it becomes obvious that the 
required balance between sovereignty and law is not only to be 
searched for in the definitions of international crimes but also in the 
modalities of their prosecution. Regardless of whether a criminal 
definition is construed in a way that rightly weighs the respect for 
State sovereignty and the need for justice, if the administration of 
this justice is imbalanced, then the overall effectiveness of an 
international crime definition will be undermined and ICC’s 
credibility severely compromised.  
 
                                                             
131 William Schabas, ‘The Rise and Fall of Complementarity’ in Stahn (n 90) 156. 
However, he notes further that this over-intrusiveness was rather welcome by the 
DRC since prosecutions were targeted against enemies of the official government. 
In this respect see also William Schabas, ‘The International Criminal Court: 
Struggling to Find its Way’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The 
Future of International Law (OUP 2012); Alana Tiemessen, ‘The International 
Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecution’ (2014) 18(4-5) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 444.   
132 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Why Would States Want to Join the ICC? A Theoretical 
Exploration Based on the Legal Nature of Complementarity’ in Jann Kleffner and 
Gerard Kor (eds), Complementary Views on Complementarity (TMC Asser Press 
2006) 49-51. 
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In this respect and since this thesis focuses on the crime of 
aggression and international terrorism, the analysis of 
complementarity should be concluded with an examination of the 
challenges that the ICC will face when it confronts an aggression 
case. Since the ICC has not as yet acquired jurisdiction over 
aggression cases, an analysis of how the complementarity regime 
will work is only speculative; however, the conclusions drawn will 
shed some light on several sovereignty-pertaining issues that might 
be raised which can also be of relevance when and if terrorism finds 
its place among the international crimes with its own international 
definition. For this reason, the next section will attempt to give an 
insight on how the complementarity regime will work for cases of 
aggression and how the adjudication of aggression cases by an 
international court may implicate with issues of State sovereignty. 
This examination will bring us closer to understand why State 
sovereignty often functions as an obstacle to the further 
development of international criminal law and how this obstacle 
can be overcome if sovereign interests are to be properly weighed 
against the purposes of international criminal justice. 
c) The applicability of the complementarity regime on cases of 
aggression 
Before examining the development and finalisation of the 
definition of aggression for the purposes of the Rome Statute in 
Chapters II and III, it is worth making some remarks on how it 
raises, among others, some jurisdictional questions under the 
existing framework of the complementarity regime. Using Article 
17 as a starting point for the following analysis, a case is 
inadmissible before the ICC when a State, which has jurisdiction 
over it, is investigating or prosecuting or has investigated or 
prosecuted the case concerned.133 The question that arises from this 
provision is obviously which State has, or better can have 
                                                             
133 Rome Statute art 17. 
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jurisdiction over a case of aggression. Since a case of aggression 
will involve at least two States, one aggressor and one victim State, 
the bases of jurisdiction that can unequivocally be invoked are the 
territoriality and the nationality principles.134 However, the 
provision does not make clear whether a third State, exercising 
universal jurisdiction, can prosecute a case of aggression if either 
the aggressor or the victim State, or both, are unwilling or unable to 
do so. Under the ‘Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction’, a 
State can exercise universal jurisdiction over an individual for 
serious crimes under international law, such as, among others, 
crimes against peace,135 the post-WWII equivalent for aggression. 
Some authors also argue that national courts of third States can try 
cases of aggression under the principle of universality.136 
Nevertheless, setting aside the precedents of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials, the principle of universal jurisdiction has not been 
invoked since for the crime of aggression, showing that State 
practice in this respect casts doubts on the existence of universal 
jurisdiction for this crime. Besides, the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind of the International Law 
Commission, in its Article 8 provides that jurisdiction on aggression 
can rest only with an international court or a State whose national is 
the alleged offender.137 From this formulation, two conclusions can 
be drawn with respect to how the crime of aggression was viewed, 
                                                             
134 Rome Statute art 12(2): ‘[…] (a) The State on the territory of which the 
conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or 
aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which 
the person accused of the crime is a national.’ 
135 Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction (2001) Principle 2(1). 
136 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th edn, CUP 2005) 145; 
Antonio Remiro Brotóns, ‘Aggression, Crime of Aggression, Crime without 
Punishment’ Working Paper No10 (Fundación para las Relaciones 
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2005) 16 quoted in Pål Wrange, 
‘The Crime of Aggression and Complementarity’ in Roberto Bellelli (ed), 
International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to Its 
Review (Ashgate Publishing Group 2010) 600.  
137 ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (6 
May-26 July 1996) UN Doc A/CN4/L532, art 8: ‘…Jurisdiction over the crime 
set out in Article 16 shall rest with an international court. However, a State 
referred to in Article 16 is not precluded from trying its nationals for the crime set 
out in that article.’ 
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at least before the establishment of the ICC: firstly, that aggression 
was different from the rest of the international crimes of the Draft 
Code, in that universal jurisdiction was not supported for it and 
secondly, that the only State that could exercise jurisdiction was the 
State of nationality of the accused, a view not shared by the Rome 
Statute and inconsistent with the regime of complementarity 
enshrined in it.138 On the other hand, domestic prosecutions for the 
crime of aggression are nowhere to be exempted in the Kampala 
Resolution, and therefore the principle of the Rome Statute 
Preamble that it is the duty of national courts to try those 
responsible for the commission of international crimes applies also 
to the crime of aggression once the Kampala Resolution enters into 
force.139 Moreover, the jurisprudence of the famous Lotus case,140 
where France questioned the jurisdiction of Turkey to prosecute a 
French sailor for criminal manslaughter when a French vessel ran 
into a Turkish one on the high seas, causing a number of deaths of 
Turkish citizens, advocates that the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is valid and that it was on France to prove that Turkey’s 
exercising jurisdiction violated a prohibitive rule of international 
law.141 In light of this principle, it has been argued that the exercise 
of domestic universal jurisdiction is valid, unless the party 
questioning this jurisdiction can demonstrate that there is a 
generally accepted rule in international law which would prohibit 
the exercise of such jurisdiction.142 
Since, under the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute, 
cases of aggression will most probably be adjudicated by either the 
aggressor or the victim State (and only if they should fail, will the 
ICC step in) it remains to be seen to what extent the national courts 
                                                             
138 Roger Clark, ‘Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’, in Stahn (n 90) 
726. 
139 Michael Scharf, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression’ (2012) 
53 (2) Harvard International Law Journal 357, 364. 
140
 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ Series A No 10. 
141 ibid para 46. 
142 Scharf (n 139) 380. 
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of either the victim or the aggressor State are competent to 
adjudicate such cases. While the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression, during the negotiations held in Kampala for 
the incorporation of aggression in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, 
decided to treat aggression similarly to the other Article 5 crimes, it 
seems that there are distinguishing features that make aggression 
not well-suited for the complementarity regime.143 Firstly, and 
generally speaking, there is the question of whether national 
judiciaries could function independently and impartially with 
respect to so politically-charged crimes such as aggression. Of 
course, this argument can be equally valid for the conduct of trials 
concerning the other core crimes under the ICC jurisdiction, which 
can also have political aspects. However, as was pointed out above, 
the crime of aggression would involve at minimum two States, 
whereas so far, the ICC practice has shown that the crimes that have 
been or are being prosecuted by the ICC, have been committed in 
the territory of one State. Without excluding a scenario where 
crimes against humanity or war crimes are committed in a context 
where more than one State is involved, the involvement of at least 
two States in a national trial concerning aggression will exacerbate 
the already disturbed relations of the States concerned with the risk 
of further aggravating an already intense situation. Corollary to this 
is also the high risk of having States conducting trials which lack 
independence and impartiality and have the intention to shield the 
accused from justice, in which case of course, the ICC can 
intervene and invoke the provisions of Article 17(2c) that the State 
appears ‘unwilling’ to try the accused due to such lack. At the same 
time, even in cases where the victim State and not the State of 
nationality of the accused is to conduct a highly politicised trial, it 
is possible that the national courts will appear ‘all too willing’ to 
prosecute, and thus, issues of fair trial and due process might be 
                                                             
143 Trahan (n 73) 587. 
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raised.144 While due process considerations do not constitute per se 
a ground of admissibility, there might be instances where 
overzealous national authorities might indefinitely detain the 
accused for purposes different from conducting a trial (such as 
extracting information). The ICC’s primary role is to function as an 
anti-impunity mechanism145 and ensure that judicial proceedings 
take place, be it national or international. In this respect, it is likely 
that where judicial proceedings do not occur, a case might be 
deemed admissible before the ICC (given also the so far 
interventionist practice it has adopted regarding the conditions of 
admissibility), not due to the commission of human rights violations 
against the accused but due to the lack of intention of the national 
authorities to conduct a trial.146 As such, it is highly likely that 
States which have been directly involved in an aggression case 
would be deemed by the ICC as either unwilling or unable to 
genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution, resulting in the 
subsequent ICC’s intervention.  
Secondly, the attribution of individual liability for the crime of 
aggression goes beyond the individual himself and implicates 
directly the State on behalf of which he acted.147 There is a direct 
implication of a State’s action with the commission of the 
individual crime of aggression, which is absent from the other 
Article 5 crimes.  This implication is also reflected into the 
definition for aggression as formulated in the Kampala negotiations, 
where the act of aggression, committed by a State, forms an express 
                                                             
144 For a discussion concerning over-zealous national prosecutions see Trahan (n 
73) 594-601. 
145 Frédérick Mégret and Marika Giles Samson, ‘Holding the Line on 
Complementarity in Libya: The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials’ 
(2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 571, 573. 
146 ibid 586. About Rome Statute’s safeguards concerning due process protection 
see Elinor Fry, ‘Between Show Trials and Sham Prosecutions: The Rome 
Statute’s Potential Effect on Domestic Due Process Protections’ (2012) 23 
Criminal Law Forum 35. 
147 Madeleine Morris, ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party 
States’ (2001) 64 (1) Law and Contemporary Problems 13, 14-15. 
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element of the offence.148 Thus, a national judiciary that will sit in 
judgement for a case concerning the crime of aggression will have 
to assess the legality of another State’s decision to use force,149 a 
competence which is primarily reserved to the Security Council 
under its Chapter VII powers.150 
With these implications in mind, it is still questionable whether 
national courts can be seen as appropriate fora to conduct 
aggression trials.151 But even if the jurisdiction-related 
considerations are set aside, there is still a number of theoretical and 
procedural issues that have to be addressed when a State acquires 
jurisdiction over a case of aggression. Firstly, it comes as a logical 
conclusion that, if a case of aggression falls under a State’s 
jurisdiction, then the jurisdictional filters that are in place for the 
ICC to exercise the same jurisdiction, will not be in place for the 
national court, unless specifically provided by the domestic 
legislation.152 In other words, when a case of aggression is referred 
to the ICC by a State or in case of a proprio motu initiation of 
proceedings, the Prosecutor shall seek the Security Council’s 
determination of the existence of an act of aggression or, in the 
absence of it, he or she shall turn to the Pre-trial Division.153 These 
mechanisms will be absent if a national court adjudicates over a 
case of aggression, meaning that the concerned State will have to 
make a determination on the existence of an act of aggression 
allegedly committed by itself or another State, something that is 
                                                             
148 Kampala Resolution art 8bis: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of 
aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person 
in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’  
149 Beth Van Schaack, ‘Par in parem imperium non habet, Complementarity and 
the Crime of Aggression’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 149. 
150 UN Charter art 39: ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression…’ 
151 Among the authors that are sceptical about the application of the 
complementarity regime to cases of aggression are: Trahan (n 73); Wrange (n 
136); Van Schaack (n 149). 
152 Van Schaack (n 149) 151. 
153 Kampala Resolution art 15bis (6) and (8). 
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contrary to Article 39 of the UN Charter, which confers this power 
primarily to the Security Council, and also contrary to the principle 
of the sovereign equality of States. 
Apart from these issues that will probably arise when aggression 
cases are to be adjudicated nationally, there are also some 
sovereignty-related questions that may come into play in the 
adjudication of both aggression and terrorism cases. In the first 
place, the issue of immunities, which will most certainly arise in 
cases of aggression since the crime of aggression is established as a 
‘leadership crime’, might also arise in cases of terrorist crimes 
which involve a State’s high political or military officials. The 
framework provided by the Rome Statute does not recognise 
immunity statuses;154 however, this renunciation of immunities will 
likely not be applied before national jurisdictions.155 Domestic 
immunities are often in place in a State Party’s national legislation 
and protect its officials from being tried before their own courts. 
Amending immunity-related domestic legislation to accommodate 
the ICC’s requirements for national prosecutions pursuant to the 
complementarity principle or for surrender to the ICC might be seen 
as an infringement into a State’s sovereignty.156 But even if States 
Parties amend their relevant domestic legislation to allow the 
surrender or national prosecution of their own nationals, the 
situation is different with respect to requests for surrender of non-
nationals. In this latter case, the ICC will have to decide whether 
States Parties, in agreeing to limit immunity before the ICC (Article 
27), are deemed to have done so with respect to one another or that 
                                                             
154 Rome Statute art 27. 
155 Wrange (n 136) 594; Mégret (n 101) 383 where he argues that immunity laws 
might be a legitimate reason for non-prosecution on a horizontal plane and 
between States but not before an independent international institution. See also 
Rome Statute art 98(1) where it states that without a waiver of immunity by the 
State whose national is being accused, the Court cannot proceed with a request 
for surrender or assistance. 
156 Broomhall (n 14) 140. France and Germany have dealt with this issue by 
making amendments which either allow the surrender to the ICC but not the 
domestic prosecution of a person entitled to immunities (France) or allow both 
the surrender and prosecution after authorisation of the parliament (Germany). 
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States Parties cannot arrest or surrender officials of another State 
Party, without a waiver of their immunity, according to Article 
98(1).157 
Another challenge that is to be faced when States adjudicate on 
cases of aggression and even more so on cases of international 
terrorism, is the fragmentation and differentiation of their domestic 
penal codes in the very definition of the crimes. The ICC, as with 
the rest of the crimes under its jurisdiction, applies a uniform legal 
framework for all the States Parties, which contain thoroughly 
negotiated elements; in contrast, a State which is going to 
incorporate or has already incorporated domestic provisions related 
to aggression, might pick and choose among the definitional 
elements of the crime, something that will give way to incoherence 
in the applicability of the legal framework for international crimes 
as accepted by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).158 As it was 
already shown by the ‘same conduct’ test that the ICC applied in 
Lubanga and considered in Katanga, it is highly likely that 
differentiation between the range of offences (and possibly their 
definitions) against an accused that are brought before national 
courts and before the ICC, will favour heavily the ICC’s 
intervention. Besides, the incorporation of domestic provisions 
related to aggression is somewhat discouraged by the 
Understandings regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court on the crime of aggression.159 
Understanding 5 provides that the Kampala Resolution does not 
create any right or obligation for States to exercise jurisdiction over 
an act of aggression committed by another State, implying i) that 
the incorporation of related legislation should not be seen as 
                                                             
157 ibid 141-45. 
158 As emphasised by Van Schaack, a national definition for aggression might for 
example reject the ‘leadership requirement’ of the crime or the threshold of 
‘manifest violation’ or even permit the prosecution of ‘attempted aggression’, 
issues that have been decided upon after careful and rigorous negotiations by the 
ASP. Van Schaack (n 149) 152. 
159 Kampala Resolution, Annex III ‘Understandings regarding the amendments to 
the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court on the crime of aggression’.   
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mandatory and probably is not even seen as desirable by the 
negotiators160 and ii) that the reference ‘by another State’ means 
that the exercise of jurisdiction by a State whose nationals are being 
accused was considered as less problematic.161 This Understanding 
was adopted due to US concerns that States Parties to the Rome 
Statute will finally incorporate a definition of aggression into their 
domestic laws (‘particularly one we believe is flawed’)162 
expanding principles of jurisdiction and resulting in officials’ being 
prosecuted for aggression in foreign courts. The US opposition 
against such a development is based on the view that international 
customary law does not recognise an existing right for States to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over aggression.163 As a result, the 
effect of Understanding 5 will be to discourage,164 but not to 
preclude States from harmonising their national criminal laws with 
the Kampala provisions. However, it has been argued that this 
Understanding could at least ensure that States Parties could not 
invoke the Kampala Resolution to support the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed by non-
nationals.165 With respect to terrorism, the problem of 
differentiation of national legislations is even more acute; the 
divergence of views regarding core elements of the definition of 
international terrorism are such166 that they have not allowed so far 
the formulation of a universally accepted definition and, as was also 
mentioned in the Introduction, the sovereignty-related implications 
of agreeing on an international definition of terrorism have heavily 
obstructed its inclusion into the ICC. 
                                                             
160 Van Schaack (n 149) 155. 
161 ibid 160. 
162 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, US Department of State, Statement at the 
Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (4 June 2010) in 
<www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/142665.htm> accessed 9 August 2015.  
163 Scharf (n 139) 365. 
164 Claus Kress and Leonie von Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the 
Crime of Aggression’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1179, 
1216. 
165 Van Schaack (n 149) 161. 
166 A thorough examination of the major points of contention on the core 
elements of an international definition for terrorism will follow in Chapters IV 
and V. 
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All in all, it seems that the complementarity model prescribed for 
the rest of the international crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
not appropriate for cases of aggression and might not be for cases of 
international terrorism as well. The very thin practice of States 
exercising universal jurisdiction on cases of aggression, the high 
risk of politicisation of national courts that will adjudicate over such 
cases and the absence of jurisdictional filters that are in place for 
the ICC but not for national courts make it clear that 
complementarity might not be applied in the same way to 
aggression as it is with the other Article 5 crimes. Finally, the 
controversial nature of aggression as an international crime touches 
upon challenges which may also come into play should terrorism 
become an international crime (under the jurisdiction of the ICC or 
any other international tribunal), such as the immunity statuses of 
high-ranking officials and the risk of fragmentation of the definition 
of the crime in domestic penal codes. All these challenges, 
however, reveal a common denominator which will inevitably 
determine the effectiveness of international crimes definitions to 
contribute to the fight against impunity: State sovereignty. The 
crucial question to be asked is what place and content State 
sovereignty should hold in the modern international criminal justice 
system in order to comply with the current exigencies of 
international law. 
Conclusion 
Having set one of the parameters of this thesis in place, Chapter I 
has demonstrated how the concept of State sovereignty in light of 
the State-centric and the cosmopolitan theories has been influencing 
international law in general and international criminal law in 
particular, as embodied in the Rome Statute of the ICC. State 
sovereignty considerations are reflected in the function of the ICC 
and specifically in its provisions regarding the complementarity 
regime under which it operates. The establishment of the 
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complementary role of the ICC is the means through which the 
Rome Statute attempts to strike the balance between the respect for 
State sovereignty on the one hand and the promotion of 
cosmopolitan purposes, in the form of international criminal justice, 
on the other. To this end, the Chapter has analysed the details of 
this complementary function, and specifically i) how a State’s 
failure to harmonise its national law definitions of crimes with the 
Rome Statute ones can be understood as State inability to genuinely 
carry out proceedings, ii) how complementarity has worked in 
practice as to whether the application of the ‘same conduct’ test 
means that States Parties are compelled to follow the ICC’s 
definitions in order not to be characterised as unable and iii) how 
the adjudication of aggression and perhaps, terrorism cases raises 
jurisdictional issues that other Article 5 crimes do not. It was shown 
that to date, the ICC has to some extent failed to implement 
complementarity as it was envisioned by the drafters of the Rome 
Statute, by overstretching its jurisdictional mandate to the 
maximum allowed for the purpose of declaring cases admissible 
even in circumstances not clearly envisioned by the Rome Statute. 
The last part of this Chapter analysed the reasons why the crime 
of aggression should not be treated in the same way under the 
complementarity regime of the Rome Statute as the rest of the 
Article 5 crimes. The implications on State sovereignty in cases of 
aggression render States a less appropriate forum for the 
prosecution of this crime by national courts whereas an 
international forum appears more suitable for this purpose. The 
strong political dimension of the crime of aggression was what had 
hampered its definition and criminalisation for so long, leaving 
room for States to prioritise their national interests over the need to 
push forward the development of international law to this direction. 
Therefore, the next Chapter will attempt to show in a historical 
perspective the dynamics that shaped the concept of aggression and 
finally led to its definition and criminalisation under the Rome 
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Statute. The analysis of these dynamics will contribute in our 
comprehension of the role that State sovereignty considerations and 
cosmopolitan ideals have played in this process, underlying the 
position they hold in the formation of international criminal law as 
it stands today. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PARADIGM OF AGGRESSION: STATE-
CENTRIC AND COSMOPOLITAN 
APPROACHES IN THE EFFORT TO OUTLAW 
AND CRIMINALISE AGGRESSION 
Introduction 
As shown in the previous Chapter, the theories of State 
sovereignty and cosmopolitanism have played their own, distinctive 
part in the formation of the Rome Statute regime and especially in 
the establishment of the complementary role of the ICC in the 
adjudication of international crimes. It has been demonstrated that 
the discrepancy between how complementarity should work 
according to the provisions of the Rome Statute and how it has 
worked so far in practice has resulted in sovereignty-related 
implications for the States Parties. As the role of State sovereignty 
in the development of international criminal law has now been 
established for the purposes of this thesis, this Chapter will now 
focus on the concept of aggression itself, using it as a paradigm of 
how the same theories of State sovereignty and cosmopolitanism 
have influenced its development. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
show that the ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ debate has 
been relevant throughout the history of outlawing, criminalising and 
defining aggression, from the League of Nations period until its 
inclusion in the Rome Statute and the formulation of the definition 
of the crime of aggression in the Review Conference held in 
Kampala in 2010.1 The driving forces that shaped this development 
are manifest in the outcome reached in the Kampala Resolution and 
what can be learnt from this outcome concerning whether and how 
                                                             
1 Resolution RC/Res.6, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression (11 June 2010) (Kampala Resolution) 
art 8bis. 
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State sovereignty concerns and cosmopolitan ideals can be properly 
balanced is what will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
To this end, Chapter II is separated into three sections. The first 
section examines the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919)2 
and the collective security system it established, which, despite its 
cosmopolitan intentions, failed to achieve its primary goal of world 
peace due to the emphasis given on sovereign interests. The second 
section moves on to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and the 
Article referring to ‘crimes against peace’ of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Charters.3 This first legal and judicial precedent of holding 
individuals accountable for waging aggressive war will be analysed 
as the first cosmopolitan effort,4 although not without criticism, 
made to criminalise and define aggression (as a ‘crime against 
peace’). Subsequently, the third section passes to the UN era and 
examines the State-centric character of the UN Charter5 provisions 
related to the prohibition on the use of force and especially the role 
attributed to the Security Council.  In particular, the discussion will 
focus on Article 39 and the powers of the Security Council in 
deciding upon international peace and security matters as well as the 
                                                             
2 Covenant of the League of Nations (adopted 28 April 1919, entered into force 10 
January 1920) [1919] UKTS 4. 
3 Charter of the International Military Tribunal  (adopted and entered into force 8 
August 1945) 82 UNTS 279 (Nuremberg Charter) and Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (adopted and entered into force 19 January 
1946) (Tokyo Charter) art 6a: ‘Crimes against peace: namely, planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.’ The provision 
reads almost the same in Article 5a of the Tokyo Charter except for two changes: 
‘…waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression…’ and ‘…or a war in 
violation of international law, treaties, agreements…’. 
4 The first step to this direction was taken with Articles 225 and 227 of the Treaty 
of Versailles, which arraigned Kaiser Wilhelm II for committing ‘a supreme 
offence against the international morality and the sanctity of treaties’. Though the 
Kaiser was never brought before a court to account for this international offence, 
this provision is the first official recognition that individuals (and not ‘abstract 
entities’ as Chief Justice Stone will say several years later) can be responsible for 
the commission of international crimes, and especially the initiation of an 
unlawful war. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and 
Germany (Treaty of Versailles) (adopted 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 
January 1920) 225 CTS 188. 
5 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
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definition of aggression as provided in the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) Resolution 33146 and its limited legal value and effect on 
the Security Council’s discretionary powers.  
 All of these instances in international legal history make 
manifest that, in the effort to make war unlawful as a means for 
settling inter-State disputes, to criminalise ‘crimes against peace’, to 
unequivocally prohibit the threat or use of force and to finally 
formulate a definition for aggression, both State sovereignty 
interests and cosmopolitan aspirations had to be taken into account 
in order to reach an outcome that would sufficiently respond to the 
need of developing international law in this direction. In this 
respect, the aim of this Chapter is to show in a historical perspective 
how the community of States treated the balancing of these two 
potentially antithetical considerations - the protection of State 
interests and the promotion of cosmopolitan ideas - in the effort to 
fight and/or define aggression. This analysis will ultimately bring us 
closer to the main subject of this thesis, which is to argue that the 
achievement of due balance between State sovereignty concerns and 
cosmopolitan ideals reflected in definitions of international crimes, 
eventually enhances their effectiveness and contributes to the 
success of international prosecutions for their commission. It is the 
author’s view that it is exactly this due balance that constitutes the 
key for the successful criminalisation and prosecution of 
international terrorism, a subject that will be analysed in detail in 
Chapters IV and V. 
I. The Covenant of the League of Nations: A 
cosmopolitan idea with a State-centric application 
After World War I, the need for a new global collective security 
system became apparent, a system which would give priority to 
universal moral values relating to peace rather than the traditional 
                                                             
6 UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974) UN Doc A/RES/3314. 
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ideas of the system of balance of powers.7 A proposal made to US 
President Woodrow Wilson by Colonel House in 1914 concerning 
an agreement between the US and the States of South America for 
mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity, 
inspired President Wilson to extrapolate this cosmopolitan model to 
Europe and the rest of the world.8 Article 10 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations reflected this core value of the new collective 
security system, stating that  
[t]he Members of the League undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity 
and existing political independence of all Members of the 
League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat 
or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the 
means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.9  
It has been argued that the Article expressed only a moral and not 
a legal obligation for the Member States of the League to consider 
aggression unlawful,10 however this was the first time that this 
general principle was unequivocally stated. The term aggression 
was used as such, but it seemed that there was no intention on the 
part of the drafters to include a definition, as it was thought that the 
emphasis put on the moral value of peace by the Member States 
would be enough for them to recognise aggression in practice.11 
However, during the negotiations of the drafting of the Covenant, 
the great powers were mostly wary of the extent of the obligations 
assumed towards the smaller States under Article 10 and the 
restraints posed on the more powerful.12 Britain was reluctant to 
                                                             
7 Page Wilson, Aggression, Crime and International Security (Routledge 2009) 
19. 
8 Charles Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol 1 (Ernest Benn Ltd 
1926) 216. 
9 Covenant of the League of Nations art 10. 
10 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (2nd edn, 
Clarendon Press 1981) 63. 
11 Wilson (n 7) 22. 
12 ibid 26. 
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assume positive obligations to protect the smaller States in light of 
Article 10, whereas France was looking to extend these obligations 
to any type of aggression, not only that related to political 
independence and territorial integrity.13 On the American side, the 
US Senate was more concerned with the power of the League to 
interfere with US actions,14 which was ultimately what prevented 
the US from becoming a member of the League.15 
As a compromise to reconcile the opposing views of the major 
powers, the US added the second part of Article 10 which conferred 
the power to the Executive Council of the League to actually decide 
how these obligations would be fulfilled. The political compromise 
of the Article, namely the assumption of only negative obligations 
by the Members on the one hand, and the power of the Council to 
give advice upon the means used for the fulfilment of these 
obligations on the other, is indicative of the then major powers’ 
willingness to take cosmopolitan steps for the prevention of war but 
in a rather modest way. Firstly, the Covenant did not specify 
whether the Members of the League were obliged to follow the 
Council’s advice or whether they were free to ignore it (in which 
case Article 10 was practically worthless).16 Secondly, the 
formulation of the Article suggested that the political and territorial 
status quo of the Members of the League was ‘just and expedient’17 
since the Members had the obligation not only to respect but also ‘to 
preserve’ from aggression ‘the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of all Members of the League’.18 Under this 
interpretation, it could be possible that the obligation ‘to preserve’ 
                                                             
13 ibid 23. 
14 ibid 23-25. 
15 ibid 26. 
16 ibid 33. This criticism was formulated by Canada in an attempt to propose 
amendments for Article 10. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. It is also suggested that the fact that Germany was ‘humiliated’ after the 
end of World War I by the Treaty of Versailles, which, among other things, 
deprived Germany of any territorial annexations or colonies, contributed to her 
initiating ‘aggressive warfare’ against the Allies of World War I (Robin Winks, 
Europe 1890-1945: crisis and conflict (OUP 2003) 209). Article 10 of the 
Covenant actually ‘freezes’ the territorial status quo as was formed by the Treaty. 
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would lead States to war in an effort to fulfil this guarantee 
enshrined in Article 10.19 
Nonetheless, subsequent Articles of the Covenant did not refer to 
‘aggression’ but to ‘war’, ‘threat to war’ (Article 11)20 and ‘act of 
war’ (Article 16).21 This discrepancy in terminology should not be 
seen as signifying that the context of ‘aggression’ and that of ‘war’ 
were different at the time. Although war could be normally defined 
as an official state of armed conflict, aggression was nowhere 
defined in the Covenant, and the use of the term was only limited to 
Article 10, the cornerstone of the new security system. The 
flexibility of the term was seen as desirable at the time of drafting,22 
in that it did not a priori restrict the types of acts that can constitute 
aggression or war. However, in practice, there were instances where 
this lack of definition led States to avoid obligations assumed under 
the Covenant, by denying the existence of a war-like situation in 
their territories,23 thus obstructing the interference of the League in 
situations where it would have been totally justified.   
Be that as it may, if read in conjunction with Articles 12, 13 and 
15,24 Article 10 attributed to aggression a dimension that it did not 
have until that time. These Articles obliged the Members of the 
                                                             
19 Brownlie (n 10) 62. 
20 Covenant of the League of Nations art 11(1): ‘Any war or threat of war, 
whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is 
hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League...’ 
21 ibid art 16: ‘Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its 
covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have 
committed an act of war against all other Members of the League...’ 
22 Brownlie (n 10) 55. 
23 During the conflict between China and Japan from 1937 to 1941, all the 
involved States refused to recognise that there was a war going on in the area. See 
ibid 60. 
24 Covenant of the League of Nations art 12: ‘The Members of the League agree 
that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they 
will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by 
the Council…’; art 13: ‘The Members of the League agree that whenever any 
dispute shall arise between them… they will submit the whole subject-matter to 
arbitration or judicial settlement.’; art 15: ‘If there should arise between Members 
of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to 
arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of 
the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council….’ 
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League to submit any ‘dispute likely to lead to a rupture’ to 
arbitration or judicial settlement.25 Thus, they provided a general 
basis by which to define the aggressor State, namely by the extent to 
which it complies with its obligations to use mechanisms of pacific 
dispute settlement as provided by the Covenant.26 Obliging States to 
use pacific means of dispute settlement indicates a hesitant but 
important step towards a cosmopolitan perspective of combatting 
aggression in light of the conservative collective security system as 
established by the League of Nations. 
In practical terms, Article 10 was in few cases successfully 
invoked. While it was successfully invoked in the Greco-Bulgarian 
dispute (1925) and in the dispute of Ethiopia against Britain and 
Italy (1926), it did not find successful application in the case of 
Manchuria (1931-33) and the second Ethiopian dispute against Italy 
(1935-36).27 It was not invoked at all in the case of Poland against 
Lithuania (1919-1920), Turkey against Armenia (1920), France 
against Germany (1923-25), Soviet Union against Finland (1939) 
and in the case of Germany’s rearmament (1935). 28 In the case of 
the dispute between Ethiopia against Britain and Italy, the concept 
of aggression was interpreted widely to include economic 
aggression as well.29 However, in the majority of cases where 
Article 10 could have been invoked, the political dynamics of the 
period did not allow any further involvement of the League security 
system, leading unavoidably to a further disturbance of world peace. 
Indicative of this state of affairs was the refusal of some small 
States, neighbouring Germany, to invoke Article 16 of the Covenant 
                                                             
25 In particular, Article 12 provides for an obligation not to resort to war ‘until 
three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the 
report by the Council…’ 
26 Brownlie (n 10) 57. 
27 Wilson (n 7) 37-42. 
28 ibid. 
29 In the dispute between Ethiopia against Britain and Italy, aggression was 
conceived in political and economic terms rather than military, since the League 
found that the financial agreement that was concluded in 1926 between the three 
States constituted an indirect threat to Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. See Wilson 
(n 7) 38. 
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against Germany, after its invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1938, for 
fear of being exposed to German animosity themselves.30 
Overall, the contribution of the Covenant, despite the lack of its 
practical value, consists of the direct recognition that aggression was 
now a matter of international concern.31 However, the efforts to 
submit States to an international institution with cosmopolitan goals 
related to world peace did not compensate for the States’ 
willingness to continue defending their sovereign interests at all 
costs. The League system failed, not the least due to the political 
climate of the period but also due to the overreliance on the 
individual members’ appreciation of whether and to what extent 
they should fulfil their Covenant obligations.32 In the subsequent 
years, the prohibition of the use of force would reappear in several 
international legal documents33 reflecting on the one hand, the need 
to create firmer foundations than those created by the Covenant and 
on the other, the fear that a possibility of a second large-scale war 
was imminent. The League security system failed to take into 
account the cosmopolitan aspirations enshrined in the Covenant and 
the sovereign interests of its great powers in a balanced way, and 
thus left the door open for further efforts towards this end.  
II. A cosmopolitan approach: ‘Crimes against peace’ 
under the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters 
Cosmopolitan aspirations shaped dynamically the development 
of international law after the end of World War II (WWII), with the 
                                                             
30 Brownlie (n 10) 59. 
31 Covenant of the League of Nations art 11(1).  
32 Brownlie (n 10) 60. 
33 Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance [1924] World Peace Foundation Pamphlet 
Series 480; League of Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes (Geneva Protocol) (adopted 2 October 1924); Treaty between the United 
States and other Powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of 
national policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact) (adopted 27 August 1928, entered into 
force 24 July 1929) 94 LNTS 57. The first two instruments used the term 
aggression as such but without ever coming into force, whereas the Kellogg 
Briand Pact has survived until today. 
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establishment of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg 
and Tokyo (IMTs). The IMTs, established to try individuals for the 
commission of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, put the foundations for the establishment of the ICC and 
the further development of international criminal law.34 As the first 
legal and judicial precedents of holding individuals accountable for 
international crimes,35 it is fair to characterise the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials as the genesis of international criminal law and ‘crimes 
against peace’ the predecessor of the newly-born crime of 
aggression.36  
The significance of the Nuremberg legacy with respect to the 
concept of aggression is twofold. Firstly, and for the first time, 
international tribunals implemented the concept of individual 
criminal liability for ‘crimes against peace’. Secondly, ‘crimes 
against peace’ were actually defined. Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine which factors facilitated the transition from the mere 
renunciation of war as a means of national policy, a principle 
enshrined in Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,37 which came 
into force during the inter-war years, to the establishment of 
individual criminal liability for, among other things, the waging of 
such a war.  
 
                                                             
34 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002) UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (Rome Statute). 
35 Admittedly, the trial of Peter Von Hagenbach in 1474 has been considered as 
the first prosecution before an international criminal tribunal for charges related to 
systematic violence against civilians, and especially rape as a war crime. See 
Helen Durham, ‘Women and International Criminal Law: steps forward or 
dancing backwards’ in Gideon Boas and ors (eds), International Criminal Justice, 
Legitimacy and Coherence (Edward Elgar 2012) 257; Gregory Gordon, ‘The Trial 
of Peter Von Hagenbach, Reconciling History, Historiography and International 
Criminal Law’ in Kevin Heller and Gerry Simpson (eds), The Hidden Histories of 
War Crimes Trials (OUP 2013). 
36 For an analysis of the impact of the IMTS on international criminal law see 
Kevin J Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of 
International Criminal Law (OUP 2011). 
37 Kellogg-Briand Pact art1: ‘The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare… 
that they condemn recourse to war…’ 
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In 1943, when the Allies first launched the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, their intention was to prosecute the German 
leaders only for the commission of war crimes, a concept which was 
well established by that time.38 However, within a year, the Allies 
authorised the tribunals to prosecute the Nazi leaders on the basis of 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity,39 
with the first category acquiring in the final judgment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal the title of the ‘supreme international crime’.40 
The incorporation of ‘crimes against peace’ into the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal was a bold legal innovation since it 
extended the scope of individual liability to violations of jus ad 
bellum for the first time. This legal innovation of the Tribunal to act 
both as a legislator and a judge41 gave rise to much controversy 
among jurists and academics42 and constituted the legal basis for the 
defence of the accused. The defence argued that the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege, which prohibits retroactive criminal 
prosecutions,43 ‘derives from the recognition of the fact that any 
defendant must needs [sic] consider himself unjustly treated if he is 
punished under an ex post facto law’.44 Specifically, the three main 
arguments of the defence were that i) aggressive war was not 
                                                             
38 William Schabas, ‘Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes 
Against Peace Became the “Supreme International Crime” ’ in Mauro Politi and 
Giuseppe Nesi (eds), The International Criminal Court and the Crime of 
Aggression (Ashgate 2004) 17. 
39 ibid. 
40
 United States of America et al v Goering et al, Judgment of the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal (1946) reprinted in (1947) 41 American Journal of 
International Law 172, 186. 
41 Richard Overy, ‘The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the making’ in 
Philippe Sands (ed), From Nuremberg to the Hague, The Future of International 
Criminal Justice (CUP 2003) 2. 
42 Senator Robert A Taft of Ohio characterised the judgment in Nuremberg as a 
‘miscarriage of justice’ and held that ‘the idea of justice in Europe might have 
been discredited for the years to come’ (in Frederic Mignone, ‘After Nuremberg, 
Tokyo’ (1946-47) 25 Texas Law Review 475, 476). See also Overy (n 41) 15. For 
an opposite view see Hans Kelsen, ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial 
Constitute a Precedent in International Law?’ (1947) 1 International Law 
Quarterly 153, 165. 
43 Affirmation of the nullum crimen sine lege principle can be found in many 
human rights treaties as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) art 11(2). 
44
 Motion adopted by all defense counsel, 19 November 1945 (1948) 1 IMT 168–
170. 
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criminal in 1939, when WWII began; ii) it did not carry individual 
criminal responsibility and iii) there was no international court with 
potential jurisdiction to try the defendants.45 These arguments were 
also complemented by the lack of legal grounds for Germany’s 
sanctions, since Germany had withdrawn from the League before 
the beginning of the war and the League system had already failed 
to counteract German aggression.46 Thus, the great powers could not 
claim that Germany had violated commitments under the League 
Covenant. 
However, in his opening speech, the Chief Prosecutor of the 
United States, Justice Jackson, held that the illegality of aggressive 
war was established by the Kellogg-Briand Pact and that in any case 
the outlawry of aggressive war was one of the ‘generally accepted 
rules of international law’47 which were part of the German Law 
under the Weimar Constitution. Moreover, concerning the legal 
basis of prosecuting the accused on crimes against peace, the 
Tribunal held that the nullum crimen sine lege principle was 
relative, being subject to exceptions, and could not apply for the 
defendants since they ‘must have known that they were acting in 
defiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they 
carried out their designs of invasion and aggression.’48 
Regardless of these arguments however, the prosecution knew 
that these trials did not absolutely conform to principles of legality49 
and for that reason the Tribunal tried to emphasise the evolving 
                                                             
45 Wilson (n 7) 55. 
46 ibid. 
47 International Military Tribunal, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, 
Opening Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors (HMSO 1946) 39. 
48 William Schabas, Unimaginable atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the 
War Crimes Tribunals (OUP 2012) 49.  
49 ‘The Tribunal was not to conform to existing principles in international law but 
to establish new rules of international conduct and agreed boundaries in the 
violation of human rights.’ in Overy (n 41) 23. See also Brownlie (n 10) 173, for 
the opinion of Judge Pal of India of the Tokyo Tribunal. 
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character of international law50 and the fact that it was trying to fill a 
gap in international criminal procedure.51 Nevertheless, if one tries 
to trace the reasons why the great powers found that this war was 
different from the previous ones, in a way that required the 
establishment of individual liability for the waging of it, one will be 
confronted mainly with cosmopolitan considerations.52 The 
Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced the use of force as a means of 
national policy but did not establish individual liability for an 
unlawful use of force. The reasons for this transition from the 
outlawing to the criminalisation of aggression were based on 
cosmopolitan considerations and have to be sought in the actual 
nature of WWII.53 Firstly, Germany was waging wars for the mere 
purpose of enslavement of people and annexation of territories,54 
without any justification of self-defence. Secondly, the war had a 
strong ideological character and the supporters of this ideology 
committed grave crimes against other ethnic or racial groups.55 The 
commission of crimes that stems from ideological motives, such as 
the Holocaust, although constituting national policy, was not 
                                                             
50 ‘The law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a 
changing world’, abstract from the Nuremberg Judgment as found in Mignone (n 
42) 481. 
51 Brownlie (n 10) 169. 
52 It has been argued however that, at least on the US part, an important 
consideration for the conduct of criminal trials against the Nazi leaders was to 
create a show for the American public. See Joseph Brunner, ‘American 
Involvement in the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial Process’ (2002) 1 (2) Michigan 
Journal of History 
<https://michiganjournalhistory.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/brunner_joseph.pdf
> accessed 2 July 2015; Jeremy Peterson, ‘Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the 
Trial of Saddam Hussein’ (2007) 48 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 257. 
53 ‘If aggressive warfare in violation of treaty obligation is a matter of 
international cognizance, the preparations for it must also be of concern to the 
international community’ in Robert Jackson, ‘Opening Address for the United 
States’ in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression vol I (United States Government 
Printing Office 1946). 
54 James N Boeving, ‘Aggression, International Law and the ICC: An Argument 
for the Withdrawal of Aggression from the Rome Statute’ (2004-2005) 43 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 557, 565. 
55 However, these arguments cannot be invoked in the case of the Japanese war 
criminals. Japanese efforts for regional domination were generally supported and 
there seemed to be no clear pattern of conduct or ideology during the war but 
rather opportunism. Besides, Japan used a range of means to promote Japanese 
domination apart from wars of conquest (such as the installation of puppet 
regimes) which could not be characterised as aggression (Wilson (n 7) 64-66). 
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regarded as a pure act of State by the Tribunal. The individuals 
involved in the commission of these crimes bore their own separate 
responsibility since they could have chosen not to become part of 
this ideology and consequently, to abstain from committing crimes 
in the name of it. Thus, it can be said that they made the moral 
choice to engage in such actions, disregarding universal values, such 
as the peace, security and well-being of the individuals they chose to 
victimise. For these reasons, the Nuremberg trials were the first 
occasion in the history of international law where individuals were 
brought to the fore of the international arena, both as alleged 
offenders but also as victims, with the criminalisation of violations 
of international law committed against individuals. The Nuremberg 
trials shifted the focus and application of international law to the 
individual, giving thus priority to cosmopolitan purposes, such as 
the fight against impunity, protection of all human beings and 
prevention from the commission of grave crimes that can put the 
peace, security and well-being of the world at serious peril, over 
sovereignty concerns of the State involved. 
All in all, the Nuremberg trials were innovative when they 
established individual criminal responsibility for the commission of 
crimes against peace, the forerunner of the crime of aggression. 
Their contribution to the introduction of ‘crimes against peace’ in an 
international criminal law context cannot be underestimated. The 
Nuremberg trials were the starting point of a new era for 
international criminal law and procedure, an era where war 
criminals, regardless of their status and potential to claim immunity, 
could and should be prosecuted and punished for their acts. 
However, apart from this cosmopolitan-oriented development of the 
attribution of individual criminal liability for aggression, the newly 
established UN condemned and prohibited the use of force using a 
more State-oriented approach, by putting more emphasis on the 
protection of State sovereign interests rather than cosmopolitan 
purposes.  
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III. A State-centric approach: ‘Act of aggression’ 
under the UN Charter and UNGA Resolution 3314 
a) The discretionary powers of the Security Council under UN 
Charter Article 39 
On 26 June 1945, the same day that the proposal to make waging 
a war of aggression a crime under international law was submitted 
to the London Conference, the UN Charter outlawed the use of force 
in San Francisco.56 The UN Charter framework on the prohibition of 
the use of force can be summarised as such: Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter provides that  
[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.  
This statement has been accepted as constituting a prohibition of 
customary law and thus, it is legally binding for all States (even for 
the few non-Members of the UN).57 Furthermore, Article 24 
complements Article 2(4) by conferring primary responsibility to 
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security58 and Article 39 confers to the Security Council the power 
to determine any ‘threat of the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression.’ These Articles introduced a number of concepts which 
are complementary to aggression and therefore, it is necessary to 
                                                             
56 Schabas (n 38) 27-28. 
57
 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 paras 188-90; Case 
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168. The former decision has 
been criticised however for its scarce citation of State practice and opinio juris 
and the fact that it did not take into account contrary State practice (in Hilary C M 
Charlesworth, ‘Customary International Law and the Nicaragua Case’ (1984-87) 
11 Australian Ybk of International Law 1, 18-22 and 28). 
58 UN Charter art 24(1): ‘In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibilityfor the maintenance of international peace and security…’. 
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examine to what extent they attributed to it new features 
independent of the ones acquired at Nuremberg. The UN Charter, 
unlike the Nuremberg one, created obligations for States to abstain 
from the use of force without any particular role attributed to 
individuals. It should be remarked that the creation of the collective 
security system established through the UN came as a necessary 
complement to the attribution of individual liability in the effort of 
the outlawing of war. However, this new collective security system, 
with the Security Council in the centre of its function, takes a more 
conservative, State-centred approach in the fight against aggression. 
While the UN Charter explicitly prohibits the use or threat of force 
by States, it also safeguards absolute discretion for the members of 
the Security Council to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a 
violation of Article 2(4) has occurred. To this end, Article 39 
provides some further explanations on the manifestations of ‘a 
threat or use of force’, by naming the circumstances under which the 
Security Council can take action against a State in order to restore 
international peace and security. 
Article 39 authorises the Security Council to determine whether a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression 
have been committed. The Security Council has full discretion in 
determining what specific actions can fall into one of the three 
abovementioned circumstances.59 However, it has been argued that 
generally, a threat to the peace is conceived of as a State’s warning 
to use force or a State’s active preparation for hostilities.60 Article 
1(1) of the UN Charter refers to the ‘prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace’, signifying that the term ‘threat’ is possibly 
                                                             
59 Leland M Goodrich and Edvard I Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, 
Commentary and Documents (World Peace Foundation 1946) 156; Robert Cryer, 
‘The Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to Coherence?’ (1996) 1 Journal 
of Armed Conflict Law 161, 163. 
60 Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (CUP 2013) 67. See UNSC Res 418 (4 November 
1977) UN Doc S/RES/418 referring to South African military built-up and 
acquisition of arms as a threat to the peace. 
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used in its literal sense.61 However, the Security Council practice 
has not been consistent regarding the criteria of when a situation 
constitutes a threat to the peace62 and the term has been employed in 
situations ranging from actual uses of inter-State armed force,63 
internal conflicts64 and mass violations of international humanitarian 
or human rights law65 to acts of terrorism.66 This ample use of the 
term probably signifies that a determination of an act as a threat to 
the peace is the least offensive one that the Security Council can 
make about a State’s use of force.67 Therefore, by implication, one 
could argue that the three circumstances of Article 39 are placed in 
order of progressive severity.68 Concerning the concept of a breach 
to the peace, it has been argued that this circumstance consists of all 
actual hostilities of inter-State armed forces69 and finally the term 
‘act of aggression’ is theoretically reserved for the commission of 
grave breaches of the peace.70 In practice, there have been a few 
occasions in which the Security Council has classified conduct as 
                                                             
61 McDougall (n 60) 66.  
62 See generally Cryer (n 59). 
63 See eg UNSC Res 353 (20 July 1974) UN Doc S/RES/353 concerning the 
Turkish invasion in Cyprus. 
64 UNSC Res 688 (5 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688 concerning the military 
action against the Kurds in Northern Iraq; UNSC Res 713 (25 September 1991) 
UN Doc S/RES/713 on the situation in the Former Yugoslavia; UNSC Res 918 
(17 May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/918 on the situation in Rwanda; more recently 
UNSC Res 2134 (28 January 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2134 on the situation in the 
Central African Republic. 
65 UNSC Res 771 (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/771 on the situation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; UNSC Res 808 (22 February 1993) UN Doc S/RES/808 
referring to violations of international humanitarian law and ‘ethnic cleansing’ as 
a threat to international peace and security. 
66 UNSC Res 731 (21 January 1992) UN Doc S/RES/731 affirming the right of 
States ‘to protect their nationals from acts of terrorism that constitute threats to 
international peace and security’; UNSC Res 2178 (24 September 2014) UN Doc 
S/RES/2178. 
67 McDougall (n 60) 66. 
68 ibid 67; Boeving (n 54) 566. 
69 Quincy Wright, ‘The Prevention of Aggression’ (1956) 50 American Journal of 
International Law 514, 524; McDougall (n 60) 67. 
70 Jochen Frowein and Nico Krisch, ‘Article 39’ in Bruno Simma and ors (eds), 
The Charter of the United Nations (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 722; Theodor 
Meron,‘Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court’ (2001) 25 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review 1, 11. 
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aggression since 1945.71 However, the term was employed in a 
rather ambiguous way, usually appearing in the preamble of the 
relevant resolution and used as an adjective rather than a noun.72 
Moreover, the permanent members of the Security Council 
occasionally abstained in these determinations,73 enforcing the idea 
that the characterisation of a State’s actions as acts of aggression 
bears the gravest implications for the concerned State. The finding 
of an act of aggression was left entirely to the discretion of the 
Security Council and no definition was provided in the UN Charter. 
However, it was felt that further clarification of what exactly 
constitutes an act of aggression was required, a need that was 
fulfilled almost 30 years later, with the UNGA Resolution 3314.   
b) The UNGA Resolution 3314: a poor legal precedent  
The first attempt to define aggression for the purposes of the UN 
Charter was made by the International Law Commission (ILC), 
which held that aggression cannot be specifically defined and 
consequently, every conflict should be considered on its merits.74 
However, the ILC included aggression as a crime in the 1954 Draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind,75 but 
did not provide a definition for an ‘act of aggression’.76 Generally, 
                                                             
71 UNSC Res 387 (31 March 1976) UN Doc S/RES/387 concerning acts of 
aggression committed by South Africa against Angola; UNSC Res 326 (2 
February 1973) UN Doc S/RES/326 (Southern Rhodesia). 
72 In UNSC Res 386 (17 March 1976) UN Doc S/RES/386 (acts of aggression 
committed by Southern Rhodesia against Mozambique) and UNSC Res 527 (15 
December 1982) UN Doc S/RES/527 (acts of aggression by South Africa against 
Lesotho) a reference is made in the preamble to ‘provocative’ or ‘premeditated 
aggressive acts’.   
73 UNSC Res 573 (4 October 1985) UN Doc S/RES/573 (US abstention on 
resolution about Israeli attack against PLO headquarters); UNSC Res 611 (25 
April 1988) UN Doc S/RES/611 (US abstention on resolution about Israel 
assassination in Tunisia). 
74 ILC Second report by Mr J Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur, Chapter II entitled 
‘The Possibility and Desirability of a Definition of Aggression’ (1951) Ybk of the 
International Law Commission vol II, UN Doc A/CN.4/44. 
75 ILC ‘Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (28 
July 1954) UN Doc Supp No 9 (A/2693). 
76 ILC Special Rapporteur Spiropoulos argued that defining aggression would be a 
‘waste of time’ and that, even though aggression could be recognisable to anyone, 
it was impossible to be comprehensively defined. (ILC ‘Report by Mr J 
Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur’ (1950) Ybk of the International Law 
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aggression was considered as any use of armed force that does not 
fall into the two exceptions provided for by the UN Charter, namely 
the use of force for the purpose of self-defence or after Security 
Council authorisation.77 The General Assembly felt that a clearer 
picture of what constituted aggression was needed and thus, 
appointed the first Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression in 1952.78 After four Special Committees and over 20 
years of deliberations, the General Assembly passed Resolution 
3314 in 1974 with a definition of aggression. The definition is 
comprised of two parts, a generic definition and an indicative list of 
acts that can possibly amount to acts of aggression.  
Article 2 of Resolution 3314 introduces two principles that 
should be taken into account by the Security Council when it 
exercises its powers under Article 39 to determine an act of 
aggression: the priority and the de minimis principles. According to 
the priority principle, a use of armed force is prima facie evidence 
of an act of aggression if it is the first use of force committed 
between the belligerent States.79 In this respect, it could be 
presumed that, by implication, the first use of armed force can fall 
into the scope of Article 2 of Resolution 3314, if it is not carried out 
in self-defence or under Security Council authorisation, a finding 
which would require further interpretation, considering that a State 
will always use some type of legal justification when it decides to 
use armed force against another State.80 The provision continues 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Commission, vol II, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1, 262 as found in 
McDougall (n 60) 4). 
77 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression’ (8 October-9 November 1956) UN Doc Supp No 16 (A/3574). 
78 Benjamin Ferencz, ‘Defining Aggression: Where it stands and where it’s going’ 
(1972) 66 American Journal of International Law 491, 494. 
79 UNGA Res 3314 art 2: ‘The first use of armed force by a State in contravention 
of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression 
although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that 
a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be 
justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the 
acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.’ 
80 See for example, the opinion of ICJ judge, Christopher Greenwood regarding 
the war against Sadam Hussein, that ‘the war was legal by reason of SC 
Resolution 678’ and the arguments made by Serbia concerning genocide in the 
100 
 
090015246 
 
however with the incorporation of the de minimis principle, stating 
that an act of aggression or its consequences should be of sufficient 
gravity in order to be characterised as such by the Security Council. 
This principle acquires particular importance when examined in 
conjunction with Article 3, which provides an indicative list of the 
acts that can amount to acts of aggression. The characterisation of 
these acts as acts of aggression is not automatic and has to be 
justified ‘in light of other relevant circumstances’,81 including that 
they are of sufficient gravity. In this respect, Article 2 gives the 
Security Council the discretion to minimise the list of acts provided 
in Article 3. Similarly, Article 4 allows the Security Council to add 
to the list other acts that can constitute acts of aggression, stating 
that the list in Article 3 is not exhaustive.82 Consequently, the 
overall effect of the main provisions of Resolution 3314 is to 
guarantee full discretion for the Security Council to make 
determinations under Article 39 of the UN Charter by i) allowing 
the Security Council to add and detract acts that can qualify as acts 
of aggression from the list of Article 3, ii) keeping the threshold of 
seriousness of a potential act of aggression undefined and iii) 
refraining from providing any distinction between the terms used in 
Article 39.  
As a general remark, the drafting of Resolution 3314 was not the 
result of a search by UN Member States to find an accurate and 
functional definition for aggression, but rather of their need ‘to 
maximise the value of the definition to themselves as an instrument 
to be invoked in support of their own political objectives, or to 
minimise its value as an instrument invoked by others against 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Use of Force cases (Provisional Measures) [1999] ICJ Rep 136 paras 34-35 and 
in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) 
[2007] ICJ Rep 43 para 278. 
81 UNGA Res 3314 art 2. 
82 ibid art 4. 
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themselves’.83  Resolution 3314 does not in any way affect the 
scope of the Security Council’s powers in determining an act of 
aggression, entrenching the sovereign interests of its Members 
States.84 As an international instrument, it was drafted by the 
General Assembly, which has no power to restrain the Security 
Council’s discretion.85 In this respect, its legal value is minimised in 
relation to the use of force provisions of the UN Charter.86 In any 
case, the purpose for which Resolution 3314 was drafted, as 
manifested by its Preamble, was to be used only as a guideline for 
the Security Council when exercising its powers under Article 39, 
without imposing any legal limitations to it or any legal obligations 
to the Member States of the UN.87 
Conclusion 
The interplay between State sovereignty and cosmopolitan 
concerns was present in all efforts to outlaw, criminalise or define 
aggression but did not end with the establishment of the UN and the 
prohibition of the use of force. Looking back, the cosmopolitan 
basis on which the League of Nations was meant to function aimed 
at the enforcement of the will of the majority of States, but it did not 
take into account that it was the great powers of that period that had 
to enforce that will.88 On the other hand, the new collective security 
system established by the UN was structured in such a way so as to 
assert that the great powers will have a mechanism through which to 
                                                             
83 Julius Stone, Conflict Through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to 
Aggression (Johns Hopkins University Press 1977) 147-48. 
84 Julius Stone, ‘Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression’ 
(1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 224, 228. 
85 Mc Dougall (n 60) 77. 
86 Stone (n 84) 225. 
87 UNGA Res 3314 Preamble para 4: ‘…Calls the attention of the Security 
Council to the Definition of Aggression, as set out below, and recommends that it 
should, as appropriate, take account of that Definition as guidance in determining, 
in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of aggression.’ 
88 Kenneth Anderson, ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and 
Unintended Consequences’ (2009) 20 (2) European Journal of International Law 
331, 354. 
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promote their own State interests, the Security Council.89 It has been 
argued that in 1945 it was perfectly understood that the League 
system was ‘too democratic and too liberal’ and thus, it was 
preferable to establish a new collective security system that might 
‘weaken certain universalistic principles and compromise the 
effective response to possible transgressions where a large nation 
was involved, but that was a lot better than no security system at 
all’.90 With the UN Charter operating on a State-centred basis and 
the Security Council enjoying full discretion in making 
determinations of aggression, there was no development in the field 
of international criminal law with respect to cases of aggression. 
The cosmopolitan legacy of the Nuremberg precedent was not used 
to the direction of formulating a definition for aggression. This 
could have only been achieved with the establishment of an 
international criminal court with explicit jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression which, while avoiding the criticisms of its Nuremberg 
predecessor, would push forward the development of international 
criminal law in the field. This development could only be 
effectuated by taking all the relevant parameters into account, as set 
out by the UN Charter and its provisions related to aggression and 
the use of force.  
In this respect, the next Chapter will turn to the Rome Statute 
regime and the definition of the crime of aggression as formulated 
in the Kampala Resolution. The definition formulated therein 
contains aspects which pertain to the ‘State sovereignty versus 
cosmopolitanism’ debate and it is precisely these aspects that will 
demonstrate whether and to what extent the definition of aggression 
achieves the delicate balance required between these two opposing 
                                                             
89 ibid. The UN Charter ensured that no P-5 State would ever be charged with 
aggression or a breach of the peace by the Security Council, given the veto 
provisions. See David P Forsythe, ‘Political Trials? The UN Security Council and 
the Development of International Criminal Law’ in William Schabas and ors 
(eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives (Ashgate 2012) 484. 
90 Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the 
United Nations (Random House 2006) 27-28. 
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dynamics. Their influence on the Kampala definition forms an 
essential part of this thesis, as it will make a valuable contribution 
on the discussion of how an international definition for terrorism 
should be approached for the purposes of international criminal 
justice under the prism of these same dynamics. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PARADIGM OF AGGRESSION: THE 
KAMPALA DEFINITION AND LESSONS 
LEARNT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFINING 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
Introduction 
Chapter II has demonstrated that the need for protection of State 
sovereign interests and the effort to promote cosmopolitan 
aspirations both clearly influenced the development of international 
law in the field of outlawing, criminalising and finally defining 
aggression. While the first collective security system ever made was 
founded upon the cosmopolitan idea of world peace and the fight 
against aggression, it soon became obvious that these ideals could 
not find practical implementation in a security system where States 
had absolute discretion whether or not to assume their obligations 
under the League of Nations Covenant. The Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials, though not without criticism, were a welcome cosmopolitan 
development in that they brought the protection of individuals from 
international crimes to the centre of international attention. The 
Nuremberg trials sought and found the responsibility of one of the 
most, if not the most, criminal wars in European history, not in the 
abstract concept of ‘State’ but in particular individuals who had 
carried out particular criminal acts, with criminal intent. 
Complementary to this judicial effort to criminalise aggression, 
came a political one, with the establishment of the UN collective 
security system and the prohibition on the use of force. While the 
UN Charter prohibits the use of force for practically all States, it 
does indeed preserve a special place for the members of the Security 
Council in its decision-making mechanisms, as they are empowered 
to determine whether aggression has occurred, who can qualify as 
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the aggressor State and ultimately what aggression actually consists 
of. These wide discretionary powers do not come without severe 
implications for the development of international law in the fight 
against aggression, by rendering this fight selective, undermining 
the protection of individuals from the commission of aggressive acts 
and finally ensuring that the arm of the UN Charter regime will not 
reach the sovereign interests of - at least the permanent - Security 
Council members. 
The criminalisation of aggression under the Rome Statute is an 
effort to counter-balance this State-oriented approach of the 
prohibition of the use of force, by holding individuals, and in 
particular, political and military leaders, criminally responsible. The 
shift, once again after the Nuremberg trials, turns to the individual 
responsible and not to the State: the crime of aggression can be 
committed by the leadership of a State, having been implicated in 
the commission of an act of aggression. However, during the Rome 
Conference, it seemed impossible to arrive at any widely accepted 
definition. After the entering into force of the Rome Statute, the 
Assembly of States Parties established the Special Working Group 
for the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA), whose work resulted in the 
Resolution adopted in the Kampala Conference which introduced a 
definition and the conditions of the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
Article 8bis of the Resolution adopted in the Review Conference 
in Kampala defines the crime of aggression for the purposes of the 
Rome Statute and reads as follows:  
 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person 
in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, of an act of 
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
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constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ‘act of aggression’ means the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a 
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 
1974, qualify as an act of aggression:…1 
 
The final text of the definition, complemented by the list of acts 
that can qualify as acts of aggression taken verbatim from Article 3 
of UNGA Resolution 3314 (Resolution 3314), follows a twofold 
structure. Paragraph 1 defines the individual crime of aggression 
whereas paragraph 2 repeats the definition of an ‘act of aggression’, 
as was formulated in Resolution 3314.2 This twofold structure 
serves the purpose of linking the individual crime of aggression to 
the State act of aggression, a link considered necessary by the 
delegations during the negotiations of the SWGCA. 
Looking at the structure of each one of the paragraphs, we can 
further discern the constituent elements of both parts of the 
definition. The definition for the individual crime of aggression is 
composed by i) the actus reus (‘…planning, preparation, initiation 
or execution…’), ii) the leadership requirement clause (‘…by a 
person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State…’) and iii) the threshold 
                                                             
1 Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression (11 June 2010) 
(Kampala Resolution) art 8bis. 
2 The first sentence of para 2 is taken from Article 1 of UNGA Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) (14 December 1974). The rest of para 2 is a repetition of Article 3 of the 
same Resolution which provides a list of acts that may constitute acts of 
aggression. 
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clause (‘…of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.’). Similarly, the definition for the State act of 
aggression is composed by i) a chapeau clause which defines the act 
of aggression following the definition of Article 1 of Resolution 
3314 and ii) a list of acts that can constitute acts of aggression if 
they fulfil the requirements of the chapeau clause. 
It is not one of the purposes of this Chapter to include a 
discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of each of the particular 
constituents of the definition. Instead, this Chapter will start with an 
analysis of those elements that are of relevance to the ‘State 
sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ debate. To this end, the first 
section will try to demonstrate how the ‘leadership requirement’ 
clause of the definition does in fact enhance the role of 
cosmopolitanism in an international criminal law context, by 
bringing individuals of a high political or military status to the fore 
of the international arena not only as alleged perpetrators of 
international crimes but also as alleged ‘violators’ of a State’s 
fundamental rights (sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence). The second section will discuss the ‘manifest 
violation’ threshold and the question of what impact it will have in 
the admission of aggression cases to the ICC. As was discussed in 
Chapter I, the ICC has sometimes shown so far a rather 
interventionist and dynamic approach in admitting cases concerning 
the other Article 5 crimes. However, the prevailing view concerning 
the meaning and role of the ‘manifest violation’ clause is that it will 
significantly restrain the ICC’s competence of jurisdiction in 
aggression cases, in that only the most serious and least disputable 
of them will be able to meet this threshold.3 Whether this is a 
                                                             
3 Claus Kress, ‘Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future of 
the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus’ (2010) 20 (4) European 
Journal of International Law 1129, 1138; James Potter, ‘The Threshold in the 
Proposed Definition of the Crime of Aggression’ (2008) 6 New Zealand Ybk of 
International Law 155, 166; Claus Kress and Leonie von Holtzendorf, ‘The 
108 
 
090015246 
 
 
desirable or an undesirable consequence requires a lot of discussion 
but what is of relevance here is the approach that the ICC will 
follow if it is ever in a position to rule the admissibility of an 
aggression case. This approach will indicate whether the ICC is 
willing to assume an interventionist role, more compatible to the 
cosmopolitan model, by setting the ‘manifest’ threshold low, or 
whether it will set the threshold high and refrain itself from taking a 
view on controversial, which are also the more frequent, cases that 
pertain to the unlawful use of force. The third section will then 
examine the relationship that the Rome Statute regime creates 
between the ICC competence of adjudicating aggression cases and 
the Security Council powers to determine the existence of an act of 
aggression. It will offer an examination of the concerns that framed 
the issue of balancing the roles of the ICC as a judicial body that 
seeks to promote a cosmopolitan model and that of the Security 
Council as a political body that seeks to preserve the sovereign 
interests of its Member States, and under this perspective, it will 
discuss the compromise reached in Kampala. Ultimately, the last 
section is going to discuss the lessons that can be learnt from the 
Kampala process in the quest of a definition for terrorism. Its focus 
will lie on how similar concerns can be raised in the context of 
terrorism and how they should be addressed under the light of the 
required balance to be achieved between State-centric and 
cosmopolitan considerations. 
It is the author’s suggestion that some aspects of the Kampala 
definition of aggression and the conditions introduced for the 
exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction by the Kampala Resolution are 
significant examples of how the definition and prosecution of 
international crimes can raise concerns that pertain to the ‘State 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’, (2010) 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1179, 1211; Stephen Barriga, ‘Negotiating the 
amendments on the crime of aggression’ in Barriga and Claus Kress (eds), The 
travaux préparatoires of the crime of aggression (CUP 2012) 29; Sergey Sayapin, 
The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press 2014) 
262. 
109 
 
090015246 
 
 
sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ debate. This Chapter, 
therefore, aims at demonstrating how cosmopolitan purposes, in the 
form of international criminal justice, and sovereign interests, in the 
form of Security Council powers, were balanced in the case of 
aggression. The analysis of the connection between the definition 
and prosecution of aggression with the State-centric and 
cosmopolitan theories will pave the way for the following Chapter, 
which will discuss how similar concerns have been raised by some 
current efforts of defining and criminalising international terrorism. 
I. The ‘leadership requirement’ clause 
The ‘leadership requirement’ clause comes directly from the legacy 
of the Nuremberg trials where crimes against peace, the equivalent 
of aggression at the time, were considered as policy level crimes4 
and therefore, it has long been linked to the commission of the 
crime of aggression.5 It has been argued that this connection is the 
consequence of the nature of aggression as a ‘State crime’, which 
can only be prosecuted and punished through the prosecution and 
punishment of the leaders of the aggressor State, having acted 
collectively.6 The crime of aggression is, by definition, more State-
centric comparing to the other Article 5 crimes of the Rome Statute, 
in that its focus lies on the protection from the use of force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
States,7 rather than the protection of individuals, which is the focus 
                                                             
4 Kevin J Heller, ‘Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the 
Crime of Aggression’ (2007) (18) 3 European Journal of International Law 477, 
488. 
5 Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (CUP 2013)169; Sayapin (n 3) 259; Barriga (n 3) 
22-23. See also ILC Commentary on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind, which limits responsibility for the crime of aggression 
to ‘leaders’ and ‘organisers’ in UNGA ‘The ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (6 May-26 July 1996) UN Doc Supp No 10 
(A/51/10) 83. 
6 Kai Ambos, ‘The Crime of Aggression after Kampala’ (2010) 53 German Ybk 
of International Law 463, 483. 
7 Robert Heinsch, ‘The Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden 
for the Future?’ (2010) Goettingen Journal of International Law 713, 722. 
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of the criminalisation of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.  
As such, the ‘leadership requirement’ clause of the crime of 
aggression brings with it a novelty which, although being of a 
theoretical character, is relevant to the ‘State sovereignty versus 
cosmopolitanism’ debate. International law is usually conceived of 
as a field of law which regulates the disputes of either States versus 
States (under public international law or the law on State 
responsibility) or individuals versus individuals, under international 
criminal law, as it has been applied by international tribunals and 
the ICC up to date. In both these situations, we will find a State or 
an individual having committed a violation or a crime under 
international law against a State or an individual who has suffered 
the results of this violation or crime. The European Court of Human 
Rights is an example of how a variation of this ‘State versus State’ 
or ‘individual versus individual’ equation is applied, by allowing 
individuals to bring claims against States.8 In this equation, the 
individual is always to be found on the side of the allegedly 
wronged person (the ‘victim’) and the State on the side of the 
alleged ‘wrongdoer’. Nevertheless, the crime of aggression, because 
of the ‘leadership requirement’ clause in its definition, is the only 
occasion in international law that permits an equation where States 
are on the side of the victim whereas individuals are on the side of 
the ‘wrongdoers’ against them. The crime of aggression protects 
States’ fundamental rights against acts of aggression, which 
although being conceived of as committed by States, are prosecuted 
and punished through the prosecution and punishment of individuals 
under the Rome Statute. While cosmopolitan thinking is usually 
linked to the protection of individuals despite State sovereignty 
considerations, the protection of State interests against individuals 
                                                             
8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols No 11 and 14) 
(adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5, arts 34-
35. 
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who occupy leadership positions and are in a position to ‘plan, 
prepare, initiate and execute an act of aggression’ is a manifestation 
of cosmopolitanism in reverse. Therefore, the effect of the 
‘leadership requirement’ clause in a criminal definition of 
aggression is that protection is afforded not only to the individual 
victims of international crimes but also to States, ‘victims’ of 
individuals who are in a position to violate their rights. 
Be that as it may, the formulation of the ‘leadership requirement’ 
in the Kampala definition does not go without some criticism. It has 
been argued that the leadership requirement makes the scope of the 
definition narrow, or at least narrower than the ‘leadership 
requirement’ standard that was applicable at the Nuremberg trials.9 
Looking back at the Industrialist cases of the IMT and the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NMT), established by the United 
States in accordance with Law No 10, both tribunals held that 
private economic actors could commit all the acts listed in the 
definition of crimes against peace, namely ‘planning, preparing, 
initiating and waging wars of aggression’.10 Specifically, paragraph 
2f of Law No 10 made it clear that both private economic actors and 
third-State officials could be convicted for crimes against peace.11 
                                                             
9 Ambos (n 6) 483; Heinsch (n 7) 722-23; Heller (n 4) 478-79. For a contrary 
opinion see Michael J Glennon, ‘The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression’ (2010) 
35 Yale Journal of International Law 71, 100. McDougall argues however that the 
leadership requirement standard was not applied in a uniform pattern at the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in the cases concerning the commission of crimes 
against peace (McDougall (n 5) 169-78). 
10 Heller (n 4) 480. In the Schacht and Speer cases, both defendants, responsible 
for Germany’s rearmament, were acquitted. In the first case, the Prosecution 
failed to prove that the defendant had any knowledge of Germany’s aggressive 
plans or that he had participated in a common plan to wage aggressive war. In the 
second case, Speer was acquitted on the grounds that he became responsible for 
Germany’s rearmament long after the initiation of aggressive policies by the 
Nazis. In this respect, ‘[h]is activities in charge of German Armament Production 
were in aid of the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid 
in the waging of war’. In the Farben case, the Tribunal also held that ‘in the right 
circumstances, industrialists could be convicted of any form of participation in 
aggression’. See ibid 481-84. 
11 Control Council Law No 10 (20 Dec 1945) art II (2f): ‘Any person…is deemed 
to have committed a crime…if he… (f) held a high political, civil or military 
(including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-
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Moreover, the NMT Tribunal also adopted the ‘shape or 
influence’ standard, as it was demonstrated by the High Command12 
and Ministries13 cases. In both cases the Tribunal held that, to 
establish the policy level of an individual, his or her ability to ‘shape 
or influence’ a State’s political or military action was sufficient14 
and that the basis for liability for the commission of aggression 
cannot be limited only to individuals who can control or direct such 
action.15 Despite the SWGCA’s view that ‘it had been always 
understood that the leadership clause would reach just as far [to 
cover industrialists and financiers] and that it had never been limited 
to heads of [S]tate or individuals in the military’ during the 2006 
inter-sessional meeting,16 the ‘control or direct’ standard does not 
answer the question of who exactly belongs to the leadership 
circle.17 While it has been argued that it covers non-political leaders 
with sufficient control over State policies18 and does not exclude 
stricto sensu religious or industrial leaders,19 the fulfilment of this 
standard requires that these persons should be in a position to exert 
sufficient control over or to direct the political or military action of 
a State, a position difficult to be formally occupied by someone 
outside a State’s political or military circle. Even if the term ‘in a 
position to’ of the leadership clause is interpreted figuratively, 
meaning that the perpetrator should have the ability to ‘control or 
                                                                                                                                                                              
belligerents or satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or 
economic life of any such country.’ 
12
 United States v. von Leeb et al, Military Tribunal XII (High Command case) 
(1950) 
13
 United States v. von Weizsäcker et al, Military Tribunal XI (Ministries case) 
(1949). 
14 ‘It’s not a person’s rank or status, but his power to shape or influence the policy 
of his State, which is the relevant issue for determining his criminality under the 
charge of crimes against peace’ in High Command case, Judgment, 489. 
15 ‘In convicting Ernst von Weizsäcker …the Tribunal rejected the idea that 
aggression could only be committed by individuals who had the ability to control 
or direct a State’s political or military action.’ in Heller (n 4) 487. 
16 Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow 
Wilson School, Princeton University, United States, Report of the Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court Team on the Crime of Aggression (8-11 June 
2006) 30-31. 
17 Ambos (n 6) 483. 
18 ibid. 
19 Heinsch (n 7) 723. 
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direct’ without necessarily belonging to formal leadership 
structures, the requirement that he or she must be able to control or 
direct the political or military action of a State signifies that he or 
she must be in a position ‘to control or direct the deeds of the 
political or military establishments of the State aimed at achieving 
particular objectives.’20 Therefore, the ‘control or direct’ standard 
does not refer to a general ability to exercise influence over the 
political or military action of a State but to a specific ability to 
‘control or direct’ political or military organs, designated to achieve 
specific outcomes. 
Nonetheless, and despite the criticisms concerning the 
formulation of the ‘leadership requirement’ clause in the Kampala 
definition, it is due to this clause that international criminal law 
takes a strong position against the impunity, not only of the 
executive organs of the political or military structures of States, but 
also of their leaders. The ICC has already issued arrest warrants 
against Presidents or former Heads of States in relation to the other 
Article 5 crimes21 and it is only a welcome prospect that it will be 
able to do so with respect to aggression in the future. The fact that, 
in practice, only a very small number of persons can fulfil the 
leadership requirement in order to be characterised as the 
perpetrators of the crime, should not necessarily be seen as a 
drawback which will hinder the administration of justice; instead, it 
could be seen as a borderline that delineates the responsibility of the 
many, State executive organs who might commit genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, with the responsibility of the few, 
persons who truly are in a position to commit the crime of 
aggression. 
                                                             
20 McDougall (n 5) 180. 
21 Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09; The Prosecutor v Gbagbo, ICC-
02/11-01/11; Prosecutor v Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, ICC-
01/11-01/11 (terminated upon his death in 22 November 2011). However, it has 
been argued that prosecutions by the ICC might unite political leaders who fear 
being prosecuted themselves. See for example African Union statements 
supporting Al-Bashir in Noah Weisbord, ‘Judging Aggression’ (2011) 50 (1) 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 82, 113. 
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II. Act of aggression: the threshold clause 
According to the definition of Article 8bis, an individual commits 
the crime of aggression when he or she plans, prepares, initiates or 
executes an act of aggression, ‘which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations’. The conclusions to be drawn from this formulation are 
firstly, that apparently not all acts of aggression automatically 
constitute manifest violations of the UN Charter and secondly, that 
the determining factors of a manifest violation are the character, 
gravity and scale of the act.   
In order to understand the context and role of the threshold 
clause, one should look at the Preparatory Commission proposals 
and SWGCA negotiations, and the intention of the drafters to 
include such a clause. A German proposal from which the 
‘manifest’ threshold appears to have originated, stated that an armed 
attack should be criminalised for the purposes of the Rome Statute, 
when ‘this armed attack was undertaken in manifest contravention 
of the Charter of the United Nations’ having as object or result the 
establishment of a military occupation or annexation of the territory 
of another State or part thereof.22 Although the threshold clause as 
incorporated into the definition does not include any reference to the 
object or result of a particular use of force, the definition retained 
the term ‘manifest’. As was also explained by Germany, the 
proposal was formulated as such so as to capture any ‘obvious and 
indisputable cases’ such as aggression committed by Hitler or 
                                                             
22 ‘Compilation of Proposals on the Crime of Aggression submitted at the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(1996-1998), the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (1998) and the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Criminal Court’ (23 July-13 August 1999) UN 
Doc PCNICC/1999/INF/2, 24. 
115 
 
090015246 
 
 
Saddam Hussein against Kuwait in 1990 and to exclude legitimate 
uses of force carried out in conformity with the UN Charter.23 
Following this interpretation, it has been generally accepted that 
the threshold of manifest violation serves a dual purpose:24 as a 
quantitative threshold, it would exclude border skirmishes and 
similar small-scale uses of force from the jurisdiction of the ICC, in 
accordance with the spirit of the Rome Statute that ‘only the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole’25 fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction. On the other hand, the 
threshold is also qualitative, precluding legally controversial cases 
from the jurisdiction of the ICC. This second interpretation has been 
confirmed by the SWGCA negotiations by reference to exclusion of 
cases ‘where there might be a degree of uncertainty (legality of the 
action)’26 or cases ‘falling within a grey area’.27 Corresponding to 
this quantitative-qualitative threshold are also the three determinants 
of whether a manifest violation has occurred: the gravity and the 
scale of the act would ensure that only acts of a certain magnitude 
and with extended consequences will amount to manifest violations 
of the UN Charter. By the same token, the character of the act 
would prevent any uses of force of questionable legitimate status 
from reaching the ICC.28 
                                                             
23 ibid 6. 
24 Kress (n 3) 1138; Potter (n 3) 166; Kress and Holtzendorf (n 3) 1211; Barriga 
(n 3) 29; Sayapin (n 3) 262. 
25 Rome Statute art 1. 
26 ‘Discussion Paper 3: Definition of Aggression in the context of the Statute of 
the ICC’ UN Doc ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II.D, 3. 
27 ‘Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression’ ICC-
ASP/6/20/Add.1 Annex II, 4. A list of ‘grey areas’ relating to the use of force 
includes ‘anticipatory self-defence, forcible reactions to a ‘minor’ use of force of 
another state, armed interventions to rescue nationals, the extraterritorial use of 
force against a massive non-state armed attack, and genuine humanitarian 
intervention’ (Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ‘Aggression’ in Robert Cryer and ors (eds), 
An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP 2007) 268). 
28 Kress (n 3) 1138. 
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Despite these clarifications as to the proper interpretation of the 
term ‘manifest’, according to some commentators,29 its meaning is 
still unclear. According to Article 46(2) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, a manifest violation under domestic law is a 
violation ‘if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting 
itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good 
faith’.30 According to delegations during the SWGCA negotiations, 
manifest is either ‘an obvious illegal violation’ or ‘a violation with 
serious consequences’ or both.31 The Amendments to the Elements 
of Crimes, as presented into the Kampala Resolution, help little in 
the clarification of the term by stating only that ‘[t]he term manifest 
is an objective qualification’,32 meaning that whether a violation is 
manifest or not does not depend on subjective opinions, the opinion 
of the actor included.33 However, all these approaches prove to be of 
little help. The definition of Article 46(2) of the Vienna Convention 
refers only to violations of domestic law where natural criminal law 
principles are stricter and better established than in international 
law.34 What is more, a US proposal during the Review Conference 
to include an Understanding referring to the definition of ‘manifest 
violation’ as provided by Article 46(2) of the Vienna Convention, 
was finally rejected by States in Kampala.35 Secondly, and in 
criminal law terms, the evidentiary issue of a violation should not be 
confused with the substance of the committed crime which is, at 
least in national criminal law, irrelevant with how ‘clear or obvious 
                                                             
29 McDougall (n 5) 160; Andrea Paulus, ‘Second Thoughts on the Crime of 
Aggression’ (2009) 20 (4) European Journal of International Law 1117, 1121 
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 46(2). 
31 Johan van der Vyver, ‘Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the International 
Criminal Court’ (2010-11) University of Miami National Security and Armed 
Conflict Law Review 1, 25. 
32 Kampala Resolution, Annex II, Amendments to the Elements of Crimes, 
Introduction para 3. 
33 Heinsch (n 7) 727. 
34 ibid 725-6. 
35 McDougall (n 5) 127. This rejection is attributed by McDougall not to any 
disagreement on the context of this definition per se but possibly to the 
connection of the proposed Understanding to the US’s proposal to exempt 
humanitarian interventions from the scope of the definition. 
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to the eye’36 a violation is. Since an evidentiary issue cannot 
constitute an element of the crime, the essence of ‘manifestness’ 
shall be sought elsewhere, namely at the indisputable illegality of a 
particular use of force. 
To this end, the three determinants of whether a manifest 
violation has occurred might be of assistance. As was mentioned 
above, the gravity and scale of a use of force will be assessed in 
order to determine whether the act was a manifest violation in terms 
of seriousness. However, there does not seem to be any link 
between these determinants and the assessment of the legality of a 
particular use of force. For this reason, it follows that the 
determinant of character will be used to assess whether a particular 
use of force is of an indisputably illegal nature or falls within a grey 
area of international law, and thus, it cannot be established as a 
manifest violation.37 
Kress argues that the crime of aggression under customary law, 
as it has evolved from the Nuremberg and Tokyo precedents, covers 
only the noyau dur of the prohibition on the use of force and that 
this acknowledgment is reflected into the Kampala definition by the 
incorporation of the ‘manifest violation’ threshold.38 In this respect, 
the qualitative threshold of the ‘manifest violation’ clause will 
ensure that the ICC will remain within the confines of customary 
law when adjudicating cases of aggression and that it will not find 
itself in a position to decide upon cases that give rise to 
controversial issues of international norms pertaining to the use of 
force.39 Given the scarcity of judicial precedents related to 
aggression, it is necessary to keep the Rome Statute definition of the 
                                                             
36 ‘Clear or obvious to the eye’ are two of the synonym words and phrases that the 
Oxford English dictionary gives for the term ‘manifest’ in Oxford English 
Dictionary Online, available at 
<www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/manifest>  accessed 7 December 
2014. 
37 McDougall (n 5) 128; Kress and Holtzendorf (n 3) 1193; Potter (n 3) 165. 
38 Kress (n 3) 1139. 
39 ibid 1142. 
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crime of aggression within the ambit of customary law and make 
use of the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime only when the illegality 
of an act of aggression is found to be incontrovertible.  
This argument has some merit, provided obviously that one 
agrees that the courtroom, albeit an international one, is not the 
appropriate forum in which to evolve controversial norms of 
international law relating to the use of force. However, one should 
be careful with the conclusion that the ‘manifest violation’ threshold 
will definitely keep the ICC into the ambit of customary law in the 
field, and as a result, that there will be successful aggression 
proceedings before the ICC only when the conduct in question 
constitutes an incontrovertibly illegal use of force. McDougall is 
right when she poses the question of whether the ‘manifest 
threshold’ will indeed restrain the ICC’s jurisdiction to the most 
serious crimes of concern.40 Specifically, her concerns relate to the 
extent to which some of the acts listed in Article 3 of Resolution 
3314, such as those in sub-paragraphs (e) and (f),41 could ever meet 
the threshold requirement and form the basis of the State conduct 
element of the crime of aggression. Admittedly, these acts seem to 
put the threshold low, maybe too low, given the general spirit of the 
Rome Statute to limit the ICC’s jurisdiction to the most serious 
crimes of concern and the intention of the drafters of the definition 
to exclude from the ICC’s jurisdiction any cases of aggression of 
lesser gravity and disputable illegality. In this respect, it seems that 
the ICC does not have enough guidance of whether it should follow 
a strict interpretation approach and thus lower the manifest 
threshold so as to cover all the acts of Article 3 or should refrain 
from a strict reading of the said Article and put the manifest 
                                                             
40 McDougall (n 5) 136. 
41 UNGA Resolution 3314 Annex art 3 (e): ‘The use of armed forces of one State 
which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving 
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any 
extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the 
agreement’; (f): ‘The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed 
at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an 
act of aggression against a third State’. 
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threshold so high that even some of the illustrative acts of 
aggression could never reach it. As a result, it remains to be seen 
how the ICC will interpret the ‘manifest violation’ threshold, either 
allowing a more flexible and inclusive reading of it - and as such, 
adopting a pro-cosmopolitan approach which would permit the 
development of international law in a judicial environment - or 
following a more politically-safe approach by admitting aggression 
cases only when there is consensus on their indisputably illegal 
status.  
Should the ICC follow the second approach, the Kampala 
definition will most probably not apply to ‘hard cases’ of 
international law,42 and thus developments of international law 
relating to its grey areas will not take place, at least not with the 
contribution of the ICC’s practice. Moreover, the same approach 
somewhat conflicts with the dynamic approach followed by the ICC 
with respect to the other Article 5 crimes to date. It was discussed in 
Chapter I that the ICC has shown a, warranted or not, dynamic and 
interventionist approach in some cases, which is not clearly 
envisioned by the Rome Statute. While this interventionist attitude 
is more in line with a cosmopolitan model of international law, in 
which international justice should function independently and 
sometimes despite States’ concerns, the regime of the Rome Statute 
was regulated by States and the final text adopted reflect State 
views. To what extent the ICC can or even should circumvent the 
intentions of the drafters of the Rome Statute in order to promote 
international criminal justice interests is a challenging question and 
will be more so, if or when the ICC is faced with an aggression case. 
Ultimately, it will be in the ICC’s discretion whether it will establish 
itself as a pro-cosmopolitan court when adjudicating on aggression 
cases or follow a more State-centred approach by remaining within 
                                                             
42 Paulus (n 29) 1124; Kress (n 3) 1142. 
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the contours of generally accepted norms of international law that 
pertain to the use of force. 
III. Sovereignty versus cosmopolitan dynamics in the 
context of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression 
a) The issue of consistency with the UN Charter and the role of the 
Security Council 
Apart from the complicated issue of finding a well-construed 
definition for the crime of aggression, the biggest thorn in the effort 
to make aggression a punishable crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction 
was to ensure that the ICC, while exercising its competences, will 
not interfere with the powers of the Security Council as enshrined in 
the UN Charter. According to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court, jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression was provided by Article 20b.43 However, Article 23(2) 
provided that a complaint related to aggression could not even reach 
the ICC before the Security Council had made a positive 
determination for the commission of an act of aggression,44 
safeguarding thus the prerogative of the Security Council under 
Article 39.  
The suggestion of the ILC Draft Statute was supported by some 
delegations during the Rome negotiations, including Russia, 
Germany and Cameroon.45 Nevertheless, Article 23(2) was not 
incorporated into the Rome Statute. Instead, Article 5(2) requires 
that the conditions of the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction must be 
‘consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United 
                                                             
43 Ybk of the International Law Commission (1994) Vol II, Part Two, 38. See also 
Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Long Journey towards Repressing Aggression’ in Antonio 
Cassese and ors (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, vol I (OUP 2002) 430. 
44 Ybk of the International Law Commission (n 43) 33-34. 
45 ibid. 
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Nations.’46 This condition of consistency was interpreted by the 
British representative as making the Security Council’s prior 
determination of the existence of aggression a prerequisite before 
the ICC can exercise its own jurisdiction.47 Any amendment that 
would allow the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction without a prior 
determination of the existence of aggression would presumably 
endanger the system of collective security as established by the 
Charter48 and would undermine the ‘primary responsibility’ of the 
Security Council ‘for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.’49 The crime of aggression presupposes that an act of 
aggression has occurred and thus, it seems that a positive 
determination from the Security Council is required for ICC 
prosecutions on the crime of aggression. 
However, allowing the ICC to proceed with cases of aggression 
only after Security Council’s determination would have implications 
for the independent effectiveness of the ICC itself, due to legal, 
judicial and political reasons. In the first place, the Security 
Council’s powers provided by the UN Charter cannot be considered 
as exclusive. According to Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council has primary responsibility in international security 
issues, however other organs may contribute to that end. This is not 
inconsistent with other provisions of the UN Charter,50 which allow 
the General Assembly to play its role for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, by discussing matters that fall into 
                                                             
46 Rome Statute art 5(2). 
47 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3rd edn, 
CUP 2009) 136. 
48 Andrea Zimmerman, ‘Jurisdiction, Admissibility and applicable law’ in Otto 
Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute on the International Criminal 
Court: observers’ notes, article by article (2nd edn, C H Beck 2008) 140. 
49 UN Charter art 24(1). 
50 In two occasions, the ICJ has affirmed that the General Assembly can 
simultaneously with the Security Council deal with a matter concerning 
international peace and security and that the responsibility of the latter to maintain 
international peace and security is primary but not exclusive. See Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 27 and Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 163. 
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the scope of the Charter and making recommendations to the 
Security Council (Article 10) as well as discussing questions 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
(Article 11) and making recommendations on ‘measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of any situation’ (Article 14). In fact, the 
General Assembly has made use of its recommendatory powers 
several times, issuing resolutions that characterise uses of force as 
acts of aggression, including cases where the Security Council failed 
to act.51 Furthermore and concerning Article 39, the power of 
determination of acts of aggression is given to the Security Council 
for the purpose of imposing sanctions on the aggressor State and is 
not carried out on the basis of judicial evidence nor for judicial 
purposes. Should a Security Council’s determination constitute a 
part of the judgment against the individual accused, fair trial 
concerns will eventually arise.52 Besides, if the ICC was able to act 
only after the Security Council’s positive determination, then i) it 
would not be able to find aggression in case the Security Council 
had not and ii) an exercise of the veto right would very likely 
preclude any prosecutions relating to the five Security Council 
permanent members.53 
Moreover, the Security Council, as mentioned in the previous 
Chapter, has not shown so far any consistency and objectivity in 
determining acts of aggression54 and, given its past practice, it could 
                                                             
51 See eg UNGA Res 1899 (XVII) (13 November 1963) UN Doc A/RES/1899 
(South Africa); UNGA Res 2508 (XXIV) (21 November 1969) UN Doc 
A/RES/2508 (Southern Rhodesia); UNGA Res 36/27 (13 November 1981) UN 
Doc A/RES/36/27 and UNGA Res 37/18 (16 November 1982) UN Doc 
A/RES/37/18 (Israel against Iraq). Cases of Security Council’s inaction include 
UNGA Res 498 (V) (1 February 1951) UN Doc A/RES/498 (China against 
Korea). Besides, the UNGA Res 377 (V) (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377 
(‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’) confirms the power of the General Assembly to 
make recommendations to Member States for collective measures in cases of 
breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.   
52 Cryer (n 27) 278. 
53 ibid 277. 
54 As Van Schaak argues, there are arguments in favour of giving the Security 
Council the role of gatekeeper for aggression cases before the ICC which have 
some merit. A prior Security Council determination for aggression cases would 
insulate from prosecution uses of force which might include acts of aggression but 
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not be trusted to make unbiased determinations of aggression in the 
future. This hesitancy of the Security Council to actually name 
States’ acts as aggression would obviously block the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over such cases,55 rendering any provisions for 
aggression practically useless. What is more, when the Security 
Council downgrades an act of aggression to a breach or threat to the 
peace,56 it does not necessarily indicate that aggression has not 
taken place. The characterisation of a State’s act as a threat or 
breach to the peace might be due to political reasons or even the 
difficulty to reach the required majority for the adoption of a 
resolution that would condemn the act as aggression. Thus, the 
absence of a Security Council determination of the commission of 
an act of aggression does not signify that a conflict will definitely 
arise between the Security Council and the ICC’s own findings.57 
There were several proposals that tried to address the issue of 
consistency as posed by Article 5(2). A proposal by Greece and 
Portugal58 suggested that the ICC shall first ascertain that the 
Security Council has made a positive determination and if not, it 
shall request it to proceed with a determination. In case of Security 
Council’s inaction within a specific time-frame, the ICC would be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
which are otherwise legitimate or desirable (such as defence of nationals, hostage 
rescues, humanitarian interventions etc) (Beth Van Schaak, ‘Negotiating at the 
Interface of Power & Law: The Crime of Aggression’ (2010) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 505, 565). However, as Van Schaak also acknowledges, while 
there are a few cases where the Security Council has made determinations of 
aggression, or at least has been referred to aggression in Security Council 
Resolutions, the cases that it didn’t (and possibly should have) are more. 
Moreover, and relating to the discussion on the ‘manifest violation’ threshold in 
the previous section, if ‘manifest’ is read by the ICC as indisputably illegal, it is 
very likely that ‘legitimate or desirable’ uses of force will not fall into the ambit 
of the definition anyway. 
 55 Cryer (n 27) 330. 
56 As examples, UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661 can be 
mentioned which defined Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a ‘breach of the peace’ or 
UNSC Res 418 (4 November 1977) UN Doc S/RES/418 and UNSC Res 527 (15 
December 1982) UN Doc S/RES/527 (1982) which characterised South Africa’s 
aggressive acts against its neighbouring States and Namibia as a ‘threat to the 
peace’. See Gaja (n 43) 434. 
57 Gaja (n 43) 434. 
58 UN Doc PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.5. 
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able to proceed with the case in question. Other States59 suggested 
that, instead of the Security Council, a different organ might act as a 
‘filter’ before the ICC will be able to proceed with a case of 
aggression. This role could be played either by the General 
Assembly or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In this way, in 
the absence of a Security Council’s determination, the General 
Assembly could be asked to make a recommendation within a 
specific time-frame60 and again, in case of inaction, the ICC would 
be able to proceed. A third option would allow the ICC to request 
the General Assembly to seek the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the 
existence of an act of aggression. However, while there is some 
logic in requesting the advisory opinion of a judicial organ as a filter 
for the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction, the involvement of the ICJ 
could be problematic from the perspective of the individual accused. 
The alleged perpetrator would not be able to appear before the ICJ 
and bring evidence61 and if the ICJ’s ruling is binding for the ICC, 
then the rights of the accused are severely infringed. Moreover, a 
proposal of having the ICJ determine the existence of an act of 
aggression was also discarded for both legal and practical reasons.62 
A serious stumbling block for the ICJ to play such a role would be 
the requirement for the involved States’ consent.63 It was also 
suggested during the negotiations that the link between ICJ’s 
jurisdiction and State consent, if it exists, does not presuppose that 
                                                             
59 See Proposal submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and 
Romania UN doc PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2/Add.1. 
60 See Discussion Paper proposed by the Coordinator at UN doc 
PCNICC/1999/WGCA/RT.1. 
61 Robert Cryer and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 331. 
62 See Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression, held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, 
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, United States, 8th Session (2009) 
ICC-ASP/8/INF.2, 10 (2009 Informal meeting) paras 42-43. 
63 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into 
force 24 October 1945) Annex to UN Charter, art 36. See also Case of the 
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v United States, United 
Kingdom & France) [1954] ICJ Rep 19. The Monetary Gold principle required 
that all States involved in an act of aggression should have accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction before it can go forward with a case.  
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the said State has also consented to the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression.64 In more practical terms, proceedings before 
the ICJ can take a long time,65 something that would risk 
infringement of the right of the accused for a speedy trial as 
provided by Article 67(1c) of the Rome Statute.66 
b) Article 15bis: A fair compromise? 
The compromise reached by the Kampala Resolution in this respect 
is regulated by Article 15bis, paragraphs (6) to (8) where the role 
attributed to the Security Council is that of the primary but not 
exclusive filter of whether an act of aggression has occurred. Article 
15bis (6) provides that the Prosecutor, before proceeding with an 
investigation relating to the crime of aggression, ‘shall first ascertain 
whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of 
aggression committed by the State concerned’ and ‘shall notify the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the 
Court’. In case of a Security Council determination, the Prosecutor 
may proceed with the investigation of the situation (Article 15bis 
(7))67 but in the opposite case and after a six-month time lapse from 
the date of notification, ‘the Prosecutor may proceed with the 
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that the 
Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of [this] 
investigation…and the Security Council has not decided otherwise 
in accordance with Article 16’ (Article 15bis (8)). Thus, the 
compromise reached in this respect is that on the one hand, the 
Security Council’s role in international peace and security matters 
                                                             
64 2009 Informal meeting, para 43. 
65 ‘…[I]n the context of the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, it took the Court more than three years to respond to a 
request from the World Health Organisation and a year and a half to act in 
response to the demand by the General Assembly in the same matter’ in Michael 
Schuster, ‘The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: a Gordian Knot in 
search of a sword’ (2003) Criminal Law Forum 1, 48-49. 
66 Rome Statute art 67(1c): ‘1. In the determination of any charge, the accused 
shall be entitled to…: (c) To be tried without undue delay’. 
67 Kampala Resolution art 15bis (7): ‘Where the Security Council has made such a 
determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression.’ 
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has been acknowledged and given primacy in the proceedings 
before the ICC but on the other hand, in case of the Security 
Council’s inaction, there is the safety valve of the authorisation of 
the Pre-Trial Division for the initiation of aggression investigations. 
While the balance achieved in the regulation of competences 
between the Security Council and the ICC is definitely noteworthy, 
in that it manages to accommodate both the Security Council 
powers under the UN Charter and a certain degree of autonomy for 
the ICC aggression proceedings, several comments can be made in 
the context of the ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ 
debate. The primacy given to the Security Council as the first organ 
to determine the existence of an act of aggression, a power already 
established under Article 39 of the UN Charter and reiterated by the 
Kampala Resolution for criminal law purposes, reinforces the 
sovereign prerogatives of the Security Council Member States in 
international peace and security matters. History however has 
shown that the Security Council has been very cautious in the use of 
the term ‘aggression’ in its resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and it is unlikely that it will act differently after the coming 
into force of the Kampala Resolution for the purposes of the Rome 
Statute.68 As was stated earlier, even when the Security Council uses 
the term ‘aggression’ or ‘aggressive acts’ in its resolutions, it is still 
unclear whether the mere reference of the term equals to a 
determination that an act of aggression has occurred, and 
consequently, whether this reference will be sufficient for the 
Prosecutor to proceed with an aggression case.69 It is possible that, 
                                                             
68 Arguably, one cannot help but consider the possibility that the Security 
Council, being mostly driven by political considerations and not international 
criminal justice purposes, might characterise incidents as aggression as a means to 
pressure the ICC to conduct aggression proceedings. Though this possibility 
might seem unlikely, it does illustrate that the need for balance between Security 
Council’s powers and ICC’s autonomy is manifested not only in situations where 
the former fails to determine aggression whereas the latter thinks that aggression 
has taken place, but also in situations where the Security Council might attempt to 
‘guide’ the ICC as to which situations require investigation. 
69 McDougall (n 5) 269. 
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for the purposes of the Rome Statute, more than a mere reference to 
the term ‘aggression’ will be needed, since Article 15bis (6) clearly 
requires ‘a determination of an act of aggression committed by the 
State concerned’. Given the practice so far of the Security Council, 
one would either expect the Prosecutor to make interpretations of 
relevant Security Council resolutions as to whether they implicitly 
or explicitly determine the existence of an act of aggression or 
expect that the Security Council will use the term ‘aggression’ in its 
resolutions, only when it clearly intends to trigger the Prosecutor’s 
ability to initiate an aggression investigation.70 
In an effort to counterbalance the effect that the absence of a 
Security Council determination would have on the independent 
function of the ICC, Article 15bis (8) introduces the Pre-Trial 
Division filter. This filter, and rightly so, is meant to work as an 
offset against a Security Council which would appear too reluctant 
to provide a ‘green light’ to the ICC to prosecute aggression cases. 
While it seems that Article 15bis (8) is a fair effort of the drafters to 
open the way for the promotion of cosmopolitan purposes, in the 
form of international criminal justice, possibly despite any contrary 
opinion of the Security Council Members, the final phrase of the 
Article reiterates the power given to the Security Council by Article 
16 of the Rome Statute,71 to block proceedings before the ICC.72 
This addition can be interpreted as a further emphasis to the 
interrelationship between the competence of the ICC to prosecute 
                                                             
70 ibid. 
71 Rome Statute art 16: ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security 
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions.’ 
72 In fact, the Security Council has already made use of this Article in requesting 
the ICC to defer for 12 months any investigation or prosecution of cases with 
respect to acts committed by non-State Party troops of peacekeeping missions. 
See UNSC Res 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422; UNSC Res 1487 (12 
June 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1487. These resolutions have been characterised as 
Security Council legislation and it has been questioned whether Article 16 indeed 
allows for such general requests. See Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as 
World Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 175, 178. 
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the crime of aggression and the role of the Security Council to 
maintain international peace and security. Besides, there is no 
reason why Article 16 should not apply to the crime of aggression 
since it applies to the other Article 5 crimes. Article 16 can be 
invoked in cases where the Security Council would assess that the 
interests of peace should be prioritised against the interests of 
international criminal justice, and as such, prosecutions should be 
delayed or even denied.73 In this respect, it seems that the power 
given to the Security Council by Article 16, coupled with the 
provisions related to the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
aggression cases, provides substantial discretion to the former as to 
when an aggression case should reach the latter, regardless of 
whether there is a determination of the existence of an act of 
aggression. Ultimately, and despite the notable effort of Article 
15bis to balance the powers of the Security Council in international 
peace and security matters with the independent competence of the 
ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression, Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute will always ensure that the ICC will be able to proceed with 
a case concerning any Article 5 crime (aggression included), only 
when the Security Council wishes the same. 
IV. Lessons learnt from the paradigm of aggression 
So far, it has been argued that i) the leadership requirement 
clause contained in the Kampala definition acknowledges that 
individuals who commit crimes against States should be prosecuted 
and punished before the ICC, ii) that the ambiguous drafting (of the 
provisions regarding the ‘manifest violation’ threshold) and the use 
of politically compromised texts of doubtful legal value as 
substantive parts of the definition (such as the list of acts of 
aggression in Resolution 3314) result in the creation of vagueness 
for the ICC to assess whether a case constitutes a manifest violation 
or not, and iii) that Article 15bis of the Kampala Resolution, 
                                                             
73 McDougall (n 5) 275. 
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although being a decent effort to balance the Security Council’s 
powers and the ICC competences in aggression cases, finally leans 
more towards preserving Security Council political interests than 
promoting cosmopolitan ideas. This section therefore, is going to 
discuss these three ‘lessons to be learnt’ from the Kampala process, 
focusing on how similar issues should be addressed in the context of 
terrorism under the light of the required balance to be achieved 
between State-centric and cosmopolitan considerations. 
It is the author’s view that these lessons are going to contribute to 
the overall argument of this thesis, which supports that the need to 
formulate a definition for, and criminalise, terrorism for the 
purposes of international criminal justice will not be effectively 
addressed, unless both State sovereignty and cosmopolitan concerns 
are given due weight. The definition of aggression has demonstrated  
that, among its aspects that pertain to the ‘State sovereignty versus 
cosmopolitanism’ debate, there are aspects that can potentially 
achieve this balance, aspects that rely, maybe too much, on the 
ICC’s discretion and ability to achieve this balance, and aspects that 
make this balance nearly impossible.  
a) How the ‘leadership requirement’ clause of the definition of 
aggression serves cosmopolitan purposes in the context of 
criminalising terrorism 
Attempting an overall assessment of the balance achieved by the 
Kampala Resolution in the light of the State-centric and 
cosmopolitan theories, one will be firstly confronted with the 
conclusion that the ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ 
debate is relevant to both the formulation of the definition for the 
crime of aggression and the conditions of the exercise of jurisdiction 
for its commission. Regarding the definition itself, in the case of 
aggression, cosmopolitanism is manifested by the ‘leadership 
requirement’ clause, in that, apart from its incorporation being a 
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historical necessity, it expands the protection afforded by the Rome 
Statute to cover State rights as well. This manifestation of 
cosmopolitanism should not go unnoticed since it constitutes an 
acknowledgement that States’ fundamental rights can be threatened 
by individuals occupying leadership positions in their respective 
States and that these individuals should be prosecuted and punished 
at an international level. The acknowledgment i) that some 
individuals can be found in a position to target and victimise States 
and ii) that despite the ‘State’ factor, the same individuals should be 
prosecuted by an international court, enhances the argument that 
crimes committed by individuals and which target States can, and 
possibly should, be prosecuted under international criminal law, 
regardless of any other sanction that the attacking State will face 
under public international law or the law on State responsibility. 
The complicated nature of the crime of aggression as a ‘State crime’ 
committed by individuals does not necessarily dictate that the 
repression or punishment of this crime should always be regulated 
by one organ, either a political or a judicial one (in this case either 
the Security Council or the ICC), excluding a priori any action to be 
taken by the other. The efficient and effective promotion of 
international criminal justice in the case of such complicated crimes 
will only be achieved by the attribution of complementary and not 
mutually exclusive competences to the international organs that are 
in a position to deal with either the State or the individual aspects of 
the crime in question.  
Having acknowledged that, in the case of aggression, there are 
separate but interlinked individual and State aspects implicated in 
the commission of the crime, it is the author’s view that this model 
should be followed in the case of criminalising international 
terrorism. Since international law acknowledges that State rights can 
be threatened by individuals, and since these individuals can be 
prosecuted and punished in an international criminal law context, 
then international criminal law can be an appropriate context where 
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the individual conduct elements of international terrorism could be 
adressed. Apparently, this is not to argue that the suppression of 
terrorism should be regulated only by international criminal justice, 
excluding any other measure or sanction being taken against any 
involved State; to the contrary, it is only the individual aspects of an 
act of international terrorism that should be regulated in this context. 
Any State aspects, if they exist, should be addressed, by the law on 
State responsibility or the use of force.  
In practice, concurrent responsibility both for aggression and 
terrorism has been implemented in international law history. For 
example, after WWII, together with the war crimes trials against 
high-ranking German officials charged with crimes against peace, 
there was concurrent State responsibility for Germany for the same 
conduct, which was held liable to pay heavy war damages to the 
victim States. In this case, State responsibility was not replaced by 
individual responsibility attributed to German leaders, but was 
addressed separately and concurrently, signifying that the attribution 
of one type of responsibility did not exlude the other.74 Similarly, in 
the Lockerbie affair, apart from the conduct of judicial proceedings 
against the two accused before a Scottish court sitting in the Hague, 
Libya accepted civil responsibility and agreed to pay compensations 
to the families of the victims.75 However, in this case, Libya’s 
acceptance of civil responsibility did not mean that Libya admitted 
that the accused, who were also its officials, had indeed carried out 
the bombing or did so after following orders.76 It seemed that, in the 
                                                             
74 Kimberley Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism (OUP 2011) 
230.  
75 Letter dated 15 August 2003 from the Chargé D' Affaires of the Permanent 
Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2003/818. 
76 ‘Yes, we wrote a letter to the Security Council saying we are responsible for the 
acts of our employees […], but it doesn't mean that we did it in fact [….]. I admit 
that we played with words – we had to […]. What can you do? Without writing 
that letter we would not be able to get rid of sanctions’. Colonel Gaddafi’s son in 
a BBC interview, ‘Lockerbie Evidence not Disclosed’, 28 August 2008, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/south_of_scotland/7573244.stm> accessed 
27 February 2015. 
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absence of any objective authority with the ability to ascertain the 
existence of State responsibility for Libya, the Scottish court 
proceedings, which convicted one of the accused, functioned as a 
means of pressure for Libya to accept even this light form of State 
responsibility.  
Having said that, the scheme of attributing concurrent 
responsibility to States and individuals for the commission of acts of 
aggression and terrorism is not something new. What should be 
noted however is that this distinction between the State and the 
individual aspects of terrorism, as was already done with the crime 
of aggression under its Kampala definition, will not only constitute 
a cosmopolitan response to the individual aspect of the crime but 
may also enhance State or UN action to be taken against the 
wrongdoing State.77 Parallel competences between the political 
organs responsible for maintaining international peace and security 
and the judicial organs responsible for addressing the individual 
aspects of terrorism is a workable way to achieve a degree of 
balance between cosmopolitanism and State sovereignty 
considerations in the context of terrorism. The Kampala definition 
has shown that the ICC is considered as competent enough to 
prosecute and punish individuals that are in a position to target and 
victimise States in an aggression context and this can constitute a 
paradigm of how the individual aspects of international terrorism 
should be equally addressed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
77 Trapp (n 74) 234-36. 
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b) Why the ‘manifest violation’ threshold in the definition of 
aggression does not effectively address the issue of balancing State-
centric and cosmopolitan concerns and should be abandoned in the 
context of criminalising terrorism 
Secondly, the discussion over the ‘manifest violation’ clause 
indicated that ultimately, the intention of the drafters to limit the 
ICC’s jurisdiction only to indisputably illegal uses of force is not 
clearly established by the said clause. Despite the intention of the 
drafters, what the ICC has as guidance for assessing the 
‘manifestness’ of an act in terms of its illegality, is the awkward 
criterion of ‘character’ and the dubious usefulness of the illustrative 
list of acts in Article 3 of Resolution 3314. The unclear meaning of 
the former and the questionable usefulness of the latter will prove of 
little help for the ICC, which will be left with barely any guidance 
as to the legality of a particular use of force, should it ever rule on 
the admissibility of an aggression case. Consequently, the ICC will 
have a certain degree of discretion in clarifying the manifest 
threshold itself and thus, either put it (too) low so as to cover all the 
possible acts of aggression indicated in Article 3 or (too) high, 
dismissing Article 3’s utility for the purposes of the Rome Statute 
and refraining from adjudicating over ‘hard cases’ that pertain to the 
use of force.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to suggest any workable way for 
the ICC to avoid the implications of the ‘manifest violation’ 
threshold described above, but rather to argue why this threshold is 
problematic and thus, should be avoided in the context of 
criminalising terrorism. The ‘manifest violation’ threshold creates 
confusion as a constituent of the definition of the State conduct 
element of the crime of aggression because i) the definition itself is 
based on a text (Resolution 3314) which was never meant to be used 
for international criminal law purposes and thus, it did not 
substantially contribute to the development of international law in 
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the field and ii) the term ‘manifest’ is by itself unclear in a criminal 
law context and its criterion of character does not make it much 
clearer. Consequently, there are two approaches the ICC will be able 
to follow: either it will keep itself into a strict reading and 
interpretation of the definition, taking into account the relevant 
Articles of Resolution 3314 and especially the list of acts of 
aggression of Article 3 or it will dismiss the usefulness of 
Resolution 3314 and ‘stick’ only to those cases which clearly 
constitute violations of the prohibition on the use of force under 
customary law. Since the acts listed in Article 3 go far beyond the 
scope of customary law on aggression,78 the ICC will either have to 
respect Resolution 3314 provisions and lower the ‘manifest’ 
threshold in order to include the illustrative acts of aggression or 
focus on the ‘character’ criterion of ‘manifestness’ and raise the 
threshold so high, making the list of Article 3 irrelevant for the 
purposes of determining the State conduct element of the definition.  
Turning now to the question of whether the ‘manifest threshold’ 
can contribute to the balance between State-centric and 
cosmopolitan concerns in the context of the Kampala definition, the 
answer is that it cannot. If the ICC is to follow a ‘low threshold’ 
approach - meaning that the ICC is willing to follow a strict 
interpretation of the definition, taking into account the list of acts of 
aggression under Article 3 and thus lower the threshold of 
‘manifestness’ in order to include all of them - there is a risk that the 
ICC might turn out to be overly pro-cosmopolitan and declare as 
admissible, cases where the use of force is of lesser gravity (such as 
                                                             
78
 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v Uganda) (Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans) [2005] ICJ 
Rep 168, 63. McDougall argues that even the fact that Article 3(g) of Resolution 
3314 (‘the sending…of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State…’) which, according to the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case, ‘…may be taken to reflect customary law’, does not 
signify that the said Article constitutes a customary definition of aggression but 
that the rule articulated therein (the prohibition of sending armed bands) is part of 
customary law. See McDougall (n 5) 90-1; Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) 
[1986] ICJ Rep 14, 195. 
135 
 
090015246 
 
 
those illustrated in Article 3 (e) and (f)) or where the prohibition of 
the commission of a certain act is not within the ambit of customary 
law. In this respect, the ICC might be found in the awkward position 
of adjudicating over controversial cases relating to the use of force 
or even of evolving international law norms pertaining to this field. 
Of course, should the ICC show a preference towards a ‘low 
threshold’ approach in assessing the ‘manifestness’ of an act of 
aggression, States might not be particularly enthusiastic with the 
idea of extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to international terrorism 
(or equally to other international offences), for fear of having an 
over-intrusive court adjudicating over terrorism cases beyond their 
immediate control. 
On the other hand, a ‘high threshold’ approach - namely a 
flexible interpretation of the definition where the ‘manifestness’ of 
an act of aggression will be mainly assessed by its indisputable 
illegality - might have the opposite effect: an ICC which will not be 
able to use all of its interpretative tools provided by the Kampala 
definition (such as the Article 3 list) and to form its own findings 
regarding the State conduct element of the crime of aggression in 
cases where the illegality of an act is not indisputable. As such, the 
ICC will have to limit its jurisdictional competence only to cases 
where there is wide State consensus (and Security Council explicit 
or implicit acknowledgment) that a particular use of force is 
indisputably illegal and will have to remain silent in the majority of 
the cases that pertain to the use of force whose illegality cannot be 
unequivocally established.  
What remains true for now however is that it will be the ICC 
itself to decide in the end what approach it should follow. However, 
it seems that neither approach will contribute to a desired balance 
between State-centric and cosmopolitan concerns. The achievement 
of this balance will be highly dependent upon the ICC’s decision on 
what the proper threshold of ‘manifestness’ is on a case-by-case 
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basis, with the risk of either putting it too low (and thus, becoming 
too pro-cosmopolitan) or too high (becoming over reliant upon 
State-centric considerations). In this respect, the paradigm of the 
Kampala definition, through its manifest threshold, shows that the 
use of a text of low legal value as a basis of definition and of 
ambiguous language in the formulation of the threshold should be 
avoided in the drafting of international criminal law definitions and 
in the drafting of an international definition for terrorism.  
c) How Article 15bis is a manifestation of some pragmatic 
limitations to cosmopolitan aspirations in the context of the ICC’s 
exercise of jurisdiction 
Finally, the discussions around the balance of competences 
between the ICC and the Security Council showed that regulating 
the conditions of the exercise of jurisdiction was just as complex as 
the issue of finding an agreed definition. Article 15bis seems to be a 
fair effort in balancing the Security Council’s primary responsibility 
to maintain international peace and security with the ICC’s 
autonomy to conduct aggression proceedings. However, the overall 
impact of the provisions of Article 15bis tends to reflect a somewhat 
conservative, from a cosmopolitan perspective, approach. While 
Article 15bis (8) introduces the Pre-Trial Division filter as an offset 
in case of Security Council’s inaction, the overall effect of Article 
15bis provisions is that the only aggression cases that will ever 
reach the ICC, will be the ones the Security Council wishes to see 
before the ICC. This likelihood is manifested in two ways: firstly, 
any reference to ‘aggression’ in Security Council resolutions, 
already being a scarce practice, may deliberately be avoided in the 
future for fear of providing the ‘green light’ to the ICC Prosecutor to 
initiate aggression proceedings. This scenario will possibly result in 
the use of ‘aggression’ exclusively for situations that the Security 
Council wishes to be investigated. Secondly, even when the Pre-
Trial Division has authorised the commencement of an investigation 
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in the absence of a Security Council determination, or even before 
the Prosecutor even notifies either the Security Council or the Pre-
Trial Division for the existence of a situation deserving 
investigation, the Security Council can always, and with respect to 
all Article 5 crimes, invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and 
block proceedings altogether. This latitude of Security Council 
powers under the Rome Statute ultimately does not create a very 
different impact to that of the initial proposal of some States 
referred to earlier in the Chapter, to make a Security Council 
determination compulsory for the Prosecutor in order to initiate 
aggression proceedings.79 The effect would still be the same, 
namely that the Security Council, a political organ whose practice 
has shown that its decisions are mostly, or even exclusively, driven 
by political expediency, has the last word in matters of international 
criminal justice and especially in the adjudication of aggression 
cases. This argument is obviously true for all Article 5 crimes but it 
becomes even more relevant especially in cases of international 
crimes that lie close to international security issues, such as 
aggression and possibly, terrorism. 
The delicate compromise achieved by Article 15bis reflects in a 
straightforward manner that cosmopolitan steps with respect to the 
adjudication of aggression cases can only be taken in a rather 
conservative way. The mere fact that the Kampala Resolution 
safeguards a role for the Security Council for the purpose of the 
ICC’s conducting aggression proceedings manifests the limitations 
posed by realpolitik to an independent and autonomous operation of 
the international criminal justice system.80 While it is not the 
author’s intention to argue for a total dismissal of the Security 
                                                             
79 Unless a Security Council member vetoes a blocking resolution.  
80 See also William Schabas, ‘The Banality of International Justice’ (2013) 11 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 545, 550 where he argues that ‘[t]here is 
no room for deference to the Security Council in a holistic, coherent and 
principled package of international justice’; Alana Tiemessen, ‘The International 
Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecution’ (2014) 18 (4-5) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 444, 454. 
138 
 
090015246 
 
 
Council’s role in the adjudication of aggression cases, preserving a 
special role for the determinations of a political organ with 
diametrically different priorities from the ICC in the adjudication of 
an international crime will weigh heavily in favour of a State-centric 
approach in the adjudication of aggression rather than a 
cosmopolitan one. This state of affairs is manifested in both the 
circumstances where the Security Council is given a role in the 
adjudication of an aggression case: i) under Article 15bis (6) where 
the Prosecutor shall ascertain whether the Security Council has 
made a determination as of the existence of an act of aggression and 
ii) under Article 16 where the Security Council can defer 
investigations and prosecutions from the ICC (with respect to all 
Article 5 crimes). 
With respect to Article 15bis (6), and setting aside for the 
moment Article 15bis (8) which provides for the Pre-Trial Division 
filter in case of Security Council’s inaction, determinations of acts 
of aggression by the Security Council are dictated mostly - if not 
exclusively - by the realities of international politics and not by 
international law.81 This is not to argue that the Security Council 
should be obliged by international law to follow certain standards 
when acting under Article 39 of the UN Charter. However, any 
determinations made by the Security Council for the purposes of 
this Article, if used in an international criminal law context, are 
bound to have severe implications in the administration of 
international criminal justice. It has been already mentioned that the 
Security Council has not shown any consistency with respect to 
determinations of acts of aggression, and while it can be argued that 
consistency is not strictly speaking required by a political organ, it is 
definitely required by a judicial one. In this respect, since the 
Security Council’s practice in determining acts of aggression can be 
                                                             
81 Carrie McDougall, ‘When Law and Reality Clash-The Imperative of 
Compromise in the Context of the Accumulated Evil of the Whole: Conditions for 
the Exercise of the International Criminal Court's Jurisdiction over the Crime of 
Aggression’ (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 277, 307. 
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characterised as selective, then there is the risk that the ICC might 
end up administering selective justice.82 As a result, any State-
centric considerations upheld by Security Council Members 
regarding an aggression case, such as shielding from justice specific 
political or military leaders or protecting their own sovereign 
prerogatives, will interfere with the ICC’s proceedings and conflict 
with the cosmopolitan ethos upon which the latter is meant to 
function. 
Admittedly, Article 15bis (8) can provide some autonomy to the 
Prosecutor to investigate situations concerning the commission of 
the crime of aggression, in the absence of any Security Council 
determination. And this is as far as cosmopolitan theory can go, at 
least until now, with respect to the adjudication of aggression cases 
without explicit Security Council support. Without undermining the 
significance of Article 15bis (8), if the absence of a Security 
Council determination equals a lack of support and assistance in 
practical matters, such as evidence gathering, arrest and surrender of 
the accused, then the ICC may appear to be poorly equipped to 
make the most of its autonomy, and apparently, to promote any 
cosmopolitan aspirations concerning the administration of 
international justice at the expense of any opposite State sovereign 
prerogatives.83 
This pragmatic limitation of cosmopolitan theory is more directly 
manifested in the power of the Security Council to block any 
investigation and prosecution before the ICC with respect to all 
Article 5 crimes.  Although there are legitimate reasons that justify 
the existence of Article 16, namely that sometimes the interests of 
peace would dictate that prosecutions should not take place, it will 
                                                             
82 ibid 310-13. 
83 This holds true for all Article 5 crimes as is manifested by the Security Council 
referral of the situation in Sudan to the ICC. The Prosecutor’s investigators have 
not been allowed to enter Darfur and since the initial referral, the Security Council 
has not exercised any pressure to Sudan to cooperate with the ICC (in Tiemessen 
(n 80) 455). 
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be ultimately the Security Council that will assess what these 
interests are and which are the appropriate means to pursue them.84 
Be that as it may, it still remains to be seen if Article 16 can 
possibly empower the Security Council to block investigations and 
prosecutions of a situation relating to the crime of aggression but 
otherwise allow the Prosecutor to proceed with respect to the 
commission of other Article 5 crimes for the same situation.85 This 
interpretation will certainly further enhance the argument made 
above that the Security Council will be able to substantially control 
aggression prosecutions. 
Eventually, the primary role of the Security Council in matters of 
international peace and security and especially that of its five 
permanent members as key international players cannot be 
overlooked and definitely not limited by the need of the current 
international criminal justice system to promote its cosmopolitan 
aspirations. This is true for any crime that falls, or will fall, into the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, including international terrorism. While this 
thesis obviously argues in favour of the international criminalisation 
and definition of terrorism, the author acknowledges that any effort 
to this direction will only partially address cosmopolitan needs. This 
pragmatic limitation cannot be ignored in a thesis whose purpose is 
to underline the need for balance between State sovereignty 
concerns and cosmopolitan theory in the process of defining 
international crimes but it cannot be overstated either. 
 
 
                                                             
84 It has been argued that, with respect to the regime of Article 39 of the UN 
Charter, the ‘... structural bias in favour of the major powers is a clear indication 
that decisions in the interest of peace and security will be based exclusively on 
(national) political considerations.’ (Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the 
United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing 2004) 134-135, cited in 
McDougall (n 81) 283). 
85 Van Schaak (n 54) 577. 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter focused on the aspects of the Kampala definition 
that pertain to the ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ 
debate. Particularly, it has been shown that the ‘leadership 
requirement’ element of the definition enforces cosmopolitanism in 
international criminal law by providing space for the protection of 
States’ rights against powerful individuals that are in a position to 
threaten them. Secondly, the discussion on the ‘manifest violation’ 
threshold demonstrated the difficulties that the ICC will face when it 
has to assess whether a particular use of force can reach the required 
threshold or not. The guidance provided for this purpose by the 
Kampala definition is limited and in reality the ICC is left with 
substantial discretion as to where to put this threshold of 
‘manifestness’. Finally, the discussion shifted to the concerns that 
framed the issue of the conditions under which the ICC can exercise 
its jurisdiction and to Article 15bis of the Kampala Resolution 
which regulates these conditions. It has been argued that the issue of 
balancing the powers of the Security Council with the competences 
of the ICC goes to the heart of the ‘State sovereignty versus 
cosmopolitanism’ debate, in that it reflects in a straightforward 
manner the competing nature of these two dynamics. While Article 
15bis does a fair effort to achieve this sensitive balance, the critical 
effect of the sum of the Rome Statute provisions related to the 
powers of the Security Council is that of the Security Council acting 
as a gatekeeper of whether an aggression case will ever reach the 
ICC.  
Ultimately, it will be the ICC itself that will determine whether 
the adjudication of aggression cases will follow a more 
cosmopolitan or a more State-centred rationale, given of course the 
limitations imposed by the Rome Statute. What is of relevance next 
is to examine whether and to what extent the ‘State sovereignty 
versus cosmopolitanism’ debate applies to international terrorism. 
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To this end, the following Chapter will attempt an analogous 
analysis, focusing on how the efforts of defining and/or 
criminalising international terrorism to date pertain to this debate.  
The influence of these two poles, State sovereignty and 
cosmopolitanism, on the formulation of a definition for terrorism 
and on the regulation of its criminalisation is fundamental in order 
to understand how an international definition for terrorism should be 
approached for the purposes of international criminal justice in light 
of these two dynamics and the lessons learnt from the paradigm of 
aggression. 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE PARADIGM OF TERRORISM: STATE-
CENTRIC AND COSMOPOLITAN 
APPROACHES IN SOME CURRENT EFFORTS 
TOWARDS ITS CRIMINALISATION 
Introduction 
In the previous Chapters, it was demonstrated that the two 
theories under examination, the State-centric and the cosmopolitan 
theory, played a defining role firstly in the condemnation, then the 
criminalisation and finally the definition of the crime of aggression1 
for the purposes of the Rome Statute.2 The interplay between these 
two theories was what transformed aggression from an abstract and 
contentious concept to an international crime with its own 
definition and international court with jurisdiction over it. Without 
disregarding the flaws and weaknesses of this process, the history 
of the criminalisation of aggression gives an insight on how to 
pursue the goals of international criminal justice with due regard to 
State sovereignty. The historical account of the attempts to 
criminalise aggression and the critical analysis of the definition of 
the crime demonstrated that State sovereignty and cosmopolitan 
considerations should be reflected in both the definitions of 
international crimes and in the balancing of the exercise of Security 
Council powers and ICC competences. Only by striking this 
balance will international law gain validity among States and 
improve its effectiveness in the fight against impunity. 
 
                                                             
1 Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression  (11 June 
2010)(Kampala Resolution) art 8bis. 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002) UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (Rome Statute). 
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Turning now to the question of criminalising and defining 
international terrorism, this Chapter will focus on how State 
sovereignty and cosmopolitan considerations have played their part 
in the effort to push the development of international law in this 
field. First and foremost, this Chapter will offer an analysis of the 
reasons why international terrorism should be included in Article 5 
of the Rome Statute, along with the core crimes. Presenting first a 
brief historical account of the main efforts to define and criminalise 
terrorism internationally, the first section will argue that 
international terrorism should be criminalised for the purposes of 
the Rome Statute. The main argument in favour of this inclusion 
into the jurisdiction of the ICC is that, under certain circumstances, 
international criminal justice can constitute a more effective 
response to the commission of terrorist acts, as the ICC could 
function as a neutral forum of prosecution and thus, potentially 
minimise the role of politics in extradition decision-making. 
However, the question of whether there are also legal grounds in 
favour of the inclusion of an international crime of terrorism into 
the Rome Statute should also be examined. Terrorism differs from 
the Article 5 crimes in that it is prosecuted and punished at the 
national rather than the international level. A terrorist conduct can 
raise international concern to the extent that it is covered by one of 
the anti-terrorist conventions.3 De Londras argues that ‘while the 
                                                             
3 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (entered into 
force 14 October 1971) 860 UNTS 105; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (entered into force 26 January 
1973) 974 UNTS 177; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons (entered into force 20 February 1977) 
1035 UNTS 167; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
(entered into force 3 June 1983) 1316 UNTS 205; Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (entered into force 8 February 1987) 1456 UNTS 
246; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (entered into 
force 6 August 1989) 1589 UNTS 474; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (entered into force 1 
March 1992) 1678 UNTS 201; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (entered 
into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 304; International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism  (adopted 9 December 1999, entered 
into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197 (Financing of Terrorism Convention); 
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offences created thereunder are not international in strict terms, 
they nevertheless reflect at their core the elements of terroristic 
activity that are to be deemed “criminal” or deserving of criminal 
sanctions within the international milieu from which they 
emerged’.4 However, the anti-terrorist conventions create 
obligations for States to criminalise particular terrorist conducts 
without being directly binding on individuals. Therefore, the first 
section will conclude with an analysis of why a so-called ‘treaty-
based’5 crime may merit inclusion into the Rome Statute despite the 
existence of the system of State cooperation established by these 
conventions.  
Subsequently, the second and third sections will focus on the 
current efforts towards criminalisation6 of international terrorism. In 
particular, they will explore the extent to which current attempts to 
criminalise terrorism are influenced by either State-centric or 
cosmopolitan concerns. The influence of both these dynamics, it 
will be argued, is closely related to the overall effectiveness and 
international legal value of the relevant provisions. It will be 
demonstrated that, by laying too much emphasis on one theory over 
the other, the effectiveness and functioning of international law in 
this field will be problematic. Unless both State sovereignty and 
cosmopolitan considerations are given due weight, international 
criminal law runs the risk of either developing only in theory 
without the support of the community of States in the pursuit of 
                                                                                                                                          
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted 15 
December 1997, entered into force 23 March 2001) 2149 UNTS 256 (Terrorist 
Bombings Convention); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (adopted on 13 April 2005, entered into force 7 July 2007) UN 
Doc A/RES/59/290. 
4 Fiona de Londras, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’ in William Schabas 
and Nadia Bernaz (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law 
(Routledge 2010) 177. 
5 For the distinction between international crimes stricto sensu and treaty-based 
crimes see Introduction, text to note 34. 
6 ‘Criminalisation’, as used in the context of this Chapter, is not only limited to 
the express criminalisation by international courts or tribunals but extends also to 
the obligations for criminalisation in national laws of terrorism-related conducts, 
as formulated in Security Council Resolutions and the anti-terrorist conventions. 
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cosmopolitan goals or not developing at all, due to too much 
emphasis on national sovereign interests. To this end, the second 
section will focus on some post 9/11 Security Council Resolutions, 
which treated the issue of combatting terrorism in a way that 
shielded State sovereignty interests at the expense of the promotion 
of international justice purposes. On the other hand, the third 
section will analyse the Appeals Chamber’s Decision of the UN 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL Decision),7 which, being more 
pro-cosmopolitan, identified a customary international crime of 
transnational terrorism, raising thus a lot of discussion as to whether 
a customary definition of international terrorism actually exists. 
Finally, the UN negotiations on a Draft Comprehensive Convention 
on International Terrorism8 will complement this analysis, as an 
example of an effort by the General Assembly to promote 
international law in the field of terrorism by taking due 
consideration of the differing views of States as to how terrorism 
shall be defined. While it is true that the General Assembly’s 
negotiations might be more time-consuming than expected, this 
effort is noteworthy for the balance it tries to achieve between the 
two opposing dynamics of State sovereignty and cosmopolitan 
purposes. It is the author’s view that the balance between these two 
poles is the key for formulating an efficient and effective definition 
which will respect the sovereign interests of States, while at the 
same time promoting international criminal justice purposes. With 
this conclusion in mind, we will be led to the final Chapter of this 
thesis, which will explore the issue of what weight a proposed 
definition for terrorism should give to the two international law 
theories, in order to push forward cosmopolitan developments with 
due regard to State sovereignty concerns in the field. 
                                                             
7 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging STL-11-01/I (16 February 2011) 
(STL Decision). 
8 The first draft on a Comprehensive Convention was presented by India. See 
UNGA Sixth Committee (55th Session) ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ (19 October 2000) UN Doc 
A/C.6/55/L.2, Annex II (Indian proposal). 
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I. Why terrorism should be introduced into the Article 
5 of the Rome Statute 
a) A brief historical account of the efforts to criminaliseterrorism 
Ironically, terrorism was the reason for the first efforts to 
establish a permanent international criminal court in 1937.9 The 
1937 Convention on the Creation for an International Criminal 
Court10 provided for the establishment of an international court that 
would serve as a judicial forum to punish terrorism as was to be 
defined in the corresponding 1937 Convention for the Punishment 
and Prevention of Terrorism.11 Although the latter never came into 
force and there were no ratifications of the Convention on the 
Creation for an International Criminal Court,12 it is worth noting 
that this preliminary effort constituted the first acknowledgment by 
the international community that terrorism merits international 
concern.13 The 1937 Convention for the Punishment and Prevention 
of Terrorism was the first comprehensive convention on terrorism 
that included the first definition of what constitutes ‘acts of 
terrorism’: ‘criminal acts directed against a State or intended to 
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group 
of persons, or the general public’.14 However, World War II and the 
subsequent demise of the League of Nations diverted attention from 
the Convention and thus, it never came into force.15 
                                                             
9 Neil Boister, ‘Treaty Crimes, International Criminal Court?’ (2009) 12 New 
Criminal Law Review 341, 360. 
10 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court (adopted 16 
November 1937) League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement No 156. 
11 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (adopted 16 
November1937) 19 League of Nations Official Journal 23. 
12 Jackson Maogoto, ‘Early efforts to establish an International Criminal Court’ 
in José Doria and ors (eds), The Legal Regime of the International Criminal 
Court (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 22. 
13 Todd M Sailer, ‘The International Criminal Court: An Argument to Extend its 
Jurisdiction to Terrorism and a Dismissal of U.S. Objections’ (1999) 13 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal 311, 325. 
14 Convention for the Punishment and Prevention of Terrorism art 1(1). 
15 Ben Saul, ‘The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism’ (2006) 
4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 78, 82. 
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From then on, there were several times when the UN addressed 
concerns regarding terrorism with Declarations, Conventions and 
Security Council Resolutions.16 UN General Assembly Resolution 
42/159 of December 7, 198717 actually stated that agreement on a 
universal definition of terrorism would enhance ‘the effectiveness 
of the struggle against terrorism’. Also, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(Financing of Terrorism Convention) provides a two-tier type of 
definition for terrorist offences: Article 2 (1a) prohibits acts that 
constitute offences under nine anti-terrorist treaties and Article 2 
(1b) gives an all-inclusive formula of acts whose funding is 
prohibited by making reference to  
any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury 
to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in 
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.18 
At a State level, in 1989, a coalition of Caribbean States 
proposed that transnational crimes should be prosecuted by an 
international criminal court.19 Although they emphasised the 
prosecution of drug-related crimes, their motivation was largely 
based on the fact that they found themselves unable to cope with 
                                                             
16 UNGA ‘Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ (7 December 1987) 
UN Doc A/RES/42/159; UNGA ‘Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism’ (9 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/60 Supp No 49 
(A/49/49); Terrorist Bombings Convention; Financing of Terrorism Convention; 
UNSC Res 1269 (19 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1269 (‘on the responsibility 
of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security’); 
UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1368 (‘Threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’); UNSC Res 1373 (28 
September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373 (‘Threats to international peace and 
security caused by terrorist acts’). 
17 UNGA ‘Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ (7 December 1987) 
UN Doc A/RES/42/159. 
18 Financing of Terrorism Convention arts 2(1a) and 2(1b). 
19 William Schabas,  An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th 
edn, CUP 2011) 10. 
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this type of criminal activity due to the influence that the organised 
crime exerted to the political power and national judicial 
authorities.20 It was after a call from those States that the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution for the creation of an ICC with 
jurisdiction over transnational drug-trafficking ‘and other 
recognized criminal activities which endanger the constitutional 
order of states and violate basic human rights.’21 Although terrorism 
was not explicitly mentioned in the Resolution, it is undeniable that 
it falls into the category of criminal activity that threatens the 
internal sovereignty of a State and violates the fundamental rights 
of its citizens.  
During the Rome negotiations and despite the support of some 
delegations for the inclusion of transnational crimes into the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, transnational crimes were ultimately omitted entirely, 
for reasons that will be discussed below. In brief, the reasons for 
their omission from the Rome Statute revolve partly around the fact 
that treaty-based crimes were not defined, or clearly defined, in 
their respective treaties in order to meet the nullum crimen sine lege 
requirements for the purpose of conducting a criminal trial.22 As 
Rubin argues with respect to terrorism, the anti-terrorist 
conventions ‘leav[e] it to [their] States-Parties to define with 
particularity the crimes set forth only broadly within [the 
conventions]’.23 Unlike the core crimes which have attained  
customary law status, treaties that oblige States to criminalise a 
particular conduct create obligations only for the States Parties to 
them.24 While international crimes establish individual 
                                                             
20 Boister (n 9) 343. 
21 UNGA Res 44/39 (4 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/39. 
22 Boister (n 9) 345. 
23 Alfred P Rubin, ‘Legal Response to Terror: An International Criminal Court?’ 
(2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 65, 66-67. 
24 Boister (n 9) 348. However, the treaty-based nature does not always distinguish 
an international crime stricto sensu from a transnational offence, such as is the 
case of the crime of genocide which was regulated firstly by the UNGA 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277. 
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responsibility and are directly binding on individuals, the 
implementation of treaty-based crimes is dependent upon State 
compliance, meaning that non-compliance entails only State 
responsibility for the violation of an obligation.25 Be that as it may, 
before arguing that treaty-based crimes might also merit inclusion 
in the ICC’s jurisdiction, this section is firstly going to focus on the 
primary reason why terrorism should be included into the Rome 
Statute and thus, have an international definition for criminal law 
purposes, namely that it will complement the current extradition 
system and possibly constitute a more effective response to terrorist 
conduct. It should be noted, however, that it will not be argued that 
national efforts to combat terrorism should be rendered redundant; 
rather an international authority could be used as an alternative 
forum (or perhaps an incentive) of adjudication of terrorist cases 
when the current extradition system is insufficient to respond to the 
needs of international accountability for terrorist offenders. 
b) International jurisdiction over terrorism as a more effective 
response to terrorist acts 
In 1995, during the first sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee on a 
Permanent International Criminal Court, the United States 
presented a strong line of arguments against the inclusion of drug-
related crimes and terrorism into the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the ICC.26 Among the arguments presented, it was argued that the 
international anti-terrorist conventions ‘aim at the development of 
strong national investigative capabilities within effective law 
enforcement agencies working in an increasingly cooperative 
manner with their counterparts in other countries’, emphasised that 
national criminal justice systems have made ‘considerable ongoing 
permanent efforts to detect and prevent terrorist activity, utilizing 
                                                             
25 Kai Ambos and Anina Timmermann, ‘Terrorism and Customary International 
Law’ in Ben Saul (ed), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism 
(Edward Elgar 2014) 24. 
26 UNGA ‘United States Comments to Ad Hoc Committee Report’ (31 March 
1995) UN Doc A/AC.244/1 /Add.2 (US Comments). 
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diplomatic, intelligence, and law-enforcement resources’ and 
argued that an ICC Prosecutor would be less competent to deal with 
complex terrorist cases than national authorities.27 In other words, 
the US argumentation was based on some pro-State sovereignty 
considerations, namely the national ability to deal with terrorist 
offences, the conviction that international conventions are 
successful in the prevention and suppression of terrorism based on 
State cooperation and the belief that an international Prosecutor will 
not do the job as competently as national governments in terms of 
investigation and collection of evidence. 
The US argumentation could have been sound if the ICC was to 
function on the basis of primary jurisdiction over national courts 
and not under the complementarity principle as enshrined into the 
Rome Statute. Firstly, and as the Rome Statute was to be shaped 
three years after the US comments, the complementarity regime of 
the ICC gives absolute priority to States to make the investigation 
and prosecution of all the crimes listed in Article 5 of the Rome 
Statute, and thus it does not undermine national capabilities in 
dealing with terrorist offences should terrorism be included in 
Article 5. Besides, the Rome Statute includes provisions concerning 
international cooperation and judicial assistance and thus it cannot 
be said that the goals of the international anti-terrorist conventions 
and those of the Rome Statute conflict in terms of State cooperation 
in the fight against terrorism.28 The subsidiary jurisdiction of the 
ICC is only to be triggered in cases of State unwillingness or 
inability to conduct investigation or prosecution and a State with 
developed ‘national investigative capabilities within effective law 
enforcement agencies’29 that makes efforts for the prevention and 
suppression of terrorism using its resources cannot be considered 
                                                             
27 ibid paras 38 and 41. 
28 Rome Statute arts 86-102. 
29 US Comments (n 26). 
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either as unwilling or as unable in the context of the Rome 
Statute.30 
i) Why States prefer to address terrorism under a State-
centric approach 
Before examining the contribution of the ICC to the 
improvement of the current system of State cooperation and 
extradition, it is worth looking at the two main reasons why States 
prefer to keep terrorism under their exclusive jurisdiction without 
the option of an international court adjudicating over terrorism 
cases. As was pointed out in the Introduction, the definition and 
inclusion of a crime of terrorism into the ICC’s jurisdiction was 
obstructed mainly for the following reasons: i) the lack of a 
universally accepted definition, ii) the conviction that not all acts of 
terrorism can meet the threshold of sufficient gravity of Article 5(1) 
of the Rome Statute, iii) the assertion that national authorities can 
respond more effectively in the prosecution and punishment of 
terrorism rather than an international court and iv) the risk of 
politicising the ICC if it is called upon to adjudicate over terrorism 
cases. It was further argued in the Introduction that the lack of a 
universally accepted definition cannot constitute per se a sufficient 
reason for its non-inclusion into the Rome Statute, as the paradigm 
of aggression has shown that negotiations conducted by States 
Parties and non-governmental actors can be fruitful and succeed in 
formulating definitions for international crimes. Concerning the 
threshold of sufficient gravity, just as not all war crimes or crimes 
against humanity can be adjudicated by the ICC on grounds of not 
being of sufficient gravity, similarly not all terrorist acts would be 
prosecuted and punished by the ICC if the same threshold is not 
reached. However, the remaining reasons demonstrate the particular 
                                                             
30 For a thorough discussion on the deliberations of the terms ‘unwillingness’ and 
‘inability’ for the purposes of the Rome Statute see John D Holmes, ‘The 
Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues Negotiations and Results (Kluwer 
Law International 1999) 41-78. 
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sensitivity of States towards issues that pertain to national security 
and the protection of their own sovereign interests. Firstly, terrorist 
crimes are thought to be better prosecuted by national courts31 
because terrorism is mostly seen as a national, or at best, a 
transnational crime (namely of concern only for the States 
involved) and not an international one (raising international 
concern). Creegan suggests that, since most terrorist crimes are 
directed against a single State, then they should be tried 
nationally.32 However, he also admits that terrorism may constitute 
a threat to international peace and security and that there have been 
instances of truly international terrorism where their referral to an 
international court would have been appropriate, such as the 1998 
embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States.33 
When an act of terrorism reaches the threshold of being a threat to 
international peace and security and presents the characteristics of 
transnational consequences and egregious violence, coupled with 
the jurisdictional States’ unwillingness or inability to prosecute, 
then the existence of an international court with jurisdiction will not 
only be helpful but also be imperative in order to promote 
international accountability. Therefore, it is safer, from an 
international criminal justice perspective, to view terrorism as a 
non-international crime, only when the threshold of threat to 
international peace and security has not been met.  
Secondly, and perhaps more convincingly, States are opposed to 
the idea of an international court for terrorism for fear of losing 
their own control over national prosecutions.34 It is unlikely that 
States with developed anti-terrorist laws and enforcement measures 
would want to see terrorists that have targeted them tried by an 
                                                             
31 Erin Creegan, ‘A Permanent Hybrid Court for Terrorism’ (2010-11) 26 
American University International Law Review 237, 262-266. 
32 ibid 266. 
33 Note, ‘Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment and War’ (2002) 115 
Harvard Law Review 1217, 1220-21. 
34 Creegan (n 31) 264. 
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international court.35 Those States that are often the targets of 
terrorist activities are wary of relinquishing jurisdiction to an 
international authority which might have different priorities in the 
application and different views on the interpretation of the law in 
the field,36 and which may not protect the national interests of the 
affected State to the same extent as the State itself. For example, the 
US and India have the right under their domestic laws to impose 
preventative detention of suspected terrorists without trial.37 While 
domestic due process considerations are not explicitly a ground of 
admissibility before the ICC, there might be instances where lack of 
substantial due process might be deliberate for the purpose of 
conducting a show trial, with the intention of shielding the accused 
and avoiding a genuine prosecution,38 or of indefinitely detaining 
the accused for purposes different from conducting a trial (such as 
extracting information). The original interpretation of 
‘unwillingness’ under Article 17(2) means that a State is unwilling 
to try an accused for the purposes of shielding him or her from 
justice,39 and obviously a State that keeps an accused detained 
without trial for purposes such as extracting information, does not 
show an intention to shield him or her, but exactly the opposite. 
However, given that the ICC is first and foremost an anti-impunity 
mechanism,40 the outcome it seeks is the conduct of judicial 
proceedings, the lack of which might be considered as ground of 
admissibility.41 
                                                             
35 ibid. 
36 Madeleine Morris, ‘Terrorism and Unilateralism: Criminal Jurisdiction and 
International Relations’ (2004) Cornell International Law Journal 473, 478. 
37 Creegan (n 31) 265.  
38 Frédéric Mégret and Marika G Samson, ‘Holding the Line on Complementarity 
in Libya: The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials’ (2013) 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 571, 587 giving the example of the Pol Pot trial 
where the violations of due process rights were such so as to signify that there 
was no genuine intention to really prosecute him. 
39 Rome Statute art 17(2a). 
40 Mégret (n 38) 573. 
41 Rome Statute art 17 (1a). Outside a terrorism context, the case of Prosecutor v 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi ICC-01/11-01/11 gave rise to a debate on whether 
domestic due process violations, especially against an accused for whom the ICC 
has issued an arrest warrant, should constitute a ground of admissibility (Mégret 
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So far, one can discern two interrelated arguments which favour 
the non-inclusion of terrorism into the jurisdiction of the ICC: on 
the one hand, terrorism is mostly seen as a domestic or transnational 
crime and as such, States prefer to deal with it at a national level. 
On the other hand, even when a terrorist crime amounts to a threat 
to international peace and security, States still prefer that it remains 
a national issue, for fear of losing control over the prosecution and 
punishment of the offenders. Consequently, one cannot help but ask 
whether the real argument for the exclusion of terrorism from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is not its domestic nature per se but mainly 
the fact that States consider it as too important an issue to be 
handled by an international authority which will function beyond 
the immediate control of the affected State. Precisely because 
terrorism can have political and foreign relations dimensions and 
can constitute a threat to international peace and security,42 States 
do not trust that an international authority would act in their 
interest.43 As Boister illustrates, the uneasy relationship between the 
US and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is an indication of 
the reluctance with which the US views international tribunals due 
to their ‘non-compliant’ nature.44 Unlike smaller States which 
appear willing to relinquish their jurisdiction to the ICC,45 powerful 
                                                                                                                                          
(n 38) 572). The case was admitted before the ICC but the Decision on the 
Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (ICC-01/11-01 Pre-Trial 
Chamber I 31 May 2013 paras 206-208) does not make any reference to human 
rights considerations and stated that the admissibility was based in part on issues 
relating to Libya’s failure to take custody of the accused. While there is a strong 
line of arguments against this ‘due process thesis’ (Kevin J Heller, ‘The Shadow 
Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
National Due Process’ 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006) 255), Mégret argues that 
in such cases, the ICC’s role is not to assess whether human rights violations 
have occurred but whether ‘something that can recognizably be described as trial’ 
has occurred (Mégret (n 38) 586). More generally about Rome Statute’s 
safeguards concerning due process protection see Elinor Fry, ‘Between Show 
Trials and Sham Prosecutions: The Rome Statute’s Potential Effect on Domestic 
Due Process Protections’ (2012) 23 Criminal Law Forum 35. 
42 Morris (n 36) 478.  
43 Neil Boister, ‘The Exclusion of Treaty Crimes from the Jurisdiction of the 
Proposed International Criminal Court: Law, Pragmatism, Politics’ (1998) 3 
Journal of Armed Conflict Law 27, 38. 
44 ibid. 
45 ‘Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia both indicated that an ICC would present 
an attractive third alternative to extradition or prosecution’ (ibid). 
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States are less willing to do the same and seem to favour the current 
‘extradite or prosecute’ approach adopted by the majority of anti-
terrorist conventions than the surrender of jurisdiction over terrorist 
offences to a neutral, international authority.46 
ii) How the ‘extradite or prosecute’ principle may serve 
the State-centric approach at the expense of 
international criminal justice 
The ‘extradite or prosecute’ principle, provided for by many 
existing anti-terrorist conventions,47 is designed to bring 
transnational criminals to justice by requiring a State ‘which has 
hold of someone who has committed a crime of international 
concern either to extradite the offender to another [S]tate which is 
prepared to try him or else to take steps to have him prosecuted 
before its own courts’.48 However, this State-based system of 
dealing with transnational crimes is not always unaffected by the 
sovereign interests of the involved States. There is the possibility 
that States, despite the presence of an extradition treaty, refuse to 
extradite their own nationals to the requesting State due to, among 
others, political or diplomatic reasons.49 Political expediency plays 
a significant role in the decision of a State to extradite or prosecute 
an offender.50 The risk of having its foreign relations disturbed if a 
                                                             
46 ibid. This tendency is illustrated in the Lockerbie case, where the US insisted 
the suspects be extradited either to the US or the UK and refused Libya’s offer 
for the establishment of an international tribunal to try them. See John Dugard, 
‘Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court’ (1997) 56 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 329, 334. 
47 Indicatively, see International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art 
10; Financing of Terrorism Convention art 9(2); Terrorist Bombings Convention 
art 9; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
art 11(1). 
48 Mohammed Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M Wise, Aut Dedere aut Judicare: 
The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (Kluwer 1995) 3. 
49 Sailer (n 13) 326. 
50 The ICC has already faced obstacles in having alleged offenders extradited, not 
the least because of political interventions. An indicative example is the recent 
failure of South Africa, being a State Party to the Rome Statute, to extradite 
Omar Al Bashir to the ICC despite the South African High Court’s decision that 
he shall not leave the country until the ICC’s request for extradition has been 
examined. See ICC Press Release, ‘The President of the Assembly calls on States 
Parties to fulfil their obligations to execute the Arrest warrants against Mr. Al 
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State does extradite an offender or even appear weak if it gives in to 
an extradition request might determine whether eventually an 
offender will escape justice by being prosecuted with unwarranted 
leniency or not being prosecuted at all.51 An illustrative example of 
this state of affairs is the Turkish refusal to extradite Osama Bin 
Laden’s son-in-law, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, to the US. Ghaith, after 
his capture in a detention camp in Iran, allegedly escaped and 
entered Turkey on a forged passport. Turkish authorities claimed 
that they were obliged to return him to Iran despite US requests for 
extradition. Turkey has repeatedly denied assistance to the US 
counter-terrorism agencies for political and foreign relations 
reasons, such as the US’s ‘alleged favourable treatment of Kurdish 
interests in Northern Iraq and its alleged support of Israel in its 
ongoing dispute with Turkey’.52 Moreover and more directly related 
to terrorism, there is also the scenario that the requesting State 
might have supported the criminal activity, as was the case with 
Libya in the Lockerbie affair. There were substantial indications 
that the offenders would be prosecuted favourably or even be 
acquitted if tried in Libya, while Libya insisted it would not 
extradite them either to the US or to the UK, despite the continuous 
sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The offenders were 
finally tried by a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands; however 
the administration of justice was blocked for over 12 years due to 
Libya’s refusal to extradite its nationals.53 A similar example where 
a refusal to extradite a terrorist suspect blocked the administration 
of justice for years was the case of Luis Posada Carriles, of Cuban-
                                                                                                                                          
Bashir’ (2015) ICC-ASP-20150613-PR1117. However, at least in principle, 
States Parties are under obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC, including the 
execution of arrest warrants, in order to bring international offenders to justice. 
(Rome Statute arts 86-102). 
51 Sailer (n 13) 327.  
52 Joseph Fitsanakis, ‘Turkey refused to extradite bin Laden’s son-in-law to US’ 
(2013) <http://intelnews.org/2013/02/04/01-1189/#more-9905> accessed 22 
November 2013. 
53 Sailer (n 13) 327-329. A similar example that can be cited is the refusal of 
Afghanistan to extradite Osama Bin Laden before the 2001 bombing of 
Afghanistan and after the UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc 
S/RES/1267 which set out sanctions to be imposed if Afghanistan refused Bin 
Laden’s extradition. 
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Venezuelan nationality, who was accused of the 1976 bombing of a 
Cuban airliner which resulted in 73 deaths and of involvement in a 
terrorist bombing in Washington DC in the same year.54 Posada 
escaped from Venezuela while awaiting his trial and in 2005 was 
found in the US seeking asylum.55 The US denied the extradition 
request made by Venezuela on grounds that the suspect might be 
subjected to torture if extradited to Venezuela.56 Instead, he was 
prosecuted in the US on immigration charges and was finally 
acquitted, despite the US Patriot Act, which requires that an alien 
suspected of terrorism should be kept in detention.57 
In all the above circumstances, the ICC can function as a third, 
alternative and neutral forum of prosecution. The Office of the 
Prosecutor has stated that ‘[g]roups bitterly divided by conflict may 
oppose prosecutions at each other’s hands and yet agree to a 
prosecution by a Court perceived as neutral and impartial’.58 Also, 
Articles 36 (3a) and 36 (8a) (ii) of the Rome Statute provide 
respectively that ‘judges shall be chosen from among persons of 
high moral character, impartiality and integrity’ and that their 
selection should be based, among other criteria, on an ‘equitable 
geographical representation’. Moreover, the ICC can serve as a 
solution in cases of concurrent jurisdictions,59 such as were seen in 
the competing jurisdictional claims over the offenders in the 
                                                             
54 Naomi Norberg, ‘Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects 
For a Future Together’ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11, 13. 
55 ibid 14.  
56 ‘Cuba Anger at US Posada Carriles Verdict’ (2011) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13026870> accessed 26 November 
2013. One cannot help but notice the irony on the part of the US, which denies 
extradition of a terrorist suspect on grounds of human rights considerations. 
57Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Interceptand Obstruct Terrorism  Act of 2001 Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 271 
(2001) (USA PATRIOT). 
58 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the 
Prosecutor’ (September 2003) ICC-OTP 2003, 5.  
59 See Andreas Schloenhardt’s Conference Paper ‘Transnational Organised Crime 
and the International Criminal Court’ (2004) Australian Institute of Criminology 
International Conference, where he argues that the ICC ‘offers a neutral forum to 
try offenders thatare not extradited because too many countries are seeking 
jurisdiction, or becausea country remains too fearful its nationals or other alleged  
offenders may face biased trials in a foreign jurisdiction.’ 
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Lockerbie case.60 Thirdly, the existence of an international, neutral 
forum may minimise the role of politics in extradition decisions, 
regardless of the existence of an extradition treaty. As was said 
before, States’ decisions for extradition are frequently driven by 
political considerations and not by a sentiment of commitment to 
extradition treaties or to the anti-terrorist conventions to which they 
are parties. Admittedly, the introduction of the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW)61 has replaced the traditional extradition scheme 
with judicial cooperation62 among the European Union (EU) 
Member States with respect to certain offences, terrorism included. 
However, for those States outside the EU (and before the adoption 
of the EAW), it remains true that there is the risk of ad hoc political 
intervention without any judicial oversight.63 In the current state of 
affairs, terrorists can escape punishment if they flee to a State that 
would deny their extradition or prosecution on grounds irrelevant to 
the purposes of international criminal justice, such as opposing 
ideology, adverse relations or distrust towards the requesting 
State.64 The ICC can offer a way through jurisdictional 
technicalities and function as a neutral, alternative venue of 
prosecution, despite the existence of an international system of 
State cooperation based on anti-terrorist conventions and 
extradition. 
 
 
                                                             
60Boister (n 43) 33-34.  
61 Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA) (adopted 13 June 2002, 
entered into force 7 August 2002) OJ L 190, art 1.1. 
62 See Elies van Sliedregt, ‘The European Arrest Warrant: Between Trust, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law: Introduction. The European Arrest Warrant: 
Extradition in Transition’ (2007) 3 (2) European Constitutional Law Review 244, 
for a critique on the application of the EAW and its similarities with the classic 
extradition scheme. 
63 Nial Fenelly, ‘The European Arrest Warrant: Recent Developments’ (2007) 8 
ERA Forum 519, 522. 
64 Sailer (n 13) 338. 
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c) The question of the inclusion of treaty crimes into the Rome 
Statute 
So far this Chapter examined the main reasons why there was 
disagreement on the inclusion of terrorism into the Rome Statute. 
The reasons related to some pragmatic aspects, such as that it can 
be effectively addressed by States through the system of State 
cooperation or extradition. However, it has been argued that this 
system might not be unaffected by political expediencies and 
therefore, the establishment of the ICC’s jurisdiction over terrorism 
can provide a solid solution in such cases as a neutral forum of 
prosecution. Nonetheless, from a legal perspective, the main 
argument against the inclusion of terrorism into the Rome Statute 
has to do with terrorism’s own genesis in international law: 
terrorism, even international terrorism, is a treaty-based crime, for 
which universal jurisdiction has not been established65 and which 
has a very questionable customary law status.66 These features are 
in fact what conceptually separates the core crimes already 
incorporated into the Rome Statute from the crime of terrorism and 
consequently from any other treaty-based crime that will ever pose 
its candidancy for inclusion into the ICC’s jurisdiction.67 Thus, this 
section is going to examine to what extent the lack of universal 
                                                             
65 The ‘extradite or prosecute’ principle, provided by many anti-terrorist 
conventions, allows a State with no traditional jurisdictional link over a 
committed crime, to assume subsidiary jurisdiction on behalf of the competent 
State. Although this scheme resembles to a model of  universal jurisdiction, it still 
differs in that the ‘extradite or prosecute’ principle requires the presence and 
arrest of the alleged perpetrator in the State where prosecution shall take place 
(Ambos (n 25) 35; Amrith Rohan Perera, ‘The Draft United Nations 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism’ in Saul (n 25) 154). 
Ambos also argues that the fact that the UNGA Draft Comprehensive 
Convention, under draft Article 21, provides for the obligation of States to 
respect territorial sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, signifies that, 
at least at present, there is no intention to make terrorism universally 
prosecutable. 
66 However, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in the 
STL Decision (n 7) held, controversially, that a customary international crime of 
transnational terrorism in time of peace exists.  
67 For an examination of the differences between international crimes and crimes 
established by treaty see Ambos (n 25). He argues however that an originally 
treaty-based crime can rise to a ‘true’ international crime by way of customary 
law (Ambos (n 25) 25). 
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jurisdiction could hamper terrorism’s inclusion into the Rome 
Statute and whether individual accountability for treaty-based 
crimes could be equally established. 
Looking back at the drafting history of the Rome Statute, in 
1991 the International Law Commission (ILC)’s Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind incorporated 
treaty crimes into the ICC’s jurisdiction.68 Treaty crimes were 
continuously being included into the Draft Codes until 1995,69 but 
in 1996, due to opposition from some members of the ILC,70 
offences regulated by the anti-terrorist conventions were finally 
excluded.71 The persistence of the ILC in arguing for the inclusion 
of treaty crimes in the ICC’s jurisdiction was based on the 
following legal reasoning, later to be confronted with more complex 
issues of jurisdiction and customary law status of treaty crimes: 
treaty-based crimes were already recognised offences under 
international law, their punishment was provided for by national 
laws, the related treaties included provisions of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, extradition and mutual assistance and also the 
‘extradite or prosecute’ principle was applicable.72 Overall, they 
appeared to constitute transnational crimes that merited punishment 
and international concern since mechanisms of State cooperation 
and provisions on extra-territorial jurisdiction could be triggered as 
a response to their commission. It is true that no other international 
tribunal before had jurisdiction over treaty-based crimes; however 
                                                             
68 UNGA ‘Report of the ILC, 43rd Session’ (29 April-19 July 1991) UN Doc 
Supp No 10 (A/46/10) paras 238-250. 
69 UNGA ‘Report of the ILC, 47th Session’ (2 May-21 July 1995) UN Doc Supp 
No 10 (A/50/10) paras 112-118. 
70 Boister (n 43) 27. 
71 UNGA ‘The ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’ (6 May-26 July 1996) UN Doc Supp No 10 (A/51/10) arts 16-20, 
including only aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against UN 
personnel and war crimes. 
72 UNGA ‘Report of the ILC, 45th Session’ (3 May-23 July 1993) UN Doc Supp 
No 10 (A/48/10) para 282. 
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this lack of precedent did not pose any legal problem for the ILC to 
suggest their inclusion into the ICC’s jurisdiction.73 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of treaty crimes into the ICC’s 
jurisdiction was confronted with two serious legal complexities. 
The first concerned the fact that the relevant treaties create 
obligations only for the States that are Parties to them and do not 
extend to non-Parties. To the contrary, core crimes are prosecutable 
under general international law without any discrimination between 
Parties and non-Parties to the Rome Statute.74 Secondly, the status 
of treaty crimes as international crimes stricto sensu must be 
established separately from the fact that they are regulated under a 
specific treaty. In Prosecutor v Tadić, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that, for a conduct to turn 
into a crime under international law, three criteria must be met: i) 
the prohibition of the particular act(s) must be a part of international 
law, ii) the breach must affect important universal values and iii) 
the breach must entail individual responsibility in its own right, 
regardless of its criminalisation under domestic criminal laws.75 
This third criterion requires that a prohibition of a certain conduct 
must ‘have a direct binding effect on individuals, without state 
mediation, and it has to be prosecutable either by the ICC or […] by 
[S]tates, independent of specific jurisdictional links’.76 Ambos and 
Timmermann argue further that this requirement of ‘universal 
prosecutability’ is what ultimately makes States to ‘express their 
                                                             
73 Boister (n 43) 30. 
74 Boister (n 9) 347.For the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of States non-Parties 
see Madeleine Morris, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court of 
Nationals of Non-Party States’ (2000) 6 ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 363; Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 618. 
75
 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1 (2 October 1995) 94. The Article 5 crimes of the 
Rome Statute meet all the above requirements.  
76 Ambos and Timmermann (n 25) 26. 
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serious interest in the recognition of certain conduct as a crime 
under [international criminal law] stricto sensu’.77 
Be that as it may, there is no reason in principle why the ICC 
should not have jurisdiction over treaty crimes even if it has to 
follow a ‘selective application’ approach for treaty crimes as 
opposed to the universal application for the core crimes.78 As 
Boister argues, a ‘selective application’ approach would mean that 
with respect to treaty crimes, the ICC would not exercise 
jurisdiction automatically but only when the State concerned is 
linked in a jurisdictionally acceptable way to the relevant treaty or 
when it consents to the ICC’s jurisdiction over the conduct in 
question. In contrast, with respect to the core crimes, ‘universal 
application’ means that the ICC’s jurisdiction is automatic due to 
the universality principle and the customary status the core crimes 
have attained. With respect to treaty crimes, there will be no legal 
hurdle for the ICC to have jurisdiction in cases where the State of 
nationality of the offender or the State in whose territory the crime 
has been committed, are Parties to the Rome Statute and to the 
relevant treaty because only under this condition would it be 
ensured that both States are under obligation to implement that 
treaty. Of course, a single regime of universal application of the 
Rome Statute provisions would be more preferable,79 but on the 
other hand, perpetrators should not simply escape justice due to 
jurisdictional technicalities.80 Moreover, and with respect to 
terrorism as a treaty crime, the situation is significantly ameliorated 
by the fact that most States Parties to the Rome Statute are Parties 
to the two most popular anti-terrorist treaties,81 the Terrorist 
Bombings and the Financing of Terrorism Convention. These two 
                                                             
77 ibid 27. 
78 Boister (n 43) 31.  
79 Boister (n 43) 31. 
80 Sailer (n 13) 330. 
81 Up to date, the Parties to the Rome Statute are 123 whereas the number of the 
Parties to these two treaties is much higher: 168 Parties to the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention and 186 to the Financing of Terrorism Convention. See United 
Nations Treaty Collection database. 
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treaties have far more Parties than the Rome Statute at the time of 
writing, which means that the situation most likely to arise is that of 
a State being a Party to one or both treaties, but not to the Rome 
Statute, an occasion which rules out ICC’s jurisdiction altogether. 
Turning now to the customary status of the crime of terrorism, 
opinions are divided as to whether treaty crimes in general and 
terrorism in particular can constitute violations of customary law. 
On the one hand, it has been argued that treaty crimes cannot be 
considered as international crimes at all;82 the crimes regulated by 
the treaties are already codified in national laws, so it is not the 
treaties that create the crimes, but the States that enact them.83 
Besides, these treaties do not produce any direct relation between 
the States Parties to them and the individual offender except the one 
already established under the States’ national laws.84 Thus, one can 
talk about national crimes for which there is a level of international 
concern and not for international crimes stricto sensu, such as the 
core crimes, for which individual criminal responsibility is 
established in customary law. On the other hand, Cassese argues 
that terrorist offences - at least those included in international 
treaties - are prohibited by customary law, and thus, can no longer 
be considered only as treaty crimes.85 This affirmation has been 
based on the increasing number of statements and declarations of 
States and international organisations, as well as actions taken by 
States in the fight against terrorism at various levels, evincing that 
terrorism has become a crime under customary law.86 This view is 
also supported by Wertheim and others, who further argue that both 
                                                             
82 Neil Boister, ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’ (2003) 14 (5) European Journal of 
International Law 955, 963. 
83 Boister (n 9) 350. 
84 ibid. 
85 Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’ in Andrea Bianchi 
(ed), Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Hart Publishing 
2004) 218.  
86 ibid 224. 
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current State practice and opinio juris87 attest this transition.88 
Under this approach, treaty-based crimes cannot be excluded from 
being developped into crimes under customary law, provided that 
both State practice and opinio juris point to that direction.   
Even if terrorism, for all the above reasons, has some potential to 
be included into Article 5 of the Rome Statute, it still needs to be 
defined for the purposes of attributing individual criminal liability. 
In this respect, it is crucial to examine how some recent definitional 
frameworks for terrorism are influenced by the two main 
international law theories, namely the State-centric theory and 
cosmopolitanism. Therefore, the next section is going to focus on 
the extent to which State sovereignty considerations and/or 
cosmopolitan considerations are reflected in current attempts to 
criminalise and define terrorism. The instruments chosen for such 
an analysis are firstly, the most significant anti-terrorist Security 
Council  Resolutions,89 which, it will be argued, show a preference 
towards the protection of State sovereignty interests, even 
sometimes at the expense of cosmopolitan purposes. Secondly, the 
STL Decision, which dynamically concluded that there is a 
customary definition of international terrorism, will be analysed as 
an example of whether and how cosmopolitan considerations alone 
can push the development of international law even without due 
regard to State sovereignty protection. Finally, the so far 
unsuccessful UN negotiations on a Draft Comprehensive 
                                                             
87 STL Decision (n 7); Ben Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United 
Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime for 
Transnational Terrorism’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 677.  
88 Peter J Wertheim, ‘Should ‘Grave Crimes of International Terrorism’ be 
included in the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court?’ (2003) 22 (2) 
Policy and Society1, 5; Marcello Di Filippo, ‘Terrorist Crimes and International 
Cooperation: Critical Remarks on the Definition and Inclusion of Terrorism in 
the Category of International Crimes’ (2008) 19 (3) European Journal of 
International Law 533, 561; Christian Much, ‘The International Criminal Court 
and Terrorism as an International Crime’ (2006) 14 Michigan State Journal of 
International Law 121, 125. 
89 UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1368 (Res 1368); 
UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373 (Res 1373);  UNSC 
Res 1566 (8 October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566 (Res 1566). 
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Convention on International Terrorism will be used as an example 
of the extent to which State sovereignty and cosmopolitan 
considerations alike can be taken into account in the effort to define 
and criminalise international terrorism. 
II. How State sovereignty concerns have influenced 
the process of criminalising international terrorism in 
prominent anti-terrorist Security Council Resolutions 
Although a significant number of international anti-terrorist legal 
instruments have been drafted since 1970 obliging States to 
criminalise different aspects of terrorist activities,90 this section is 
going to focus on some post 9/11 Security Council Resolutions. The 
reason for this selection is that the Security Council Resolutions 
drafted after the 9/11 attacks reflect the more recent stance that the 
Security Council has adopted with respect to what it understands by 
‘terrorism’ as well as what it regards as the best way to confront 
it.91 Contrary to the several anti-terrorist treaties which cover and 
define specific terrorist activities, Security Council Resolutions 
offer a more generic approach as to how terrorism is understood, 
and even the fact that they lack an umbrella definition for terrorism 
is indicative of this understanding. Finally, these Resolutions were 
chosen also for the reason that they revealingly give space to States 
to confront terrorism unilaterally, without any outer legal 
boundaries of what is defined as terrorism or what the lawful means 
to combat it are. This latest attitude towards terrorism reveals that, 
despite the coordinated UN efforts for a multilateral fight against 
terrorism and despite the several legal frameworks provided by the 
anti-terrorist treaties, States have the discretion to choose 
                                                             
90 For a list of all international anti-terrorist instruments since 1970 see 
<www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml> accessed 22 November 2014. 
91 Kimmo Nuotio, ‘Terrorism as a Catalyst for the Emergence, Harmonization 
and Reform of Criminal Law’ (2006) 4 (5) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 988, 1002-3. 
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unilaterally what they understand as terrorism, even if this 
understanding conflicts with their international obligations.92 
First of all, it should be remembered that Security Council 
Resolutions do not create law and are driven mostly by political 
considerations.93 However, they prescibe normative obligations for 
the Member States under the UN Charter.94 They evince general 
principles of law and they can assist in interpreting Charter 
provisions.95 In this respect, it has been argued that the actions and 
decisions of the Security Council have legal consequences,96 
framed by the terms used in the Resolutions, the surrounding 
discussions, the invoked Charter provisions and the 
circumstances.97 Moreover, Security Council Resolutions acquire 
additional value due to their precedential effect in similar 
situations,98 especially regarding issues of international peace and 
security, where ‘the body of principles is still so fragmentary and 
abstract’.99 Therefore, resolutions adopted right after the 9/11 
attacks merit a detailed examination, in order to understand how the 
Security Council approached the issue of international terrorism by 
focusing mostly on the most appropriate measures to combat it. 
                                                             
92 For example, the lack of a definition for terrorism in Resolution 1373 permitted 
Syria to adopt the definition contained in the Arab Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorism (adopted 22 April 1998), which distinguishes between 
terrorism and legitimate struggle against foreign occupation (art 2). The 
Financing of Terrorism Convention does not make such a distinction and thus, 
violent acts regarded as terrorist by the Financing Convention, fell outside the 
scope of the Syrian definition (Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World 
Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 175, 189). 
Apparently, this is only one of the interpretative problems created by Security 
Council Resolutions due to the lack of an international definition for terrorism. 
For a more elaborative analysis on this issue, see Talmon 188-92. 
93 Ben Saul, ‘Definition of “Terrorism” in the UN Security Council:  1985-2004’ 
(2005) 4 (1) Chinese Journal of International Law 141, 142. 
94 ibid. 
95 ibid.  
96 Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, ‘The Role of the United Nations Security Council 
in the International LegalSystem’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of 
International Law in International Politics (OUP 2001) 268. 
97
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 41. 
98 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly’ (1964) 58 American Journal of International Law 960, 963-4. 
99 ibid 964. 
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a) ‘Threat to the peace’, ‘armed attack’ or both? The pro-State 
sovereignty ambiguousness of Resolution 1368 
Security Council Resolution 1368 (Resolution 1368), drafted one 
day after the 9/11, revealed on the one hand the intention of the 
Security Council to take on the responsibility of responding to the 
attacks while, on the other hand, it left the door open for unilateral 
State response. Resolution 1368 attempted to promote international 
justice goals by regarding the attacks as crimes and by making 
reference to ‘bringing the perpetrators to justice’,100 an expression 
that signifies that one day after the attacks, the terrorist acts were 
primarily seen as criminal rather than acts of war. A further 
indication that the Security Council had not, at least initially, ruled 
out the possibility of collective action, was the recognition that the 
attacks constituted a threat to international peace and security,101 a 
characterisation which triggers Security Council’s competence to 
take action. However, Resolution 1368 appeared to take into serious 
consideration the sovereign interests of the UN Member States, 
since it made explicit reference to the ‘the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter’102 in connection with a terrorist act. This reference would 
not necessarily have created any confusion since it only repeated 
the words of the UN Charter. However, its connection with a 
terrorist act was something unprecedented for a Security Council 
Resolution.103 Despite the assertion of the Security Council that it is 
ready to ‘take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist 
attacks…and to combat all forms of terrorism’,104 it did not 
authorise any collective military action, leaving room for unilateral 
                                                             
100 Res 1368 para 3. 
101 ibid preambular para 4. 
102 ibid ‘Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter,…’ 
103 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The UN Security Council and International Terrorism’ in 
Bianchi (n 85) 86-7. 
104 Res 1368 para 5 
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State response.105 Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for a 
temporary right to self-defence, which, in theory, is terminated once 
the Security Council takes all the necessary measures for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.106 Between the 
conflicting ideas of collective security and self-defence,107 the 
Security Council seemed to lean towards the latter as the most 
appropriate way to respond to a terrorist attack, even though it was 
not yet clarified on the day the Resolution was drafted, whether the 
attacks had been committed by private actors or were State-
sponsored, in which case the self-defence arguments would have 
had a sound basis.108 
In this respect, it seems that, according to the Security Council’s 
understanding, a terrorist act can constitute a form of armed attack 
within the context of the UN Charter, since self-defence is 
recognised as a legitimate response. This recognition signifies that a 
terrorist act, at least of the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks, is better 
addressed in the context of the UN Charter (by invocation of Article 
51) rather than international criminal justice. In other words, the 
Security Council viewed that, in that particular case, what mattered 
most was not to hold those responsible accountable under 
international criminal law, not even under national criminal law, but 
rather, to ensure that the US could act unilaterally in whatever way 
deemed appropriate. However, what is of relevance to the question 
of defining terrorism is that, a definition formulated for 
                                                             
105 Saul (n 93) 155. 
106 Christine Gray, ‘The Use of force and the International Legal Order’ in 
Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 633. In practice, 
the Security Council usually avoids making pronouncements on the legality of 
the right to self-defence, with the exception of UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) 
UN Doc S/RES/661, where it openly supported Kuwait’s right to self-defence 
against Iraq. 
107 Cassese argues that the characterisation of the 9/11 attacks as a threat to the 
peace does not legitimise self-defence because the concept of a threat to the peace 
differs from that of an armed attack, for which Article 51 of the UN Charter 
recognises the right to self-defence (Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also 
Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law’ (2001) 12 (5) 
European Journal of International Law 993, 996); Fassbender (n 103) 88. 
108 Fassbender (n 103) 88. 
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international criminal law purposes will be interpreted and used in a 
more cosmopolitan way than that of providing the right to use force 
to the victim State of a terrorist attack as a way of response. Those 
States wary of seeing international terrorism defined in the context 
of international criminal law might fear that such a definition will 
not leave room for the use of force as a legitimate response to a 
terrorist act or generally, it will not allow any other response 
different from the conduct of a trial either at a national or an 
international level. Resolution 1368 demonstrated that, precisely 
because there is no definition of international terrorism, its context 
can be broadened to an extent which overlaps with the concept of 
armed attack and which justifies the use of force as a legitimate 
response. 
Therefore, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 seem to have expanded 
the notion of armed attack, in order to cover attacks carried out by 
terrorist, non-State groups.109 Even before 9/11, the US, among 
other States, promoted this widened right of self-defence,110 but the 
response to this position has never been clear enough.111 The ICJ in 
the Nicaragua case held that self-defence can constitute a response 
to  
the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed 
forces against another State of such gravity as to amount to 
                                                             
109 Gray (n 106) 626. See also Elizabeth Wilmhurst, ‘The Chatham House 
Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence’ (2006) 
55(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 963, 969-71, where it is 
widely argued that self-defence can be invoked against non-State actors when the 
State on whose territory they are based, is either unwilling or unable to take 
action against them. 
110 Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 
September’ (2002) 51 International Criminal Law Quarterly 401, 406. US 
Secretary of State George Shultz stated in 1986 that ‘[i]t is absurd to argue that 
international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or 
airspace; from attacking  them on the soil of other nations, even for the purpose 
of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train, and 
harbor terrorists or guerrillas’ (in Schultz, ‘Low-Intensity Warfare: The 
Challenge of Ambiguity’ (1986) 25 International Legal Materials 204, 206). 
111 Byers (n 110) 407. 
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(inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular 
armed forces, or its substantial involvement therein.112 
Thus, according to the ICJ’s ruling, self-defence as a response to 
an attack committed by non-State actors can be justified only when 
there is a close link between a State and a non-State actor and the 
seriousness of the committed acts is analogous to an attack 
committed by a State.113 
In State practice, incidents prior to 9/11 have shown that attacks 
by non-State actors do not per se justify an invocation of the right 
to self-defence by the victim State. When Israel attacked the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation Headquarters in Tunisia in 1985 
claiming to be attacking terrorist targets under its right of self-
defence, the Security Council condemned that action.114 Also, 
following the bombings in US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998, the US, claiming its right to self-defence, launched a cruise 
missiles attack against Sudan and Afghanistan in an effort to target 
the terrorists that were allegedly in their territory.115 Several 
governments expressed concerns related to the violation of these 
States’ territorial sovereignty, as the attacks were not directed 
against the States themselves.116 Moreover, even in cases where 
there was evidence of State implication in a terrorist act, self-
defence arguments were not sufficient to justify the use of force. 
When the US bombed Tripoli in 1986 as a response to a terrorist 
bomb attack in a nightclub in Berlin that killed American soldiers, 
their claim to self-defence was widely rejected.117 However, 
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regarding a post-9/11 attack by non-State actors against Israel, the 
Security Council remained silent as to whether the attack could be 
classified as armed attack and thus, justify Israel’s right to self-
defence. In the case of Hezbollah’s minor cross-border attack 
against Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2006, Israel responded in a 
rather disproportionate manner, launching attacks by land, sea and 
air, provoking destruction to Lebanese infrastructure and causing 
massive population displacement.118 The Security Council avoided 
discussions related to the Israel’s right to self-defence and focused 
on issues of proportionality. Most States found the Israeli response 
disproportionate to the initial attack, while Israel, the US and the 
UK argued that the continuous threat posed by Hezbollah justified 
the use of force in order to prevent future attacks.119 
As was noted previously, at the time when Resolution 1368 was 
drafted, it was not clear whether there was a close link between the 
non-State actors that carried out the 9/11 attacks and a State (in this 
case the State of Afghanistan). Thus, the question remained whether 
the right to self-defence can be extended in order to cover military 
responses to terrorist acts carried out by non-State actors only. 
Therefore, while Resolution 1368 did not explicitly authorise the 
use of force by the US as the victim State, it was drafted and 
interpreted in such a way so as to implicitly encourage the US to 
claim its right to self-defence by taking unilateral military action.120 
The reference to the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence could not but be recognised as a legitimisation of resort to 
force by the victim that suffered the attack.121 Had the Security 
Council authorised the use of force explicitly in Resolution 1368, it 
would have been likely that the Security Council would also impose 
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a time-limited mandate on the use of force carried out in self-
defence or that it would authorise force in a necessary and 
proportionate manner, namely for the purpose to capture Osama Bin 
Laden and members of Al Qaeda only.122 Thus, the controversial 
interpretation of Resolution 1368 as implicitly providing an 
argument for the US to use force without directly authorising it, is 
obviously the result of the ambiguous drafting of the resolution 
which, in turn, is indicative of the political divide among the main 
actors of international politics on how to combat terrorism. As a 
general remark, it can be said that this political divide, particularly 
among the five permanent members of the Security Council, makes 
the UN decision-making process even harder, with the Security 
Council members either exercising their right of veto or threatening 
to exercise it or resorting to ambiguous drafting in an effort to 
accommodate all their political interests.123 For the purposes of this 
thesis, this ambuiguousness was partly due to the fact that 
international terrorism still remains outside the realm of 
international criminal justice and without a universally accepted 
definition. As such, until an international definition is agreed upon, 
the fight against international terrorism will heavily rely on 
individual (and the most powerful) States’ understanding of what 
constitutes the best response, even if this response requires the use 
of force in a manner not clearly envisioned by the provisions of the 
UN Charter.  
b) Resolution 1373: Security Council legislation without UN 
definition 
Turning now to Security Council Resolution 1373 (Resolution 
1373), it has been argued that the Security Council adopted a more 
legislative role124 in combatting international terrorism by 
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introducing wide-ranging counter-terrorism measures. Resolution 
1373 included three types of obligations imposed on States: i) 
mandatory measures against terrorism financing, ii) different types 
of measures against terrorism (which were also mandatory) and iii) 
general counter-terrorism measures which States are just ‘called 
upon’ to adopt.125 Moreover, the text of the Resolution reaffirmed 
the inherent right to self-defence and repeated the assertion that the 
attacks constituted a threat to international peace and security.126 
However, the reference to the Security Council’s readiness to ‘take 
all necessary steps to respond…’ was omitted and instead 
obligations were imposed on States to outlaw inter alia the 
financing of terrorist acts and to improve international cooperation. 
Thirdly, Resolution 1373 established the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC) with the mandate to monitor the implementation 
of the Resolution and to receive State reports on actions they take in 
the fight against terrorism.127 
Resolution 1373 also stated that threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts should be combatted ‘by all 
means’, an expression which cleared the ground for any US military 
action against Afghanistan.128 By the time Resolution 1373 was 
adopted, it had been made clear that the US was not going to 
subject its military response to the rules and procedures of the 
Security Council, which, as a sign of support to the US, stepped 
back from its responsibility for collective security under the UN 
Charter.129 Thus, the US could base their military actions against 
                                                             
125 Luis M Hinojosa-Martínez, ‘A Critical Assessment of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1373’ in Saul (n 15) 626-627. 
126 Res 1373 ‘Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international 
terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security, [r]eaffirming the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the 
Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001) …’ 
127 ibid preambular paragraph 2. For an elaborate analysis of the CTC’s work and 
progress since the adoption of Resolution 1373 see Martinez (n 125). 
128 Surya Subedi, ‘The UN Response to International Terrorism in the Aftermath 
of the Terrorist Attacks in America and the Problem of the Definition of 
Terrorism in International Law’ (2002) 4 International law Forum Droit 
International 159, 160. 
129 Fassbender (n 103) 89. 
175 
 
090015246 
 
those considered as their targets on self-defence arguments.130 In 
this respect, the paradox created by Resolution 1373 is that, while 
the Security Council abstained from trigerring Chapter VII 
provisions for the purpose of authorising force (and did not 
authorise force even as a continuation of the unilateral US 
response), it overstepped its role as an executive organ to assume an 
unprecedented legislative competence. The language of Resolution 
1373, focusing on the inherent right to self-defence, appeared to 
give an almost unlimited competence to the US to use force.131 It 
has been argued that, if the Security Council had not made any 
reference to the right of self-defence in the two Resolutions, then it 
would have been forced to remain silent alltogether, probably due 
to a likely exercise of veto by the US, and thus, its role would not 
have been any greater.132 However, it is still one thing for the 
Security Council to remain silent due to the veto power while 
otherwise condemning a particular course of action133 and another 
thing to pass ambiguous Resolutions implying support to an act 
which can be seen as a violation of the UN Charter. Even if it is 
accepted that after the 9/11 attacks, the right to self-defence has 
been widened in order to cover terrorist attacks carried out by non-
State actors, it has been argued that a possible restriction to this 
‘new doctrine’ of self-defence is that this right ‘may exist only in 
cases where [it] has been asserted by the Security Council, as…in 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373.’134 The US expected Security Council 
backing135 and the Security Council responded with a resolution 
that could be interpreted according to the US’s expectations.136 
These expectations, according to Byers, might include a US 
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strategic movement of loosening international law on the use of 
force  ‘to the ongoing (emphasis in the text) advantage of the US’, 
even when circumstances are not as grave.137 
This preference of the Security Council to support an individual 
State’s sovereign interests and not to assume its responsibility of 
collective security in a circumstance characterised as a threat to 
international peace and security reflects the tendency towards the 
protection of a State’s own political priorities in the fight against 
terrorism. This tendency is also evidenced by the fact that neither 
the Resolution nor the CTC introduced a definition for terrorism. 
While, generally, the work of the CTC aims at promoting a 
coordinated effort in combatting terrorism, more prone to a 
cosmopolitan model of law implementation,138 the lack of an agreed 
definition of terrorism showed that this was not possible. In the 
past, the absence of a definition did not create any implications 
since no international rights or duties were built upon the terms 
‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ but after the adoption of Resolution 1373 
this has changed.139 The Resolution relies greatly on these terms, 
creating obligations for States to criminalise financing of terrorism; 
suppress terrorist groups; deny refugee status to terrorists; prevent 
the movement of terrorists; bring terrorists to justice; and, vitally, 
establish terrorist acts as serious domestic crimes. The lack of a 
definition, though it made it easier to achieve consensus on the text 
of the Resolution,140 allowed States to unilaterally define terrorist 
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acts without having any outer international legal standards of what 
is terrorism or who is considered as terrorist.141 The CTC relied on 
domestic terrorism laws which, it advocated, should be widened in 
order to cover international terrorism,142 encouraging States to 
ratify the anti-terrorist conventions. Leaving so much discretion on 
States and on their domestic legal systems to implement their own 
framework on terrorist cases results in divergence in the adoption of 
counter-terrorism measures,143 in the lack of harmonisation of 
national definitions for terrorism and in an arbitrary categorisation 
of a variety of national security or public order offences as 
terrorist.144 Moreover, the text of Resolution 1373 does not 
designate specific temporal or geographical limitations concerning 
the States’ response to terrorism145 and characterises terrorism in 
general as a threat to international peace and security.146 While 
incidents of terrorism such as the 9/11 attacks or the 2002 and 2005 
Bali bombings reach the threshold of threat to international peace 
and security, it is difficult to say that this holds true for any terrorist 
attack. This very broad scope of the Resolution’s mandate and the 
wide discretion of States to define their own ‘terrorisms’, results in 
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a widened State discretion to identify particular incidences as 
terrorist without any kind of criteria of reference.147 
The definitional gap left open by Resolution 1373 as to what 
constitutes terrorism was partly remedied by Security Council 
Resolution 1566 (Resolution 1566) which, though not expressly 
referring to a definition for terrorism, sets a frame about which acts 
are unjustifiable under any circumstances:  
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the 
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act, and all other acts which constitute offences within the 
scope of and as defined in the international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances 
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature…148 
This paragraph of Resolution 1566, seen mostly as a 
compromise among the States Members of the UN rather than an 
attempt to define the concept of terrorism,149 reveals that it is a 
common acknowledgment among the Security Council that 
terrorism is the aggregate of the definitions already provided in 
international anti-terrorist instruments.150 It is a definition limited to 
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acts constituting sectoral offences as well as ‘all other acts which 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the 
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism’. 
Therefore, this paragraph adds little to the development of the legal 
concept of terrorism.151 Consequently, its usefulness and 
precedential value remains doubtful. Also, in the three-year time 
lapse since the adoption of Resolution 1373, States would have 
already adopted domestic anti-terrorist laws which it would be very 
unlikely to reform in order to conform them with the text of the 
Resolution 1566.152 
The above analysis reflects the Security Council’s conviction 
that international terrorism can - and obviously should - be 
combatted without the adoption of a universal definition for it, since 
it suffices to turn to domestic anti-terrorist legislation and 
definitions. The Security Council, instead of defending the powers 
conferred on it by the UN Charter, views a decentralised response 
to international terrorism as a more opportune means to combat it, 
regardless of the cost that this response may bear to the 
international order it is meant to protect. On the other hand, we 
have recently witnessed efforts to criminalise international 
terrorism in a more cosmopolitan perspective. These efforts include 
the STL Decision, which identified a customary international crime 
of transnational terrorism153 as well as the ongoing discussions on a 
UN Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, 
seeking to define the crime at an international level and delimit the 
scope of application of such a Convention. Although there is some 
criticism of these efforts, judicial intervention in the development of 
international law for the former and substantial divergence in 
States’ attitude towards different aspects of terrorism for the latter, 
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both these steps should be considered as noteworthy efforts in the 
‘cosmopolitan’ fight against terrorism. Therefore, the last section of 
this Chapter is going to examine how the cosmopolitan theory has 
influenced recent attempts to define and criminalise international 
terrorism, at times provoking reactions about bold judicial decisions 
but also creating hope for more concerted and less politically driven 
efforts towards this end.  
III. Pro-cosmopolitan efforts to define and 
criminalise international terrorism 
a) Judicial activism versus State sovereignty: A customary law 
definition of international terrorism? 
As opposed to the Security Council’s approach in combatting 
terrorrism, the cosmopolitan approach favours a more centralised 
response to international terrorism, without much room for State 
sovereignty concerns. Even before the STL Decision, which 
identified a customary international crime of transnational 
terrorism, Cassese argued that ‘a customary rule on the objective 
and subjective elements of a crime of terrorism in time of peace has 
evolved’.154 Di Filippo is also of the view that ‘a definition of a 
terrorist crime is already present in the mass of international 
practice’ and that it ‘could quickly enjoy customary status’155 and 
Much also contended that ‘terrorist acts - at least the most severe 
ones - have advanced into the category of international crimes.’156 
The most recent and indicative example of this cosmopolitan 
approach with respect to terrorism is the Decision of the Appeals 
Chamber (AC) of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon (16 February 
2011), which, among other things, ruled that there is a customary 
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law definition of international terrorism157 and that this definition 
should be applied in the interpretation of domestic terrorist offences 
under Lebanese law.158 The STL was established after Security 
Council Resolution 1757 (Resolution 1757)159 with jurisdiction 
over the crime of terrorism, to prosecute those responsible for the 
2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 
twenty-two others.160 After a request of the Pre-Trial judge, the AC 
issued a ruling concerning questions on, among other things, the 
substantive criminal law to be applied by the STL and held 
unanimously that a customary law definition of the international 
crime of terrorism exists. Although this ruling may contribute to the 
emergence of an international crime of terrorism and to its 
definition,161 there has been much controversy among scholars162 
about this type of judicial activism which, according to Saul, 
invented a new and post facto individual criminal liability for 
terrorism163 and overruled the judicial sovereignty of Lebanon. 
In particular, the points of contention were: firstly that a 
customary international law definition for terrorism, at least in time 
of peace, exists and has been crystallised by UN Resolutions, 
international treaties and legislative and judicial State practice164 
and secondly that the Lebanese criminal code provisions with 
respect to terrorism should be construed in accordance with 
international treaty and customary law.165 Regarding the first point, 
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the AC concluded that the customary definition of terrorism has 
three key elements:  
(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, 
kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or 
threatening such an act;  
(ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which 
would generally entail the creation of public danger) 
or directly or indirectly coerce a national or 
international authority to take some action, or to 
refrain from taking it and 
(iii) when the act involves a transnational element.166 
While neither the prosecution nor the defence agreed that 
terrorism is a customary law crime,167 the prosecution 
coincidentally asserted that the first two elements of the offence, as 
concluded by the AC, constituted components of a potential 
customary norm.168 However, the requirement of a transnational 
element goes beyond purely domestic Lebanese law.169 The AC’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction and applicable law ‘remain national in 
character’170 and thus, the Lebanese criminal law provisions are the 
applicable law.171 Of course, the STL, being an international or 
mixed tribunal, should only apply national law which is compatible 
with international law and ‘high standards of justice’;172 in other 
words, international law can serve as an interpretative aid in cases 
of correcting ‘unreasonable’ or ‘manifestly unjust’ national law.173 
However, the AC moved beyond this approach, favouring a 
teleological interpretation of the law from the start, rather than 
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determining first the existence of a lacuna and then closing it by 
interpretation.174 Namely, the AC did not find any ‘unreasonable’ or 
‘manifestly unjust’ national law and try to correct it by 
interpretation; rather it concluded from the start that since the 
national applicable law should be compatible with international 
law, which provides a customary law definition of international 
terrorism, then this definition should be applicable in domestic 
Lebanese criminal code. This approach weighs heavily in favour of 
the role of cosmopolitan theory in the development of international 
law, by allowing the principle of teleological interpretation to 
overturn the principle in dubio mitius, which favours State 
sovereignty.175 The Decision clearly states that the latter principle, 
according to which, ‘in case of doubt, the most favourable 
construction [to State sovereignty] should be chosen’, is indicative 
of an ‘old international community’ construed by sovereign States 
for sovereign States, where the role of the individual was limited or 
non existent.176 Modern international courts no longer or rarely use 
this principle, since the ‘modern international community’ gives 
more weight to universal values and the doctrine of human rights 
rather than to State sovereignty interests.177 
As Ambos argues, this line of argumentation, while totally 
compatible with the model of cosmopolitanism, overturns the 
sovereignty of Lebanon in a manner that is not justified by human 
rights concerns or other universal values.178 Resolution 1757 which 
established the STL, makes a clear reference to ‘the strict respect of 
the sovereignty…of Lebanon’179 and the only issue in question did 
not concern human rights or universal values180 but what the 
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applicable law of the STL should be,181 an issue addressed already 
in Article 2 of the STL Statute. As Ambos suggests, even the fact 
that the Security Council characterised the events in Lebanon as a 
threat to international peace and security cannot imply that the 
applicable law of the STL should be international law instead of the 
national applicable law.182 This could have only been the case had 
the Security Council made an express reference that international 
law is the applicable law, a quite unlikely scenario given the fact 
that there is no international agreed definition of terrorism.183 
The Decision of the STL reflected mostly the desire of the 
judges to push forward the development of international law in 
criminalising international terrorism without due regard to 
Lebanon’s sovereignty as to the applicable law. While, from a 
cosmopolitan perspective, international law should develop 
independently from, and sometimes despite State sovereignty 
considerations, it should always move into certain boundaries 
which would ensure the legitimacy of this development. The STL 
Decision seems to surpass those boundaries by considering as fact 
something which, at best, constitutes a desirable development in 
international criminal law, namely the customary nature of 
international terrorism. All in all, it remains to be seen whether this 
Decision will acquire a precedential value in the jurisprudence 
concerning international terrorism or will be overturned by future 
State practice and opinio juris.184 
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b) The UNGA Draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism: a road to balance? 
A less dynamic attempt to define international terrorism for the 
purpose of attributing individual criminal responsiblity185 has been 
made by the General Assembly (GA), starting in 1994, with the 
adoption of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, as part of the GA Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 
1994.186 This Resolution encouraged States to review existing 
international anti-terrorist legislation in order to ensure that all 
issues surrounding terrorism are covered by the existing 
international legal framework and in 1996, the GA established an 
Ad hoc Committee with the mandate to elaborate a comprehensive 
convention on international terrorism.187 
However, the 9/11 attacks expedited the GA’s efforts on drafting 
a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. Apart from 
the adoption of a resolution on 12 September 2001,188 which 
condemned the attacks, the GA felt pressured to respond to the 
events in a separate way than that of the Security Council.189 The 
Ad hoc Committee submitted a report to the GA in its 56th Session 
in September 2001, with the points of contention that surfaced 
during its work regarding a draft comprehensive convention: i) 
what the scope of this convention will be, ii) how the crime of 
terrorism is going to be defined, iii) whether activities of the armed 
forces during an armed conflict should be exempted from the 
convention and iv) what the relationship between the draft 
convention and the sectoral anti-terrorist treaties should be.190 
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Eventually, the issue of the drafting of a comprehensive convention 
on terrorism, along with the discussions about the abovementioned 
contentious matters, were assigned to a Working Group established 
for this purpose by the 6th Committee on 8 October 2001.191 
The discussions about a comprehensive convention had as a 
starting point a proposal submitted by India.192 After deliberations 
between States, there was substantial convergence in several of the 
proposed provisions, however the issues of the definition and the 
exemption from the convention of the activities of armed forces 
remained controversial.193 In short, it could be said that the main 
controversy around these issues was the question of who could have 
the right to use force without the risk of being described as 
terrorist.194 On the one hand, some States favoured the addition of a 
provision which would exclude from the scope of the convention 
any activities carried out for the purpose of a people’s struggle for 
self-determination.195 On the other hand, some States, the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries among them, sought to exclude 
Article 18(2) of the draft convention which provides for the non-
applicability of the term ‘terrorism’ to the conduct of States or State 
agents. Both these suggestions reveal the real bone of contention 
with respect to defining terrorism, namely which group or 
individuals could have the privilege of carrying out any acts without 
the risk of being labelled as terrorist. The Indian proposal, with its 
Article 18(2), provides that ‘[t]he activities of armed forces during 
an armed conflict…’ as well as ‘the activities undertaken by the 
military forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties, (…) 
                                                             
191 UNGA Sixth Committee (56th Session) ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ (29 October 2001) UN Doc 
A/C.6/56/L.9 para 2. 
192 Indian proposal (n 8). 
193 ibid art 2 and art 18(2) respectively. 
194 Hmoud (n 189) 1033. 
195 UNGA Sixth Committee (55th Session) ‘Report of theWorking Group on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ (19 October 2000) UN Doc 
A/C.6/55/L.2 Annex III para 30 (Malaysian proposal on behalf of the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) Group). The proposed provision was 
taken verbatim by the 1999 Convention of the Islamic Conference on Combatting 
International Terrorism art 2. 
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are not governed by this Convention’,196 leaving out of the scope of 
the convention any State terrorist activity. By the same token, the 
Malaysian proposal to exclude activities carried out for the purpose 
of self-determination would justify any acts carried out by private 
actors ‘against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and 
hegemony’.197 While the right for self-determination is well 
established in international law,198 it does not constitute an absolute 
right but is subjected to limitations in accordance with international 
humanitarian law.199 Therefore, a struggle for self-determination is 
not justified if carried out by whatever means necessary but only 
when these means do not violate international humanitarian law 
provisions. 
Despite the disagreements that emerged from the discussion on a 
draft comprehensive convention on terrorism, it should be noticed 
that the GA chose to follow a more long-term and systematic 
approach on the problem of international terrorism.200 While 
definitely more time-consuming, the GA approach is commendable, 
in that it tries to accommodate the need to develop and push 
forward international law with respect to terrorism with the need to 
take into account State sovereignty considerations and the differing 
views of States in the field. Unlike the Security Council approach, 
which, after having assumed a role as a world legislator and 
imposed legal obligations to States, offered little or no development 
in the field of international law on terrorism, and the STL’s 
approach, which offered a questionable one, it seems that GA’s 
work, if ever completed, might be able to significantly develop 
international law in the field without giving rise to any legimacy 
                                                             
196 Indian proposal (n 8) art 18(2). 
197 Malaysian proposal on behalf of the OIC Group (n 195) art 2. 
198 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 art 1 which 
unequivocally provides for the right to self-determination to all people; 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 
7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 art 1(4). 
199 Subedi (n 128) 165. 
200 ibid 161. 
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issues. However, the fact that the GA discussions on a 
comprehensive convention on terrorism have currently ceased, is 
indicative of the complexity of the issue and of the dubious 
willingness of States to finally evolve international law on 
terrorism. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter was to demonstrate how the pro-
sovereignty and pro-cosmopolitan theories are present at and 
substantially affect the development of international law in the field 
of terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks which initially triggered what 
has been known as ‘the war on terror’, the Security Council has 
urged States to combat terrorism by any means and has allowed 
unilateral State response against a terrorist act that, according to the 
text of the relevant Resolutions, amounted to a threat to 
international peace and security. Although by this determination 
one should have expected the Security Council to assume collective 
security measures, it seemed that the sovereign interests of the US, 
the victim State of the attack, superimposed unilateral US action 
over collective UN response. Before the 9/11 events, attacks by 
non-State actors did not amount to an armed attack201 and thus 
invocation of the right of self-defence by the victim State was often 
rejected. At the other end of spectrum, the STL held that the 
international law on terrorism has been developed to such an extent 
that a customary law definition of terrorism has been indeed 
crystallised and can therefore be applied in a terrorist case which 
would otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of Lebanon (and its 
national law provisions). Both these efforts of responding to 
terrorism reveal the weaknesses that each of the two theories bring 
along, weaknesses that are reflected in the very development of 
                                                             
201 Sir Michael Wood, ‘Terrorism and the international law on the use of force’ in 
Saul (n 25) 197. After 9/11 however, self-defence can be invoked against non-
State actors if the State where the perpetrators are based is either unwilling or 
unable to take action against them. See Wilmhurst (n 109) 969-71.  
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international law that these efforts mean to promote. As was also 
noted above, the Security Council Resolutions did not bring any 
substantial development in international law on terrorism whereas it 
is still questionable whether the STL Decision has indeed cleared 
the way for the emergence of a customary rule definition of 
terrorism.  
Lastly, the GA negotiations for a draft convention on terrorism 
have been analysed as a pro-cosmopolitan effort, differing however 
from the bold judicial activism of the STL. Despite the existence of 
the system of anti-terrorist treaties, the GA acknowledged the need 
for a comprehensive convention on terrorism with an agreed 
universal definition without sidestepping State sovereign interests. 
Therefore, and without disregarding sound criticism concerning the 
length of the negotiations, the GA efforts serve so far as the best 
example of how the required balance between State sovereignty and 
cosmopolitan theories might be achieved. With these conclusions in 
mind, the next Chapter will try to demonstrate how the ‘State 
sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ debate is still relevant not 
only in the process of criminalisation but also in that of definition. 
Having already argued that aspects of the State sovereignty and 
cosmopolitan theories were manifest in the Kampala definition of 
the crime of aggression, the next Chapter will suggest how due 
balance between the two theories could be similarly achieved in the 
context of defining international terrorism. 
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CHAPTER V 
A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM IN THE 
MAKING: BALANCING STATE INTERESTS 
WITH COSMOPOLITAN IDEALS 
Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, it was argued that current efforts to 
criminalise terrorism or terrorism-related conduct have been 
affected at times by both of the international law theories under 
examination: Security Council anti-terrorist Resolutions placed their 
emphasis on how to entrench and protect the sovereign interests of 
the US that suffered the attack of 9/11, prioritising thus State 
sovereignty interests over cosmopolitan purposes, whereas the STL 
issued a quite bold pro-cosmopolitan decision that a customary law 
definition for terrorism exists, at least in time of peace. It was 
further argued that the GA effort to draft a universal definition for 
terrorism seems to be so far the only example that, despite its being 
pro-cosmopolitan, takes into account State concerns regarding the 
issue of defining terrorism in a quite balanced way with its 
cosmopolitan aspirations. Though it still remains to be seen whether 
the GA negotiations will come to fruition, it seems that the most 
workable way to substantially develop international law in the field 
of terrorism, is to attempt a balance between State concerns and 
cosmopolitan ideas in the process of its criminalisation and 
definition to the maximum extent possible. 
Having thus shown how State-centric and cosmopolitan concerns 
have influenced the process of criminalising (or creating a 
framework for criminalisation of) terrorism, this Chapter will focus 
on the definitional process and principally, on how concerns that 
relate either to State interests or cosmopolitan purposes should 
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shape the formulation of an international definition for terrorism. In 
this respect, it has to be restated here that the effectiveness of 
international criminal justice in general and the need to agree upon 
an international definition for terrorism in particular require that this 
definition should allow room for cosmopolitan steps to be taken 
with due regard to State concerns, in order to eliminate the 
circumstance where the former is pushed back by the latter. Only by 
taking into account State-related considerations can cosmopolitan 
ideals take shape in an international criminal law context in a 
meaningful way and be prevented from becoming a dead letter in 
practice. 
Therefore, this Chapter will turn from the issue of criminalisation 
to the question of finding a well-balanced definition for terrorism. 
The first international definition of terrorism was provided in the 
1937 anti-terrorist Convention under the auspices of the League of 
Nations.1 However, after the establishment of the UN, the first 
example of a treaty law definition for international terrorism that 
can be tracked down at an international level is the one provided by 
the Financing of Terrorism Convention2 and this will be the starting 
point of the subsequent analysis. Secondly, the UN Draft 
Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism and the STL Decision,3 as 
well as some regional instruments and domestic anti-terrorist law, 
will be compared and contrasted, with the purpose of tracing which 
definitional elements are the least debated and which ones remain 
                                                             
1 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (adopted 16 
November 1937) 19 League of Nations Official Journal 23. The definition 
provided in its Article 1(2) is very similar to the definition provided in the 
annexed UNGA ‘Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ 
(9 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/60 Supp No 49 (A/49/49) (1994 UNGA 
Declaration), and reads as such: ‘criminal acts directed against a State or intended 
to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons, 
or the general public’. For the definition of 1994 UNGA Declaration see text to n 
33. 
2 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(adopted 9 December 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197 
(Financing of Terrorism Convention). 
3
 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging STL-11-01/1 (16 February 2011) 
(STL Decision). 
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contentious. The comparative analysis of these instruments will 
reveal some common ground that already exists (and can be used as 
a safe basis to build upon an international definition) as well as the 
two major contested elements of defining terrorism: i) the inclusion 
of a political/ideological motive requirement and ii) the exemption 
of activities carried out by particular groups or individuals from the 
definition. Subsequently, both these groups of elements will be put 
under the light of the ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ 
debate, highlighting their aspects that pertain to this debate and 
demonstrating how these aspects should be addressed in the context 
of formulating a definition. The purpose of this Chapter is to make 
suggestions on the best possible way to treat these aspects so as to 
achieve this fine balance between the two theoretical poles under 
examination, in an effort to argue that there is a workable way to 
formulate an international definition for terrorism for the purposes 
of international criminal justice, without disregarding State 
sovereignty considerations nor minimising the significance of 
promoting cosmopolitan ideals in this field. 
I. Analysing existing definitions for terrorism in 
international and regional instruments: common 
ground and points of contention 
The crystallisation of some general and common elements of an 
international definition for terrorism is not an easy task; one could 
argue that the task would be somewhat facilitated if one tries to 
unify the main sectoral anti-terrorist conventions4  listing the several 
acts they prohibit and then adding some common jurisdictional 
provisions to reflect the purposes of international criminal justice.5 
This approach would also serve the general argument of this thesis, 
namely that definitions of international crimes should be construed 
                                                             
4 Some main anti-terrorist conventions are listed below (n 9). 
5 Robert Kolb, ‘The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over International 
Terrorists’ in Andrea Bianchi (ed), Enforcing International Law Norms Against 
Terrorism (Hart Publishing 2004) 241. 
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in such a manner, so as to reflect both the respect for State 
sovereignty - the sectoral treaties were drafted by States for States 
and thus, reflect State interests - and the promotion of international 
criminal justice purposes, achieved through the international 
criminalisation of terrorism. However, it seems that using the 
sectoral conventions as a starting point for criminalising terrorism 
might be problematic. Firstly and most importantly, the sectoral 
conventions, where they provide a definition for terrorism, have 
application only in a specific context. For example, the definition of 
terrorism in the Financing of Terrorism Convention under Article 
2(1a) and (b) is applicable only when someone finances a terrorist 
activity. It is a functional rather than a general definition and most 
probably, if it was to be used for attributing individual criminal 
liability, it would not fulfil the requirements of the nullum crimen 
sine lege principle nor capture sufficiently the objective and 
subjective elements of the criminal act.6 Moreover, achieving State 
consensus on the core elements of terrorism and defining the 
jurisdictional scope of application in order to formulate one general, 
‘catch-all’ definition is anything but simple. In fact, the drafting of 
several anti-terrorist conventions which oblige for national 
criminalisation of different sets of terrorist acts, is indicative of the 
fact that States preferred to circumvent one general definition7 and 
avoided dealing with critical questions surrounding the subject. The 
international instruments under examination in this section, starting 
with the Financing of Terrorism Convention, will shed some light 
on the common ground covered so far in the effort to define 
terrorism but also on the main contentious issues which have led 
this effort to its current stalemate. 
 
                                                             
6 ibid 234. 
7 Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’ in Bianchi (n 5) 216. 
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a) A comparative analysis of the definition of the Financing of 
Terrorism Convention and definitions in regional and domestic law 
instruments 
i) The definitions provided by the Financing of Terrorism 
Convention and other anti-terrorist instruments 
The Financing of Terrorism Convention is one of the most 
widely ratified anti-terrorist treaties which includes a definition for 
international terrorism in the particular context of terrorism 
financing and also one of the few to use the term ‘terrorism’ as such. 
Thus, the treaty prohibits the financing of acts of terrorism as 
defined in its Article 2(1a) and (b). The adopted definition is 
formulated in a ‘two-limb’ approach,8 meaning that the drafters 
provided both a list of acts that constitute terrorism and then a 
general definition in which any other act not prohibited by the list 
could be included. Article 2(1a) prohibits the funding of any act 
already prohibited by nine anti-terrorist treaties9 while Article 2(1b) 
uses an ‘all-inclusive’ general definition, albeit used for the 
purposes of this Convention only. Apart from the specific acts 
prohibited by Article 2(1a), a person commits an offence when he or 
she uses funds for the commission of  
                                                             
8 Kolb (n 5) 241. 
9 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (entered into 
force 14 October 1971) 860 UNTS 105; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (entered into force 26 January 
1973) 974 UNTS 177; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons (entered into force 20 February 1977) 
1035 UNTS 167; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
(entered into force 3 June 1983) 1316 UNTS 205; Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (entered into force 8 February 1987) 1456 UNTS 
246; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (entered into 
force 6 August 1989) 1589 UNTS 474; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (entered into force 1 
March 1992) 1678 UNTS 201; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (entered 
into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 304; International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (entered into force 23 March 2001) UN Doc 
A/RES/52/164, 2149 UNTS 256. 
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[a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury 
to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in 
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.10  
This ‘catch-all’ formula, which completes the provided list of 
prohibited acts of Article 2(1a), serves to highlight some core 
elements of the concept of terrorism which could be useful even 
outside the context of the particular convention. However, 
substantial divergence can still be found regarding these elements if 
one attempts to compare definitions of terrorism provided for in 
other international anti-terrorist instruments as well as in national 
legal orders. 
To start with, the element of violence against human beings, 
being ‘civilian[s], or…any other person not taking an active part in 
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict’, would constitute the 
actus reus of the crime of terrorism were the definition to be used 
for criminal law purposes.11 What is needed is the commission of a 
violent act whose victim is a human being. Nevertheless, the 
requirements of i) the commission of violence and ii) the human 
victim, should not be necessarily considered as a safe starting point 
in the effort to define terrorism. For instance, the Arab Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorism (Arab Convention),12 although 
providing a definition very similar to the one in Article 2(1b) of the 
Financing of Terrorism Convention, requires either an act or a threat 
of violence under its Article 2. Furthermore, the definition of the 
Arab Convention is not limited to an act or threat of violence only 
                                                             
10 Financing of Terrorism Convention art 2(1b). 
11 Christian Walter, ‘Defining Terrorism in National and International Law’ in 
Christian Walter and ors (eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and 
International Law: Security versus Liberty? (Springer 2004) 27. 
12 League of Arab States, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
(signed 22 April 1998) (Arab Convention). 
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against humans but also provides that terrorism is ‘any act or threat 
of violence…aiming to cause damage to the environment or to 
public or private installations or property or to occupy or to seize 
them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource’.13 The more 
recent UN Draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism also provides in its draft Article 2 that the definition of 
international terrorism includes ‘serious damage to public or private 
property, including a place of public use, a State or government 
facility, a transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the 
environment’.14 This tendency of including violence against 
property in a definition for terrorism moves along the same lines 
with some domestic legal orders. For example, the UK Terrorism 
Act 2002 extends also to acts or threats of damage to property15 and 
the Canadian Bill C-36,16 the US Immigration and Nationality Act17 
and the Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union 
of 13 June 200218 show a tendency to conceive of terrorism as a 
violent and non-violent, but definetely destructive, action against 
public facilities. In this respect, violence in the context of defining 
terrorism, is not only limited to violence against persons but also 
tends to include the threat of violence as well as any destructive 
action against the environment and public or private property. 
ii) The issue of exempting the activities of specific groups or 
individuals from the scope of terrorism definitions 
The most difficult question to be answered with respect to how to 
define terrorism is whether one should exempt from the definition 
acts of national liberation movements carried out in the context of 
self-determination (the so-called ‘freedom fighters’) on the one 
                                                             
13 ibid art 2. 
14 UNGA ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA Res 51/210 of 
17 December 1996’, 6th Session (28 January – 1 February 2002) UN Doc Supp 
No 37 (A/57/37), (UNGA Report) Annex II art 2(1b). 
15 UK Terrorism Act 2000, c 11, s 1 (2b). 
16 Canadian Bill C-36, Part II.1, 83.01(1b). 
17 US Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC§1182 a3B. 
18 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism [2002] 
OJ L164/3 (EU Framework Decision). 
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hand, and/or acts of law enforcement agencies on the other. Cassese 
argues that it was due to disagreements on the freedom fighters’ 
exception that the formulation of a general definition for terrorism 
was impeded and not because the general concept of terrorism per 
se was in question.19 However true as that may be, attention should 
be paid to whether this exception, if adopted, should apply to the 
scope of application of the convention or to the elements of the 
definition of terrorism.20 In other words, it is one thing to leave out 
of the scope of an anti-terrorist convention acts of freedom fighters 
because they are covered by another field of international law - for 
example international humanitarian law (IHL) - and another thing to 
say that freedom fighters’ acts do not fall into the definition of 
terrorism anyway, regardless of whether they are covered by any 
other international instrument. Regarding the scope of its 
application, IHL is applicable in armed conflicts of either an 
international or non-international character. However, whether an 
armed conflict indeed exists can be in itself hard to determine, 
especially in cases of internal violence. Article 1 of the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional 
Protocol II)21 defines an armed conflict of a non-international 
character as an armed conflict  
which take[s] place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or 
other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations[…]  
                                                             
19 Cassese (n 7) 214. 
20 Walter (n 11) 41. 
21 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, (adopted 8 
June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (Additional 
Protocol II). 
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Article 2 however exempts from the scope of the 
abovementioned Article, ‘situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature’. Nevertheless, for situations that can 
be found in between what is described by Articles 1 and 2, it is hard 
to establish whether the appropriate legal framewok to be applied is 
either the rules of IHL or law enforcement. Even though in non-
international armed conflicts the combatant status does not exist, as 
it does in international conflicts, Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, and 
customary international humanitarian law all provide safeguards for 
the rights of the detainees ‘in relation to treatment, conditions and 
due process of law’.22 It has been argued that, in this respect, the 
hesitation on the part of the States to recognise that a non-
international armed conflict takes place in their territory, is partly 
due to the political consequences that such recognition brings as 
well as the obligation to apply rules of IHL.23 
In terms of substance, there is ambiguity as to what extent the use 
force to attain self-determination can be justified.24 The use of force 
in the context of exercising the right to self-determination is 
understood to denote that anti-government force can be legitimately 
utilised in a ‘just cause’,25 namely in a revolutionary context where 
this right has been denied by the official government of a State. 
However, it is exactly this point at which struggles against a State’s 
official government can intersect with terrorist offences.26 While 
legitimate violence committed in the context of self-determination 
can be distinguished from terrorism in terms of motivation and 
                                                             
22 For a description of the existing IHL rules that pertain to terrorism see 
<www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/terrorism-ihl-210705.htm> accessed 
26 April 2015. 
23 Elizabeth Chadwick, ‘Terrorism and Self-determination’ in Ben Saul (ed), 
Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (2014 Edward Elgar 
Publishing) 313. 
24 ibid 300. 
25 ibid 301. 
26 ibid. 
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means used,27 it is not uncommon that States would like to 
stigmatise their opponents as terrorist and would turn to one or other 
forms of counter-insurgency doctrines usually adopted in anti-
terrorist strategies and measures.28 
Closely connected to the debate of the potential overlap between 
terrorism and self-determination, is also the issue of State-
committed terrorism, namely terrorist acts perpetrated by State 
agents within that State, as a response to political violence 
committed in self-determination or the fight against oppressive 
regimes. The question of exempting specific groups or individuals 
from a definition of terrorism is not limited only to freedom fighters 
but extends also to State agents that might commit acts of violence 
as a response to political opposition. Complementary to the issue of 
State-committed terrorism, is also the concept of State-supported 
terrorism which generally includes acts committed by third parties 
in a third State that are funded or prompted by a State’s agents. Both 
of these manifestations of the more general term ‘State terrorism’ 
are precisely the second grey area that features in the concept of 
terrorism, namely the potential overlap between terrorist acts and 
forms of violence employed by a State which are typically 
considered as lawful, or violence committed by third parties with 
direct or indirect State involvement. 
Turning now back to the definition of the Financing of Terrorism 
Convention, there is no reference to any exception for particular 
perpetrators. In fact, the Preamble of the Convention follows the 
formulation of the definition given in the 1994 UNGA Declaration 
on ‘Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’, which 
condemns ‘all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal 
                                                             
27 ibid 298. 
28 ibid 314. See also UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism’ 62nd Session, Agenda Item 17, (28 
December 2005) UN doc E/CN.4/2006/98, para 56(a). 
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and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed’.29 In this 
respect, the formulation leaves no ground for exclusion of either 
freedom fighters or, at least in principle, terrorist acts committed by 
State agents. However, the Convention continues by making 
reference to an ‘international element’ that has to be fulfilled in 
order that States apply the provisions therein. Article 3 provides that 
‘[t]his Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed 
within a single State, the alleged offender is a national of that State 
and is present in the territory of that State…’,30 meaning that in the 
classical situations where State agents commit terrorist acts against 
a part of the population within the State, the ‘by whomever 
committed’ clause does not have any application.31 On the other 
hand, regarding the question of the freedom fighters’ exception, the 
Arab Convention excludes in its Article 2(a) ‘[a]ll cases of struggle 
by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign 
occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination…’, 
from the definition of terrorism.32 As mentioned above, both the 
Financing of Terrorism Convention and the 1994 UNGA 
Declaration condemn terrorism by whomever committed. Moreover, 
the UNGA Declaration goes on to condemn terrorist acts whatever 
their justification.33 However, it has been argued that the fact that 
Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions34 provides 
for the recognition as lawful combatants of those who ‘are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
                                                             
29 1994 UNGA Declaration Annex I art 1. 
30 Financing of Terrorism Convention art 3. 
31 Walter (n 11) 37. 
32 Arab Convention art 2a. An almost identical provision is included in the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries Convention to Combat Terrorism (1999-
1420H) (OIC Convention) art 2a. 
33 1994 UNGA Declaration Annex I art 3: ‘Criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
any other nature that may be invoked to justify them;’ 
34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 
December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (Additional Protocol I). 
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regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’35 might 
offer an acceptable solution to the problem of labelling ‘freedom 
fighters’ as terrorists36 due to the caveat offered by international 
humanitarian law to those fighting for their right to self-
determination. 
iii) The issue of a political/ideological motive requirement 
as an element of terrorism 
Finally, a last major point of divergence between the definitions 
examined so far, is whether it is necessary to include the element of 
a political/ideological motivation in a definition for terrorism. The 
Financing of Terrorism Convention, the Arab Convention and the 
EU Framework Decision do not make any explicit reference to the 
requirement of a political/ideological purpose, whereas the 1994 
UNGA Declaration explicitly states that ‘criminal acts…for political 
purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable…’.37 The UK and the 
Canadian definitions for terrorism also include a 
political/ideological element, requiring the ‘advancing of political, 
religious or ideological cause’38 and an act committed ‘in whole or 
in part for political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or 
cause’39 respectively. This divergence can be attributed to the fact 
that the definitions not requiring such a motivation refer to the 
minimum requirements present in most national legal systems40 and 
did not include elements which may vary from one national 
definition to another. However, even the definitions of the 
Financing of Terrorism Convention and the EU Framework 
Decision, which do not explicitly include a political/ideological 
motive requirement, do not reject any connection to a 
political/ideological intent. In the first case, the definition provides 
                                                             
35 ibid art 1(4). 
36 Cassese (n 7) 217. 
37 1994 UNGA Declaration (n 33). 
38 UK Terrorism Act 2000, c 11, s 1 (1c). 
39 Canadian Bill C-36, Part II.1, 83.01(1biA). 
40 Walter (n 11) 35. 
202 
 
090015246 
 
that ‘the purpose of [the terrorist] act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’,41 
while the EU Framework Decision definition states that the aims of 
the committed act should be to  
seriously intimidat[e] a population, or unduly [compel] a 
Government or international organisation to perform or 
abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilis[e] or 
[destroy] the fundamental political, constitutional, economic 
or social structures of a country or an international 
organisation.42 
 It is clear that when the commission of a violent act has as its 
purpose to compel a government or an organisation to follow or not 
to follow a particular course of action, or to do serious damage to 
the fundamental structures of a State, the intention of the perpetrator 
is driven by political/ideological considerations. On the other hand, 
it is very rare for a terrorist act to have as its only aim to intimidate 
the population without any further ideologically-related intention, 
such as the advancement of a political, religious or any other 
ideological agenda. Violent acts resulting in the intimidation of a 
large part of a State’s population without the intention to influence 
politics and/or ideology in a certain way do not reflect the severe 
impact of terrorism and do not differentiate from non-terrorist but 
rather violent, ordinary offences. 
b) The Definition of the UN Draft Comprehensive Convention on 
Terrorism 
The second example of a definition for terrorism under 
examination is the definition provided in Article 2 of the UN Draft 
Comprehensive Convention as proposed by the Coordinator of the 
                                                             
41 Financing of Terrorism Convention art 2(1b). 
42 EU Framework Decision art 1(1). 
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Working Group of the 6th Committee established for this purpose in 
2001.43 The definition is similar to the one of the Financing of 
Terrorism Convention in that it requires the commission of a violent 
act against persons with the inclusion however of acts of damage 
against public or private property, facilities, infrastructure and the 
environment and providing separately for cases where such damages 
result in major economic loss.44 Proposed Article 2(1) provides:  
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and 
intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any 
person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private property, 
including a place of public use, a State or government facility, 
a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the 
environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or 
systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting 
or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of 
the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act. 
The formulation of the purpose of such acts is taken verbatim 
from the Financing of Terrorism Convention, namely that the act’s 
aim is ‘to intimidate a population or compel a Government or an 
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act’. 
The proposed definition as such did not raise any particular issues 
for controversy.45 What did and still does raise controversy 
however, is the scope of application of the UN Draft Convention, 
which, when delimited, will establish who can qualify as terrorist in 
a given context. 
                                                             
43 UNGA Report (n 14) Annex II. 
44 ibid.  
45 Surya P Subedi, ‘The UN Response to International Terrorism in the Aftermath 
of the Terrorist Attacks in America and the Problem of the Definition of 
Terrorism in International Law’ (2002) 4 International Law Forum Droit 
International 159, 163. 
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Despite the fact that the Preamble of the Coordinator’s paper 
repeats the language of the 1994 UNGA Declaration that ‘all acts, 
methods and practices of terrorism’ are ‘criminal and unjustifiable, 
wherever and by whomever committed’,46 draft Article 18 provides 
for two exceptions from the definition: i) that ‘[t]he activities of 
armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are 
understood under international humanitarian law, which are 
governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention’ and ii) 
that ‘[t]he activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in 
the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed 
by other rules of international law, are not governed by this 
Convention’.47 Concerning the first exception, it is suggested that, 
as it is formulated, it will not cover activities of armed resistance 
groups or ‘unprivileged combatants’ against a party to the conflict, 
groups which do not belong to a State’s army and which are 
otherwise lawful under international humanitarian law.48 Therefore, 
there was an alternative suggestion by the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) to replace the words ‘armed forces’ with 
‘parties’,49 so as not to exempt from this provision organisations 
such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad or Hezbollah which fight against 
Israeli occupation in Lebanon and Palestine.50 However, draft 
Article 18(1), as it stands, already contains a safeguard against the 
labelling of armed resistance groups as terrorist. Draft Article 18(1), 
reads as follows: ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall affect other 
rights, obligations and responsibilities of States, peoples and 
individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international 
                                                             
46 UNGA Report (n 14) 4. Similar exceptions can be found in the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art 12, where it states that, when an 
act of hostage-taking occurs during an armed conflict and when the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols are applicable, then the said Convention does not 
apply. 
47 UNGA Report (n 14) Annex IV draft arts 18(2) and 18(3). 
48 Mahmoud Hmoud, ‘Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1031, 
1037. 
49 UNGA Report (n 14) Annex IV. 
50 Walter (n 11) 38. 
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humanitarian law.’51 Self-determination and the fight against foreign 
occupation are well-established peoples’ rights under the UN 
Charter and international humanitarian law,52 and although they 
need not be violent, success of such pursuits often call for the use of 
force.53 While in the past, the scope of the concept of self-
determination focused more on fights ‘against colonial 
domination…alien occupation and against racist regimes’,54 today a 
more comprehensive and broad approach tends to be adopted with 
the purpose to include also political struggles for greater democracy 
and human rights.55 Furthermore, draft Article 18(3) differentiates 
the language from Article 18(2), by exempting the activities of the 
‘military forces of a State’. The difference in language must 
obviously mean that there is a difference between ‘armed forces’ 
and ‘military forces of a State’, the first term being more 
comprehensive than the second and thus, including all parties to a 
conflict.56 
Regarding the second exception from the scope of the 
Convention, referring to the activities of the ‘military forces of a 
State, in the exercise of their official duties’, draft Article 18(3) does 
not specify that the acts should be carried out in the context of an 
armed conflict. Thus, it can be suggested that it refers to acts 
undertaken only or also in peacetime. However, the provision 
continues by stating that these activities are exempted ‘inasmuch as 
they are governed by other rules of international law’ - ‘by other 
                                                             
51 UNGA Report (n 14) Annex IV. 
52 Charter of the United Nations  (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter) arts 1(2) and 55; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 and International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) Common Article 1 which unequivocally 
provides for the right to self-determination to all people; Additional Protocol I art 
1(4); UNGA Resolutions 1541 (XV) (15 December 1960) UN Doc A/RES/1541; 
2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/2625; 60/145 (14 February 
2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/145 . 
53 Chadwick (n 23) 301. 
54 Additional Protocol I art 1(4). 
55 Chadwick (n 23) 301 . 
56 Walter (n 11) 39. 
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rules’ obviously referring to rules other than international 
humanitarian law which applies in cases of armed conflict. If 
‘inasmuch as’ is to be understood as ‘to the extent’ they are 
governed by other rules of international law,57 it is hard to identify 
the cases where these acts are not governed by any other rule of 
international law. Activities of military forces in peacetime are 
covered, inter alia, by rules of international human rights law,58 for 
example rules that protect civil rights such as the right of free 
expression, assembly or privacy.59 Moreover, acts of State-
supported terrorism fall into the ambit of the law on State 
responsibility and, according to the UN Declaration on Friendly 
Relations,60 the prohibition of State terrorism is an ‘instantiation of 
the general prohibition of the use of force’.61 Thus, the overall effect 
of draft Article 18(3) will be to generally exclude acts that would 
otherwise fall into the definition of the UN Draft Comprehensive 
Convention, when carried out by the military forces of a State. This 
effect clearly contradicts the purposes of the Convention as they are 
formulated in the Preamble, which, among other things, states that 
acts of international terrorism that have to be suppressed, include 
also ‘those which are committed or supported by States, directly or 
indirectly’.62 In an effort to include in the scope of the Convention 
incidents of terrorist acts committed by military forces, the OIC 
States made an alternative proposal to the formulation of Article 
18(3) suggesting that ‘the activities of the military forces of a State, 
in the exercise of their official duties’ be exempted from the scope 
                                                             
57 Hmoud (n 48) 1041. 
58 Walter (n 11) 41. 
59 Chadwick (n 23) 311. 
60 UNGA ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’ (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/Res/2625 (XXV) 1st Principle. 
61 Hmoud (n 48) 1034; Kimberley N Trapp, ‘Holding States Responsible for 
Terrorism Before the International Court of Justice’ (2012) 3 (2) Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 279, 283 where she argues that State obligation 
to refrain from terrorist conduct is a manifestation of the general prohibition on 
the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
62 UNGA Report (n 14) Annex I. 
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of the Convention, ‘inasmuch as they are in conformity with 
international law’.63 
All in all, it appears that the most thorny issues about defining 
terrorism concern more the question of who can qualify as 
perpetrator rather than what terrorism actually is. It is a fact that 
there are grey areas that need to be clarified before delimiting the 
scope of the UN Convention on Terrorism, such as the potential 
overlap with international humanitarian law or the law on State 
responsibility. Therefore, it is crucial to see the drafting of the UN 
Convention on Terrorism as an opportunity to clarify not only its 
scope but also the scope of other adjacent fields of international law. 
Although it is not one of the purposes of this thesis to analyse 
further the issue of delimitation between the fields of international 
law that relate to terrorism, it is the author’s view that the work of 
the Working Group mandated with the drafting of the Convention 
should follow this direction. A clear-cut distinction between the 
different international law regimes that relate to terrorism could 
eliminate any gaps in their respective legal frameworks, contribute 
to the creation of a more uniform perception about the nature of 
terrorism and establish clearer boundaries on which acts are beyond 
legitimacy under any circumstances.  
c) The Appeal’s Chamber Decision of the UN Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon 
Finally, the most recent example of a definition for international 
terrorism is found in the STL Appeals Chamber’s Interlocutory 
decision.64 As was also mentioned in the previous Chapter, the STL 
was established for the purpose of investigating the 2005 
assassination of the former Prime Minister Hariri Rafiq and 22 
others in a bomb attack and is the first international court with 
                                                             
63 UNGA Report (n 14) Annex IV art 18(3) (as proposed by the OIC States). 
64 STL Decision (n 3). 
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jurisdiction over terrorism.65 The definition given in the decision 
addressed the formulation of the subjective and objective elements 
of the offence and did not elaborate on issues such as the freedom 
fighters’ exception or State-committed terrorism. Besides, the STL, 
though being a UN-backed tribunal, was bound, according to Article 
2 of the STL Statute, to apply Lebanese law,66 which had already in 
place a definition for terrorism. However, the judges of the STL 
held that, due to ‘the unique gravity and the transnational dimension 
of the crime at issue’,67 Lebanese law should be construed in 
accordance with international law and thus a more extensive 
definition of terrorism should apply than the one provided in the 
Lebanese Criminal Code.68 Thus, after the request of the Pre-Trial 
Judge that it answer some critical questions which, among other 
issues, related to terrorism, the Appeals Chamber finally held that 
there is a customary law definition of terrorism and also determined 
the objective and subjective elements of the crime of terrorism to be 
applied by the Tribunal. The controversy surrounding the customary 
nature of international terrorism was already discussed in the 
previous Chapter. Related to this controversy is also the task of 
defining the elements of the crime of terrorism based on 
international law.  
The international law applicable on Lebanon is composed by 
conventional law - in this case, the Arab Convention - and 
customary international law (which, it held, exists in the case of 
international terrorism).69 Thus, according to the Tribunal, the 
elements to be applied resulting from the abovementioned sources 
of law are: ‘i) the volitional commission of an act or credible threat 
                                                             
65 Emmanouela Mylonaki, ‘Defining Terrorism’ (2011) 175 Criminal Law and 
Justice Weekly 338 <http://www.criminallawandjustice.co.uk/features/Defining-
Terrorism> accessed 3 July 2015. 
66 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon UNSC Res 1757 (30 May 2007) 
UN Doc S/ RES/ 1757 <www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/un-documents/un-security-
council-resolutions/security-council-resolution-1757> accessed 23 January 2014, 
art 2. 
67 STL Decision (n 3) 3. 
68 ibid paras 43-46. 
69 ibid. 
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of an act; ii) through means that are likely to pose a public danger; 
and iii) with the special intent to cause a state of terror’.70 
Starting from the Lebanese Law, according to Article 314 of the 
Lebanese Criminal Code,71 the objective elements of terrorism are i) 
an act, whether it is an offence under the Lebanese Criminal Code 
or not and ii) the use of means ‘liable to create a public danger’.72 
The subjective element, which was retained by the STL Decision in 
the definition of terrorism, is the intent to cause ‘a state of terror’.73 
The Lebanese definition also provides an illustrative list of the 
means that are considered as ‘liable to create a public danger’. 
Though the list is not exhaustive, it seems that some Lebanese 
courts have preferred a strict interpretation of this objective element 
of the definition, by limiting the ‘means’ only to those which, as 
such, are likely to create a public danger.74 Thus, it follows that any 
means not listed therein would only fall into the definition if they 
create a similar effect to those listed.75 In this respect, according to 
the Lebanese case law, non-enumerative implements not envisaged 
by Article 314 include guns, machine-guns, revolvers, letter bombs 
or knives.76 
However, the Arab Convention and customary international law 
as interpreted by the Tribunal, do not include any constraint 
regarding the means used for the commission of an act of 
terrorism;77 therefore the Appeals Chamber took a broader 
interpretation of this objective element, extending the domestic 
definition to include means that are liable to create a public danger 
                                                             
70 ibid paras 149-150. 
71 Lebanese Criminal Code art 314: ‘Terrorist acts are all acts intended to cause a 
state of terror and committed by means liable to create a public danger such as 
explosive devices, inflammable materials, toxic or corrosive products and 
infectious or microbial agents.’  
72 STL Decision (n 3) para 49. 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid para 52. 
75 ibid paras 51-52. 
76 ibid para 52. 
77 ibid para 69; para 113. 
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‘either by exposing bystanders or onlookers to harm or by 
instigating further violence in the form of retaliation or political 
instability’.78 It held further that this interpretation addresses better
the exigencies of modern forms of terrorism and brings Lebanese 
law closer to the relevant international law which is binding on 
Lebanon.79
Apart from the elements of the crime of terrorism as introduced 
by the Appeals Chamber, it is also relevant to mention the 
customary elements of the definition of the crime, as provided for in 
the STL Decision. In the previous Chapter, it was mentioned that 
this finding of the Tribunal gave rise to controversy surrounding the 
customary status of terrorism; however, it cannot be overlooked that 
the STL Decision offered an account of State practice and opinio 
juris that points to the direction of raising terrorism to a crime under 
customary international law. The Appeals Chamber has used a 
number of treaties, UN resolutions as well as legislative and judicial 
practice of States as a basis to conclude that there is a customary 
crime of terrorism, at least in time of peace.80 The analysis of these
sources of custom led the Appeals Chamber to conclude that the 
customary rule that has emerged regarding the international crime of 
terrorism requires:  
i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder,
kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening 
such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population 
(which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or 
directly or indirectly coerce a national or international 
78 ibid 3 and paras 125-128. 
79 ibid para 129. 
80 ibid para 85. For a detailed analysis of the sources of customary law used by the 
Appeals Chamber see ibid paras 86-113. For an opposite view on the 
interpretation of these sources as a sound basis for the customary status of 
terrorism see Ben Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime for Transnational 
Terrorism’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 677. 
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authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) 
when the act involves a transnational element.81 
The articulation of the abovementioned elements as a customary 
rule is a vital contribution of the Appeals Chamber and can 
constitute a turning point in international criminal law in the field of 
terrorism should the STL Decision leave a lasting impact for future 
cases. The reference to customary law adds legitimacy to the 
judgment82 and it has been argued that this ruling can set a 
precedent for an international definition for terrorism and for the 
UN to establish in the future special tribunals with jurisdiction over 
terrorist crimes,83 offering guidance in terms of how international 
terrorism should be dealt with. However, if a ruling derives its 
legitimacy from customary law, it should also take into account a 
well-rounded interpretation of it, rather than an one-sided one. 
Generally speaking, customary law can be ‘controversial due to its 
indeterminacy and fluidity’.84 While one tribunal can use it as a 
source for its ruling, another might reject it on grounds that it is too 
vague,85 and even the Appeals Chamber of the STL acknowledges 
that customary law is not applicable in all tribunals.86 Secondly, and 
with respect to terrorism, customary law has been used in order to 
show that a customary rule on terrorism has not yet emerged.87 A 
decision, ruling on such a controversial issue such as international 
terrorism, should have reflected all aspects of customary law 
relevant to it, rather than only those aspects which are in accord 
with the opinion of the judges. 
                                                             
81 STL Decision (n 3) para 85. 
82 Prakash Puchooa, ‘Defining Terrorism at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ 
(2011) 2(3) Journal of Terrorism Research 34, 43. 
83 Mylonaki (n 65) 338. 
84 Puchooa (n 82) 43. 
85 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Chamber of Criminal law, Decision of 18 
September 2001 in the case of D D Bouterse para 4.4 and 4.7. The Supreme Court 
overturned an Appeals Chamber conviction for torture as a crime against 
humanity on the grounds that customary law is too vague as a source of law to 
base such a conviction. 
86 STL Decision (n 3) para 101; paras 114-17. 
87 See generally Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (OUP 2006). 
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However, it should be noted that the decision provides a starting 
point on which discussions about a definition for terrorism for 
criminal purposes can be triggered. It remains to be seen whether 
the negotiations for the UN Draft Convention on Terrorism will be 
influenced by this decision. Furthermore, since this decision 
articulates for the first time objective and subjective elements for the 
international crime of terrorism, it constitutes an opportunity to 
initiate again discussions about the inclusion and definition of the 
crime of terrorism into the Rome Statute.     
The existing efforts of defining terrorism in international law 
demonstrate some common ground on what is understood as 
terrorism, but also some points of contention. In summary and as it 
has been already illustrated, it seems that there is a general 
consensus that terrorism includes violent acts or threats thereof, that 
put at risk the physical integrity of human beings, but also 
destructive actions taken against the environment and public or 
private property. The purpose of an act of terrorism as has emerged 
so far, is to intimidate a population or compel a government or 
organisation to do or to abstain from doing a particular act and the 
special intent entails the creation of a state of terror. On the other 
hand, the points of divergence revolve around the questions of i) 
whether political or generally ideological motivation should 
constitute an element of the offence and ii) whether specific groups 
should be exempted from the definition, namely national liberation 
movements or State agents. This latter point however has been an 
issue only for the drafting of the UN Comprehensive Convention on 
Terrorism and has not been specifically addressed by the rest of the 
anti-terrorist instruments examined in this section (with the 
exception of the Arab Convention), leaving thus room to deduce 
that terrorism is generally condemned ‘by whomever committed’. 
Finally, the STL Decision raised a point which requires further 
elaboration: in ruling on the elements of the crime of terrorism, the 
Appeals Chamber held that terrorism is a customary law crime with 
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its own elements, one of which is the transnational nature of the act. 
Putting aside the issue of controversy surrounding the customary 
nature of terrorism, the contribution of the STL Decision to the 
development of a definition for terrorism in international law cannot 
be overlooked. Thus, it is essential to examine further the scope and 
interpretation of the international element of the offence as a 
potential constituent definitional element of the crime of 
international terrorism. 
However, and regardless of the degree of State consensus on the 
elements of a definition for terrorism, it is the author’s view that a 
definition of an international crime will not be functional nor serve 
the purposes of international criminal justice unless it balances 
properly State sovereignty considerations and cosmopolitan ideals. 
Thus, in the quest for a definition of terrorism, one should put both 
the common elements as well as the points of divergence under the 
spectrum of this approach, namely whether the interpretation and 
scope of these elements manage to strike the required balance 
between the need to protect State sovereignty and to promote 
cosmopolitan considerations. To this end, the second section will 
first focus on an analysis of the agreed elements of a definition for 
terrorism in the context of State sovereignty considerations and 
cosmopolitan purposes. Secondly, it will be suggested that this 
context can help resolve the most contentious issues surrounding the 
definition, namely the question of including a political/ideological 
motive as an element of the offence and that of exempting particular 
groups from the scope of the definition. Finally, it will be argued 
that the international element of the crime, introduced by the STL, 
should be an essential definitional element, as it helps bridge the gap 
between the protection of State sovereignty and the promotion of 
cosmopolitan goals. It will be suggested that the threshold of 
‘internationality’ of a terrorist act will place clearer boundaries on 
the circumstances under which a terrorist act should rise to the level 
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of an international crime without sidestepping national efforts to 
combat terrorism. 
II. Reaching the required balance: how the consented, 
contested and the ‘internationality’ elements can 
contribute to the creation of due balance between 
State-centric and cosmopolitan concerns in defining 
terrorism 
The previous section identified three types of constituents of a 
definition for terrorism: i) the first type consists of the more 
common elements, as they are illustrated through international and 
regional instruments and domestic law, ii) the second type includes 
those elements where there is continuous disagreement about how 
they should be approached, namely the inclusion of a 
political/ideological motive as an element of the crime and the 
exemption from the definition of activities carried out by particular 
groups or individuals, and iii) a suggestion made by the author and 
backed up by the STL Decision, to include an international element 
in the definition of terrorism. This section will try to address the 
major challenge posed by the drafting of a definition for terrorism, 
namely how terrorism can be best defined in order to protect both 
the State interests and the universal values that are threatened by the 
commission of a terrorist act. For this reason, this section will put 
the abovementioned constituent elements of a defintion for terrorism 
in the context of the theories of State sovereignty and 
cosmopolitanism. Thus, it will be demonstrated how the drafting of 
a definition for terrorism can serve as a means to achieve the desired 
balance between these potentially antithetical poles and contribute 
substantially to the development of international criminal law in the 
field. 
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a) ‘Creation of a state of terror’, the intention to influence politics 
and the political/ideological motive requirement  
Starting with the least controversial elements of a definition for 
terrorism, the element of violence against the physical integrity of 
persons88 and destructive action against property are the most 
dominant. The STL Decision ruled that one of the elements of the 
crime of terrorism, both in the customary definition and the 
definition to be applied by the Tribunal in the particular case, is the 
perpetration of a criminal act. Saul argues that the kind of violence 
entailed in a terrorist act - political or religious violence - cannot be 
tolerated by States because it both jeopardises the safety and human 
rights of individuals, being their citizens or other persons that 
happen to be in their territory, and aims at influencing politics or 
promoting a religious or ideological agenda.89 In other words, the 
violence used during the commission of a terrorist act against 
physical persons or against property is the means used by terrorists 
to achieve their aim of attacking a State’s national security and 
stability. Therefore, it becomes obvious that even the single element 
of violence reflects the need to balance carefully the two parallel 
aims of a terrorist act: the attack on universal values and 
international community interests through the violation of basic 
human rights (a cosmopolitan concern) and the attack on national 
interests (a State-centric concern).   
In this respect, it can be said that terrorist violence targets both 
cosmopolitan and State-centric interests, namely universal values 
and fundamental freedoms on the one hand and the political stability 
                                                             
88 For the purposes of this analysis, ‘persons’ or ‘individuals’ are limited to the 
civilian population. While Cassese argues that victims of terrorism can be both 
civilians and military personnel (Cassese (n 7) 224), this limitation only to 
civilians relate to the previous acknowledgment made in this Chapter that 
international humanitarian law is the law applicable to armed conflicts where 
military personnel is the target of terrorist acts. 
89 Ben Saul, ‘Civilising the Exception: Universally Defining Terrorism’ in 
Aniceto Masferrer (ed), Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency, 
Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 14 (Springer 2012) 
91. 
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and national security of States on the other. This dual nature of 
terrorist violence has to be clearly reflected in a criminal definition 
for terrorism. Regarding cosmopolitan concerns about the violation 
of basic human rights, the element of violence should be defined in 
such a way so as to reflect what Cassese and Delmas-Marty call the 
‘depersonalisation of the victim’90 or in other words, indiscriminate 
violence.91 Putting aside cases where the victim of a terrorist attack 
is a political person and whose death would be considered rather 
‘symbolic’ and might not endanger the general public during its 
commission,92 random violence against individuals is the most 
dominant feature of terrorism. The element of random violence is 
what generates what is considered to be one of the purposes of a 
terrorist act, namely the aim to spread terror. The deprivation of the 
sense of security that the citizens of a State, or any other person that 
happens to be in the territory of a State, should enjoy is the basic 
cause of terror among individuals and therefore, the actus reus of 
terrorism should entail any act or threat thereof that can cause that 
effect. To this end, the element of violence should include acts that 
are already prohibited by the anti-terrorist conventions or by 
national laws but the list should remain ‘open-ended’ in order to 
ensure that any new or unanticipated methods not yet listed would 
also fall into the category.93 If, as it has been suggested, there has to 
be ‘an overarching idea of what we understand as terrorism’94 in 
order to link disparate acts having a similar effect, then this idea 
should focus on the creation of a state of terror. 
                                                             
90 Cassese (n 7) 219 ; Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘Les crimes internationaux 
peuvent-ils contribuer au débat entre universalisme et relativisme des valeurs?’ in 
Cassese and Delmas-Marty (eds), Crimes Internationaux et Juridiction 
Internationale (Presse Universitaire de France 2002) 67. 
91 Kolb (n 5) 235. 
92 This point does not argue that attacks against persons of high political, religious 
or other status should not be considered as terrorist under any circumstances. 
However, if the commission of the attack does not endanger the general public, it 
will probably fall into other categories of crime, eg political assassination or 
murder. 
93 Saul (n 89) 91. 
94 Ben Golder and George Williams, ‘What is “Terrorism”? Problems of Legal 
Definition’ (2004) 27 (2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 270, 288. 
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Despite the fact that human beings or private or public property 
are the direct targets of terrorist violence, the indirect ‘victim’ is a 
State’s stability and national security. Generally, there is consensus 
that the criminal act that can qualify as terrorist should aim at either 
the intimidation of the population (‘intent to spread fear among the 
population’ as was formulated in the STL Decision)95 or at
compelling a government or an international organisation to do or to 
abstain from doing a particular act.96 Having said previously that the
element of creating a state of terror shoud be reflected into the 
elements of the crime for cosmopolitan-related purposes, it is 
suggested that the element of compelling a government or 
organisation to do or refrain from doing a particular act should also 
be reflected for sovereignty-related considerations. However, the 
use of ‘or’ between the two separate subjective elements of a 
terrorist act seems to signify that either a ‘mere’ intimidation of a 
population or a ‘mere’ compulsion of a government will be enough 
for an act to qualify as terrorist. This alternative use of either the 
intention to create a state of terror or the intention to compel a 
government or organisation to do or refrain from doing a particular 
act, implies that when one of the two subjective elements is present, 
the other is not a necessary requirement.97 If, in this respect, an
‘either…or…’ approach is followed, then acts with the exclusive 
aim of spreading terror (without any other political/ideological 
motivation, such as a crime wave of random violence)98 will qualify
as terrorist. To the contrary, the intention of compelling national or 
international authorities to do or refrain from doing a particular act, 
95 STL Decision (n 3) para 85. 
96 Financing of Terrorism Convention art 2(1b); EU Framework Decision art 1(1); 
UN Draft Convention on Terrorism proposed art 2(1); STL Decision (n 2) para 
85. 
97 Walter (n 11) 28. 
98 For example, indiscriminate violence between Shiite and Sunni groups in Iraq 
based on ethnicity cannot be qualified as terrorist even if the means of violence 
used resemble to the means commonly used by terrorists (eg suicide bombers or 
car bombs). See Mariona Llobet, ‘Terrorism: Limits Between Crimes and War. 
The Fallacy of the Slogan “War on Terror”’ in Masferrer (n 89) 106. 
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often presupposes a political/ideological motivation,99 which might
be absent from acts intending only to spread terror among the 
population, such as an attack by a sniper in a public space who does 
not follow a particular ideology.100 Therefore, the absence of a
political/ideological motivation behind the intention to spread terror 
among the population or part of it, risks the inclusion into the 
definition of a much broader category of violent acts, that would 
deprive of the concept of terrorism its direct link to issues of 
national security and protection of State interests. 
This absence of the element of a political/ideological motive 
from a definition of terrorism can be seen from a dual perspective in 
the context of both theories that form the framework of this analysis. 
From a cosmopolitan perspective, Di Filippo argues that the core 
context of the fight against terrorism should not be the preservation 
of a particular State system but rather the protection of individuals 
and of the human values they embody.101 Under this perspective, the
motivation behind a violent act is made irrelevant, since we cannot 
exclude that criminal associations which commit particularly violent 
crimes can have mixed objectives, including, but not limited to, 
political ones.102 Therefore, the distinction of terrorism from
ordinary crimes by reference to the motive of the offender is 
unnecessary and can be misleading because the condemnation of 
terrorism should be absolute irrespective of the context in which it is 
carried out. Under this approach, terrorism is seen as a method of 
achieving a particular purpose and whether this purpose is idealistic 
99 Arguably, since it is still possible to compel a government or organization for 
private, non-political reasons (in Saul (n 89) 89). 
100 Walter (n 11) 29. 
101 Marcello Di Filippo, ‘Terrorist Crimes and International Co-operation: Critical 
Remarks on the Definition and Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of 
International Crimes’ (2008) 19 (3) European Journal of International Law 533, 
547. 
102 ibid 541-42. 
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or materialistic should not determine the qualification of an act as 
terrorist.103
Under a more State-centric perspective, Saul argues that the 
political motive can serve as a means of distinction between a 
terrorist and a non-terrorist act, not in the sense that the former is 
morally worse than the latter, but morally different.104 He is of the
view that political or generally public-oriented violence is morally 
different than violence carried out for private ends, even if the latter 
is of equal gravity, and that this differentiation should be reflected 
into a definition for terrorism.105 This moral difference between
terrorism and other equally violent crimes is based on the view that 
the former aims ‘to disrupt and coerce peaceful political processes 
through violence’ and it is this aim that makes terrorism 
‘distinctively wrongful’.106 Therefore, the omission of the political
motive from anti-terrorist instruments as a distinguishing element of 
terrorism results in ‘overbroadness’, undermining their counter-
terrorism character107 and risking the qualification of other acts of
serious violence as terrorist, such as a crime wave or a snipper’s 
attack in a public space. The emphasis should consequently be laid 
on the aim of terrorism to attack society and democratic 
institutions,108 as well as the political system of a particular State.109
As was said previously, a political or ideological motive is not 
specifically included into the requirements of which acts can qualify 
as terrorist in all international anti-terrorist instruments. However, 
this is not to say that there needs to be no connection between a 
violent act and a political/ideological purpose for the act to be 
categorised as terrorist because a political/ideological motive, even 
103 ibid 547. 
104 Saul (n 89) 88. 
105 ibid. 
106 ibid. 
107 Saul (n 89) 89. 
108 Rt Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism, vol 
1 CMD3420 xi in Saul (n 89) 90. 
109 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Australia), Supplementary 
Submission to the Security Legislation Review Committee (2006) 8. 
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if not explicitly mentioned in a definition for terrorism, is being 
implied by one of the two aims of a terrorist act. Nonetheless, it is 
the author’s suggestion that a political/ideological motive should be 
explicitly included in a definition for terrorism, not only in 
connection to acts carried out with the intention to coerce the 
authorities but also to acts carried out with the intention to create a 
state of terror among the population or part of it. The absence of a 
political/ideological motive that will connect to both the subjective 
elements of the crime will result in overbroadness, undermining its 
character as a crime against non-violent politics and social life.110 If 
the motive of the offender is made irrelevant, acts of serious 
violence whose motive might be economic profit, despair or simply 
insanity, will be equated with a category of substantially different 
crimes, whose motive is completely political or ideological in 
character and definitely requires a different kind of analysis.111 This 
overreach would weaken the counter-terrorism character of existing 
anti-terrorist instruments and measures and will not emphasise the 
distinctively wrongful character of terrorism which targets 
individuals and State structures at the same time. 
To recapitulate, cosmopolitanism in the context of international 
criminal justice requires that ‘universal standards applicable to 
humankind should take priority in international affairs’112 over any 
national priorities and strategies of the State that has suffered the 
attack. In other words, the prosecution and punishment of the 
individual offenders of an act of international terrorism and in this 
respect, the fight against impunity for these offenders should be 
given priority despite any national strategies that would opt for a 
non-judicial response, such as resort to the use of force or political 
                                                             
110 Saul (n 89) 89. 
111 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen 
Habermas’ in Giovanna Borradori (ed), Philosophy in a Time of Terror: 
Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (University of Chicago 
Press 2003) 34. 
112 Page Wilson, Aggression, Crime and International Security: Moral, Political 
and Legal Dimensions of International Relations (Routledge 2009) 6. 
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or economic coercion. Therefore, a proposed definition should first 
of all reflect the need to protect all human beings by preventing 
grave crimes that ‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world’,113 and thus have as the actus reus of international terrorism 
the commission of a criminal act with the intent to create a state of 
terror among a population or part of it. On the other hand, since the 
intent of a terrorist act is more often than not combined with the 
intent to attack a State’s national stability and security, a definition 
should equally ensure that violent or non-violent acts aiming at 
compelling a government or organisation to do or refrain from doing 
a particular act are clearly included. To this end, it has been 
proposed that the political/ideological motive requirement will 
ensure that all acts that will fall into the definition, being acts that 
either create a state of terror or intimidate the authorities of a State 
or both, are acts driven by the special intent to promote a certain 
political/ideological agenda by disrupting peaceful political 
processes or social life. Additionally, the inclusion of a 
political/ideological motive requirement will preclude criminal acts 
driven by non-political/ideoligical ends, such as economic profit, 
despair or insanity, from being categorised as terrorist, retaining 
thus the morally different stigma that a crime of international 
terrorism should carry. 
b) Exemption of activities of particular groups or individuals 
So far, it has been argued that, for a definition of terrorism to 
achieve the fine balance between the protection of both State-centric 
and cosmopolitan concerns, it has to include: i) the subjective 
element of either creating a state of terror among the population 
through the use of violence or compelling the authorities to do or 
refrain from doing a particular act and ii) a political or otherwise 
ideological motive as a special element required for both of the 
subjective elements. Turning now to the question of whether 
                                                             
113 Rome Statute Preamble para 3. 
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activities of particular groups or individuals should be exempted 
from the definition, such as those carried out by freedom fighters or 
State agents, it was mentioned previously that, with the exception of 
the Arab Convention114 and the OIC Convention to Combat 
Terrorism,115 the general tendency does not support the 
incorporation of any exceptions. Both the Arab and the OIC 
Conventions provide for an exclusion of activities carried out in the 
context of self-determination; however the 1994 UNGA 
Declaration116 and the Preambles of both the Financing 
Convention117 and the UN Draft Convention on Terrorism118 
condemn terrorism ‘by whoemever committed’. Furthermore, the 
STL Decision did not address the question of exempting activities 
carried out in the context of self-determination. 
It has been argued previously that the issue of self-determination 
and activities of national liberation movements in the context of an 
armed conflict are already covered by international humanitarian 
law. Activities during war time, in both international and national 
conflicts, that bear similarities with terrorist offences during peace 
time are already criminalised as war crimes,119 including the act of 
spreading terror among civilians as a separate war crime.120 Also, 
the people’s right to self-determination is very well established in 
the UN Charter, IHL and the two UN International Human Rights 
Covenants121 and thus, activities carried out in this context cannot 
fall into the definition of terrorism, regardless of whether a separate 
exception of this type of activities is finally adopted.122 The ‘by 
                                                             
114 Arab Convention art 2a. 
115 OIC Convention to Combat Terrorism (1999-1420H) art 2a. 
116 1994 UNGA Declaration Annex I art 1. 
117 Financing of Terrorism Convention Preamble. 
118 UNGA Report (n 14) 4. 
119 Saul (n 89) 95. 
120
 Prosecutor v Galić, ICTY-98-29-T (5 December 2003) paras 65–66; affirmed 
in Prosecutor v Galić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) IT-98-29-A (30 November 
2006) paras 87–90. 
121 Text to n 52. 
122 See René Värk, ‘Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of Armed Force’ 
(2011) 14 Estonian National Defence College Proceedings 74, 79 arguing that 
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whomever committed’ clause that is included in the anti-terrorist 
instruments mentioned previously cannot be extended to those who 
engage in warfare in conformity with international humanitarian 
law; in case of violations, the perpetrators will be liable for 
prosecution for war crimes or crimes against humanity.123 On the 
other hand, in cases where an internal situation does not amount to 
an armed conflict for international humanitarian law to apply, then 
any terrorist-type conduct will be covered by domestic law on 
terrorist offences.124 As a result, the reaffirmation of people’s right 
to self-determination and to fight against foreign occupation does 
not need to be restated in a definition of terrorism to be used in an 
international criminal law context. 
Generally speaking, it is the author’s view that the question of 
exempting or not freedom fighters’ activities from a definition for 
terrorism is somewhat out of place, for the reasons analysed above. 
However, the same cannot be argued for the exception of the 
activities of State agents (police, military forces etc). As was 
mentioned previously, the UN Draft Convention, despite the 
reference in its Preamble that, among the acts of international 
terrorism that have to be suppressed, are also ‘those which are 
committed or supported by States, directly or indirectly’,125 provides 
for an exception, in its draft Article 18(3) for those ‘activities 
undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their 
official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of 
international law (…)’.126 Despite the cosmopolitan aspiration stated 
in the preambular text of the convention to stand up against 
international terrorism even when committed by State agents, the 
caveat offered in its draft Article 18(3) demonstrates its 
cosmopolitan limitations. The principles that apply to the conduct of 
                                                                                                                                           
‘the inclusion or exclusion of the activities of armed forces is mostly emotional 
and symbolic.’ 
123 Saul (n 89) 95. 
124 ibid. 
125 UNGA Report (n 14) Annex I. 
126  ibid Annex IV draft art 18(3). 
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military forces in time of peace are those which relate to the law on 
State responsibility, the use of force and human rights law under 
general international law127 and thus, activities of military forces 
will always be outside the scope of this convention. It has been 
argued that this interpretation is consistent with the overall direction 
of the Coordinator’s proposal that State-committed or State-
supported terrorism will continue to fall into the ambit of other 
fields of law such as the UN Charter framework, IHL, international 
criminal law (for acts committed in the context of the crime of 
aggression or crimes against humanity) and the law on State 
responsibility, which provide for State obligations in cases where 
acts of violence are committed by State agents.128 However, IHL 
applies only in situations of armed conflicts and thus, any acts 
committed in the context of ‘situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature’129 are exempted from its scope. 
Moreover, international human rights law, while being relevant in 
the context of protecting civil and political rights such as free 
expression, assembly or privacy, does not include any prohibitions 
related to State-committed terrorism per se and, regarding State-
supported terrorism, State responsibility has hardly ever been 
invoked or established successfully.130 Concerning the international 
criminal law framework, the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime 
of aggression is not as yet commenced, and consequently, the only 
branch of international criminal law that is in a position to address 
                                                             
127 ‘Report of the Coordinator on the Bilateral Contacts: Informal Summaries by 
the Chairman of the Working Group’ in UNGA Sixth Committee (65th Session) 
‘Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ 
(3 November 2010) UN Doc A/C.6/65/L.10, Annex III, 20. 
128 Amrith Rohan Perera, ‘The Draft United Nations Comprehensive Convention 
on International Terrorism’ in Saul (n 23) 161. 
129 Additional Protocol II art 2. 
130 Trapp (n 61) 280. Even in the Lockerbie case, Libya accepted civil 
responsibility only, for the conduct of its officials (ibid) and paid compensation to 
the victims in order to have Security Council measures lifted (See Colonel 
Ghaddafi’s son’s interview in BBC, ‘Lockerbie Evidence not disclosed’, 28 
August 2008, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/south_of_scotland/7573244.stm> accessed 
20 February 2015).  
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acts of State-committed terrorism is the one related to the 
commission of crimes against humanity. Therefore, if the UN Draft 
Convention leaves outside its scope the commission of terrorist-type 
activities by military forces in time of peace, then there will be 
limited room for any other international legal framework to 
condemn these activities as terrorist and to directly link criminal 
responsibility to acts of terrorism committed by State agents.  
In sum, for a balance to be achieved regarding the question of 
exempting activities from the scope of a definition for terrorism, a 
‘moral symmetry’131 should be retained: the ‘by whomever
committed’ clause should be understood as covering both activities 
of non-State actors and State agents if they exhibit the same effect. 
In fact, the broader a definition is, the more room for exceptions it 
will have and for this reason, it has to be strictly construed in order 
to avoid any grey areas that might allow the commission of acts 
which assume the characteristics of terrorism. Only when the 
question of a perpetrator is not a qualifier of which acts can be 
understood as terrorist, will it be possible to further the 
cosmopolitan aspirations of a definition and push forward the efforts 
to condemn terrorism in all its forms. The inclusion of activities 
carried out by non-State actors is obviously imperative to serve the 
need of protecting State interests pertaining to national security and 
stability of a State. However, should the definition not cover 
activities carried out by State agents, then State-centric 
considerations as to the autonomy of how a State should behave to 
individuals that live or happen to be in its territory will severely 
weigh against any cosmopolitan aspirations of fighting impunity for 
the commission of grave crimes and of applying universal standards 
that all humankind should equally enjoy. 
131 Saul (n 89) 96. 
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c) The international element of a terrorist act
A final suggestion on how a definition for terrorism will best 
reconcile the somewhat antithetical State sovereignty and 
cosmopolitan concerns in the fight against terrorism is the inclusion 
of an ‘international element’ requirement. As was mentioned 
previously, the STL Decision ruled that a customary definition for 
terrorism requires that the terrorist act be transnational. The 
Tribunal held that this ‘transnationality’ consists of i) a connection 
of perpetrators, victims or means used across two or more States or 
ii) a significant impact that a terrorist act in one State has on
another, constituting a threat to international peace and security, at 
least for the neighbouring States.132 Putting aside the debate whether
there is general agreement on the existence of a customary rule 
concerning the definition for terrorism, this ‘transnational element’ 
requirement serves as a distinguishing line between the acts of 
terrorism that should remain within the national jurisdictional realm 
and those that can or should justify the intervention of an 
international tribunal. In sum, the transnational element becomes a 
threshold beyond which an act of terrorism becomes of international 
concern and qualifies intervention from an international body due to 
its international connections or a direct ‘spill over’ effect to other 
States. However, if the planning, execution or direct impact of a 
terrorist act does not have transnational dimensions, then the act is 
considered of purely domestic nature and only national criminal law 
is applicable, even when the act has a similar effect to a 
transnational act of terrorism in terms of the number of victims or 
social destruction.133
Be that as it may, it is the author’s view that this requirement 
should be renamed as an ‘international element’ rather than a 
‘transnational element’ requirement. While in criminological terms, 
132 STL Decision (n 3) para 90. 
133 ibid. 
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there is no substantial difference between the two,134 there is 
difference in juridical terms, originating from the distinctive nature 
of transnational and international crimes. Boister argues that 
transnational crimes, or ‘transnational criminal law’, form part of 
international criminal law in general, which is further divided into 
transnational and international criminal law stricto sensu.135 The 
former significantly differs from the latter, in that it does not create 
individual liability but consists of ‘an indirect system of interstate 
obligations, generating national criminal law’.136 Putting its function 
in the context of the two theories, one could say that transnational 
criminal law extends rather than limits the sovereign reach of States 
in the struggle against transnational crimes.137 Consequently, this 
system of interstate cooperation is mostly State-centric and 
functions on the basis of State sovereignty considerations,138 
contrary to the system of international criminal law stricto sensu, 
which restricts the role of States in the adjudication of international 
crimes.  
With respect to terrorism, terrorist offences were established in 
international law by the anti-terrorist conventions which fall into the 
ambit of transnational criminal law, according to Boister’s 
distinction. Whether the origins of the struggle against these 
offences have been national or international in character is 
debated,139 however, as it stands so far and according to the sectoral 
                                                             
134 Gerhard O W Mueller, ‘Transnational crime: Definitions and Concepts’ in Phil 
Williams and Dimitri Vlassis (eds), Combating Transnational Crime, Concepts, 
Activities and Responses (Frank Cass 2001) 13 as found in Niel Boister, 
‘Transnational Criminal Law?’ (2003) 14 (5) European Journal of International 
Law 953, 954. 
135 ibid 955. 
136 ibid 962. 
137 Naomi Norberg, ‘Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects 
for a Future Together’ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11, 17. 
138 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ‘An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing 
Trends of International Criminal Law’ (1974) 45 Revue Internationale de Droit 
Penal 405, 429 in Niel Boister, ‘Human Rights Protections in the Suppression 
Conventions’ (2002) 2 (2) Human Rights Law Review 199, 200. 
139 See Norberg (n 137) 18, arguing that the adjudication of the crimes that are 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction today was initiated at the international level, whereas 
this ‘is not the case with respect to terrorism’. For an opposite view see Boister (n 
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regime of the anti-terrorist conventions, the penal proscription 
against terrorist offences remains national. While the sectoral anti-
terrorist conventions could also promote ‘a cosmopolitan 
international morality’ in the fight against terrorism,140 they fail to 
do so because of this reliance of transnational criminal law to 
national penal systems. This sectoral regime presupposes the 
existence of fully developed national criminal systems141 which pay 
due regard to cosmopolitan concerns about individuals prosecuted 
and punished nationally.142 However, one should be aware that 
national criminal systems might be poorly developed or heavily 
influenced by ideals of how criminal law should be, held by the 
most powerful and influential States.143 This sectoral anti-terrorist 
regime demands first and foremost law enforcement expertise in the 
effort to suppress terrorism and relies for its effectiveness on some 
influential States which assume the role of an ‘international 
enforcer’.144 Thus, the outcome is that the ideas of the most 
powerful States on how criminal law should be, along with their 
national penal systems, predominate over cosmopolitan values 
relating to the international legality and the human rights of 
individuals being prosecuted and punished under this regime.145 
This implicit faith of the sectoral anti-terrorist regime in the national 
criminal justice systems of its States parties leaves too much room 
for States to guard zealously their sovereign interests at the expense 
of international legality and protection of human rights, which 
constitute cosmopolitan aspirations that international criminal law 
should embody. 
                                                                                                                                           
134) 955 arguing that ‘[t]he offences established by the suppression conventions 
are, in contrast, classed by international lawyers as “crimes of international 
concern” or “common crimes against internationally protected interests” because 
although the origin of the norm is international, penal proscription is national.’ 
140 Ethan A Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in 
International Society’, (1990) 44 International Organisation 479, 481 in Boister (n 
134) 957-58. 
141 ibid 958. 
142 Boister (n 138) 220. 
143 Boister (n 134) 958. 
144 ibid 960. 
145 ibid. 
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For these reasons, and regarding a definition for terrorism, a 
formulation which would favour the transnational over the 
international nature of a terrorist act should be abandoned. The 
connotations of ‘transnationality’ of terrorism, contrary to those of 
its ‘internationality’, entail ideas of how terrorism should be 
suppressed, based mostly on State-centric considerations. However, 
and as the overall argument of this thesis suggests, the effectiveness 
of a definition is based on the extent to which State-centric and 
cosmopolitan considerations are given due regard in order to avoid 
the effect of cosmopolitan efforts being pushed back by State-
centric barriers. Besides, there is no reason in principle why one 
should preclude the transition of terrorism from a transnational 
offence to an international crime with its own definition, should 
certain requirements be fulfilled, the international element being one 
of them.  
Turning now to the question of the context of this international 
element, there is substantial convergence among academics and the 
STL ruling on the ‘transnationality’ of terrorism, about what this 
element should entail. Cassese argues that terrorism can amount to 
an international crime when: i) it transcends national boundaries, in 
terms of persons, means and violence involved, ii) it is promoted or 
tolerated by a State because State involvement renders a particular 
terrorist act iii) ‘a phenomenon of concern to the whole international 
community and a threat to international peace’.146 Finally, he 
completes this list by adding that a terrorist act can amount to an 
international crime when, all the abovementioned requirements 
being fulfilled, it is iv) very serious and large-scale.147 Secondly, 
Kolb suggests that the internationality of a terrorist act consists of 
its international consequences, namely whether the rights and duties 
of more than one State or foreign interests are affected.148 Thus, for 
Kolb, internationality is mostly defined by the transnational 
                                                             
146 Cassese (n 7) 223. 
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148 Kolb (n 5) 243. 
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dimensions of a terrorist act, determined by the persons involved 
(perpetrators, victims or when the target is a person with an 
international status) and the number of States that are affected 
(including cases where the act is committed in a space where no 
State has exclusive jurisdiction).149 However, he leaves open the 
question of whether only a gravity requirement or the element of 
indiscriminate violence can be sufficient in order for a terrorist act 
to reach the threshold of internationality.150 Broadly speaking, even 
if the persons involved in a very serious or large-scale terrorist act 
are exclusively from one State, which is also the only affected State, 
then the terrorist act can still be considered as an attack to universal 
values and interests of the international community, qualifying 
intervention from an international tribunal.151 Besides, it is 
unrealistic to say that even when a very serious and large-scale 
terrorist act involves or affects persons exclusively from one State, 
it does not aim at provoking international concern or attracting the 
attention of the international community.152 Therefore, his argument 
goes, the ‘internationality’ of a terrorist act should not be strictly 
determined by its pragmatic transnational dimensions but be 
extended to include acts of particular gravity that can generally 
affect international community interests.153 
However, the question that remains is how the ‘internationality’ 
threshold can be defined in such a way so as to respond to the 
current exigencies of combatting terrorism without transgressing the 
boundaries of State sovereignty. The transnational element, as 
defined by the STL Decision, does not cover acts of terrorism which 
are of purely domestic nature, even if their impact on a State is 
similar to the one of a transnational act of terrorism as far as victims 
and social destruction are concerned.154 Cassese agrees with this 
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151 ibid. 
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153 ibid 245. 
154 STL Decision (n 3) para 90. 
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view, arguing that, for an act of terrorism to be an international 
crime, all the conditions he presents have to be met, together with 
the requirement that the act be very serious and large-scale.155 This 
last condition does not suffice on its own if the act does not present 
the other characteristics he proposes, namely, the cross-border 
character, State involvement and the requirement that the act 
amount to a threat to international peace. This approach of the ambit 
of ‘internationality’ precludes the possibility of an act of domestic 
terrorism amounting to an international crime, based strictly on 
grounds of gravity and/or indiscriminate violence. This question is 
left partly unanswered by Kolb who leans, however, towards a more 
flexible interpretation, according to which an act of domestic 
terrorism ceases to be purely domestic when being of such gravity 
so as to affect international community interests. Though in 
pragmatic terms, one would agree that very serious and large-scale 
acts of domestic terrorism aim at attracting international attention or 
attacking international values, their inclusion into a definition for 
international terrorism, overrides national priorities and strategies in 
the field. Besides, the sectoral anti-terrorist conventions regulate 
only transnational acts of terrorism, leaving outside their scope 
domestic acts,156 without any reference to their gravity. Therefore, 
the inclusion of gravity as a sufficient qualifier of which acts can 
amount to international terrorism even without having a cross-
border character, goes far beyond the scope of the existing anti-
terrorist conventions and widens the ambit of ‘internationality’ to an 
extent that seriously collides with the ambit of national anti-terrorist 
policies and State sovereignty-based priorities. 
Therefore, it seems that the introduction of the element of gravity 
as a sufficient qualifier for the ‘internationality’ of an act of 
terrorism will not bridge but rather widen the gap between the 
concerns relating to State sovereignty protection and promotion of 
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cosmopolitan aspirations in the fight against terrorism. For this 
reason, it is the author’s suggestion that one should focus on another 
of the proposed elements, in an effort to eliminate the tension 
between the two poles of State sovereignty and cosmopolitanism: 
both the STL Decision and the element of ‘internationality’ 
proposed by Cassese support the view that an act of terrorism is 
‘internationalised’ when it constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security. The STL Decision ruled that an act of terrorism 
amounts to a threat to international peace and security when it has 
an impact on more than one State, namely ‘when it is foreseeable 
that a terrorist attack that is planned and executed in one country 
will threaten international peace and security, at least for 
neighbouring countries’, 157 an interpretation that is consistent with
the generally accepted cross-border element. Moreover, Cassese 
interprets the element of ‘threat to international peace’ by referring 
to the State involvement in a terrorist act; if a terrorist act is 
committed with State support or tolerance, then it stops being a 
criminal activity which can be suppressed within the national realm 
and becomes a problem of international concern.158 Finally, Saul
also argues that ‘if terrorism is thought to threaten international 
peace and security, an international definition must be limited to 
acts capable of that result’;159 what makes them capable of that
result can be their cross-border character and/or State 
involvement,160 inflicting thus an injury to international community
interests and values. In this case, it is highly likely that these acts 
cannot be suppressed by one State’s law enforcement mechanisms 
and will present a ‘spill-over’ effect rendering the act a threat to 
international peace and security. These acts that will present a cross-
border element or include State involvement, and also attack, in 
both cases, international community interests and values, cannot be 
157 STL Decision (n 3) para 90. 
158 Cassese (n 7) 223. 
159 Saul (n 89) 93. 
160 ibid. 
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considered as purely domestic and will fulfil the requirements of 
‘internationality’. 
To recapitulate, it is suggested that the element of 
‘internationality’ will be a necessary threshold in a definition for 
terrorism, as it will help reconcile the gap between State-centric and 
cosmopolitan concerns about the suppression of acts of international 
terrorism. It has been argued that the preferred terminology should 
refer to the ‘internationality’ of terrorism, rather than to its 
‘transantionality’, not for reasons relating to criminological 
differences between the two but to juridical ones. If terrorism is to 
be suppressed at the international level, an international definition 
should reflect and put emphasis on the international dimension of 
terrorism. References to its ‘transnationality’ relate to the 
categorisation of terrorism as a transnational offence, which States 
have an obligation to suppress through State-based mechanisms of 
cooperation. However, the formulation of a definition for 
international terrorism should and can constitute a starting point to 
signify its transition from a transnational offence to an international 
crime. The establishment of the STL demonstrated that there are 
particularly grave acts of terrorism that qualify for international 
intervention. This ‘internationalisation’ should be further developed 
by the formulation of a universal definition which will advance the 
international dimensions of a terrorist act and promote 
accountability at an international level. Secondly, the inclusion of an 
international element in the defintion will set a clearer distinction 
between which acts of terrorism can and should be suppressed 
within the national realm and which acts qualify for international 
intervention. It is as crucial to protect State sovereignty and national 
security interests in cases of purely domestic terrorism as it is to 
protect basic human rights and universal values and international 
community interests in cases of international terrorism. Lastly, it has 
been suggested that the ‘internationality’ of an act of terrorism 
should be determined not by the gravity of the act as such but by the 
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extent to which it constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security. Since the Security Council, the only international organ 
empowered to determine a threat to international peace and security, 
is not bound to follow any legal rules in order to make such a 
determination, it is proposed that acts of terrorism that conceptually 
amount to such a threat should demonstrate either a cross-border 
element, in terms of perpetrators, victims or means of violence used, 
or direct or indirect State involvement. The cross-border element of 
a terrorist act will result in a ‘spill-over’ effect to other States and 
State involvement will render the suppression of the terrorist act by 
the national authorities of that State highly difficult. Therefore, in 
both cases, international community interests will warrant protection 
and suppression at an international level will be the only option in 
order to protect the interests of the affected State(s), the interests of 
the affected individuals and the interests of the international 
community as a whole. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter it has been argued that a definition of terrorism 
should be construed in such a way so as to respond to the need of 
protecting both State sovereignty and cosmopolitan interests. To this 
end, it has been suggested that the definition should: i) include the 
element of indiscriminate violence and the creation of a state of 
terror, in order to demonstrate how terrorism targets universal 
values applicable to humankind, ii) reflect the dual aim of terrorism, 
namely the aim of intimidating a population or compelling a 
government or organisation to do or refrain from doing a particular 
act, in order to show that terrorism constitutes a threat to both States 
and individuals at the same time, iii) include a political or 
ideological motive requirement as a special element that will extend 
to both of the aims of a terrorist act, in order to make a clear 
distinction of which violent acts can qualify as terrorist and which 
cannot, and thus emphasising the ‘distinctively wrongful’ character 
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of terrorism, iv) include a ‘by whomever committed’ clause, in 
order to condemn all forms of terrorism committed by both State 
agents and non-State actors and v) include a threshold of 
‘internationality’, in order to make a distinction between terrorist 
acts that can and should be suppressed nationally and those acts that 
warrant suppression at the international level if they are found to 
threaten international peace and security.     
As the overarching argument of this thesis goes, State 
sovereignty considerations and cosmopolitan ideals are the two 
principal driving forces in the development of international law in 
general and international criminal law in particular. However, these 
two dynamics ofter appear to conflict, with the former, typically 
based on political interests and exigencies, trying to push back any 
developments aspired to by the latter. For this reason, more often 
than not, international criminal law developments have been slow 
and often confronted by States which tend to have a rather 
conservative view of how international law should work in practice. 
This thesis has been an attempt to demonstrate how these two 
dynamics can be potentially reconciled in an effort to define and 
criminalise terrorism for international criminal justice purposes. It is 
the author’s view that not only is there an imperative need to finally 
agree upon a universal definition for terrorism but also that this 
definition should be more than a compromise between those who 
aspire to cosmopolitan ideas and those who prioritise State concerns 
over those ideas. The formulation of an international definition for 
terrorism, if ever achieved, should be seen as an example of how 
States and international criminal justice can work together towards 
the achievement of a common end which will eventually benefit all 
sides involved, States, individual victims and the international 
community, contributing meaningfully in the effectiveness of the 
international criminal justice system as it stands today. 
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CONCLUSION 
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
 
This thesis has been an attempt to show that the effectiveness of 
definitions of international crimes relies heavily on the extent to 
which concerns of State sovereignty and aspirations of 
cosmopolitanism are balanced properly. The paradigm of aggression 
served to highlight how these dynamics shaped its definition and 
criminalisation throughout history, starting from the League of 
Nations period and until the Review Conference in Kampala. On a 
similar basis, the paradigm of terrorism was examined, 
demonstrating that State sovereignty and cosmopolitanism 
constitute the same driving forces towards this direction, and their 
antithesis is most of the time the main reason why the most 
contentious issues surrounding the matter cannot be adequately 
addressed. In this ‘State sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ 
scheme, the Security Council was sketched as an organ with 
primarily State-centred priorities and the ICC as an institution 
whose priorities have a cosmopolitan basis, though in practice, their 
priorities might well be mixed.  Finally, a suggestion was made on 
how an international definition for terrorism should be approached 
taking into account sovereignty - and cosmopolitanism-related 
parameters, as this is, according to the author’s view, the most 
workable way of achieving a meaningful development in this 
direction. 
After analysing the concepts of State sovereignty and 
cosmopolitanism and their interplay with international law, 
emphasis was given early in this thesis on the complementary 
mandate of the ICC. One could argue that this emphasis might seem 
somewhat out of place since there is still a long way before 
terrorism is actually defined for the purposes of international 
criminal justice, let alone from being included into the jurisdiction 
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of the ICC. Apart from its contribution to our understanding of the 
modalities of ICC prosecutions under its complementarity regime, 
this analysis reveals once again in the history of international law 
the ‘tug of war’ relation between politics and law, a relation that all 
members of the international community, States and international 
organisations, have to deal with. In the ICC context, this relation is 
primarily manifested in two ways: firstly, in the implementation of 
the Rome Statute provisions by its States Parties and secondly in the 
prosecutorial policy in the selection of cases. Despite the fact that 
many States Parties have already harmonised in some respects their 
national laws concerning international crimes with the Rome Statute 
provisions as was shown in Chapter I, it is hard to speculate to what 
extent States Parties (or which of them) will conduct themselves in a 
similar way to the ICC regarding the implementation of the Rome 
Statute definitions, the prosecutorial policies, sentencing, 
immunities etc. While, obviously, differentiation between the Rome 
Statute and national legislations is not a ground for admissibility per 
se and the spirit of the complementarity regime does not support 
such a view, examples of the ICC’s prosecutorial policy have shown 
that there might be instances where this differentiation might be 
extended to a degree that covers the grounds for admissibility, 
provided by Article 17 of the Rome Statute. This tendency to 
intervene in cases not strictly envisioned by the Rome Statute can be 
said to constitute the pro-cosmopolitan facet of the ICC, in the sense 
that international prosecutions predominate over the conduct of 
national proceedings. 
This need for balance between State sovereignty and 
international criminal justice purposes did not come to the surface 
with the establishment of the ICC. The paradigm of aggression 
showed that the two World Wars drew the attention of the 
international community to the need for outlawing, criminalising 
and finally defining the crime of aggression. This process has been 
undoubtedly slow, not the least because of the implications it bore 
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on the sovereign interests of the most powerful States. This long 
process, marked by the establishment of the first security system of 
the League of Nations, the cosmopolitan legacy of the Nuremberg 
trials, the creation of the Security Council as the ultimate authority 
in international peace and security matters and finally the 
criminalisation and definition of aggression for the purposes of the 
Rome Statute, made it clear that no substantial development can be 
made in the field unless sovereign priorities and cosmopolitan ideals 
are properly balanced. The Kampala definition for the crime of 
aggression seems to have provided a way forward, by introducing 
an adequate legal framework at the international level for the 
prosecution and punishment of political and military leaders found 
to be implicated in acts of aggression. 
It remains to be seen in practice however, to what extent this 
newly-adopted definition will accomplish the hopes of those who 
aspire to an international justice system free of politics. Much is left 
to the ICC’s discretion in the interpretation of the definition but it is 
equally true that much is left to the relation that the ICC will form 
with the Security Council if and when a case of aggression comes 
before the former. It was highlighted in Chapter III that the 
pragmatic limitations that permeate any future aggression 
prosecutions, posed by the role preserved for the Security Council 
by Articles 15bis (6) and (8) of the Kampala Resolution1 cannot be 
overlooked and therefore it would be better for the ICC to try to 
minimise them than to pretend that they do not exist.2 The Security 
                                                             
1 Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression (11 June 2010) 
(Kampala Resolution) art 15bis (6) (providing that the Prosecutor ‘shall first 
ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of 
aggression committed by the State concerned’) and art 15bis (8) providing that 
‘the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of 
aggression, provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the 
commencement of [this] investigation…and the Security Council has not decided 
otherwise in accordance with Article 16’). 
2 William Schabas, ‘The International Criminal Court: Struggling to Find its Way’ 
in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law 
(OUP 2012) 259 referring to the political factors that might influence the ICC 
Prosecutor in the selection of situations to be brought before the ICC. 
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Council, having a primary and key role in international peace and 
security matters, might ultimately exercise control over which 
aggression prosecutions will or will not take place and therefore, the 
ICC should make the most of its autonomy as provided by the Rome 
Statute provisions. 
The issue of defining and criminalising international terrorism 
has similarly at its centre this ‘State sovereignty versus 
cosmopolitanism’ antithesis. Especially after the 9/11 attacks, where 
terrorism drew international attention in the most tragic way, 
counterterrorism responses by individual States focused mostly on 
the protection of their own sovereign interests without due regard to 
cosmopolitan aspirations relating to the administration of 
international criminal justice. For the Security Council and the most 
powerful individual States, it suffices that terrorism be addressed 
nationally, despite the differentiation of each State’s understanding 
of what constitutes terrorism and the lack of a commonly accepted 
definition. The ambiguous drafting of some post-9/11 Security 
Council Resolutions which provided the US with the latitude to 
respond with the ‘war on terror’ and the substantial discretion they 
also provided to individual States to fight terrorism unilaterally, 
widened further the gap in States’ understanding and response to 
terrorism and encouraged an abusing use of the term in order to 
include a wide range of other ordinary offences. On the other hand, 
the Decision of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon surpassed State 
sovereignty considerations and held that a customary law definition 
for terrorism in times of peace actually exists. While this is a very 
welcome conclusion for those who support the criminalisation and 
definition of terrorism for the purposes of international criminal 
justice, this cosmopolitan judicial activism to apply to the Lebanese 
case a widened definition for terrorism, different from the national 
one, raised concerns about whether such a customary definition 
exists and whether overlooking a national definition to apply a 
customary one was justified under the circumstances of a national 
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case. Finally, the United Nations General Assembly negotiations on 
a draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism were examined as 
another pro-cosmopolitan effort to this direction, which however 
tries to accommodate the different State views in the issue of a 
terrorism definition. Though the process has been slow and no 
agreement has as yet been reached, the outcome of these 
negotiations, despite any flaws it might have, is bound to achieve a 
better balance between State concerns and cosmopolitan aspirations 
without being heavily influenced by the most powerful States’ 
understanding of the concept of terrorism nor raising any legitimacy 
issues.  
Chapter V exclusively focused on the question of defining 
international terrorism. This question was approached by a two-tier 
analysis: firstly, an effort was made to trace the common ground as 
well as the main points of contention among the elements of 
terrorism in definitions as provided by several international anti-
terrorist instruments and national law. Secondly, both the consented 
and the contested elements were put under the light of the State 
sovereignty and cosmopolitan theories in an effort to argue in favour 
of balance between these two theories. As such, it was finally 
concluded that a definition for international terrorism should reflect: 
i) the element of indiscriminate violence that ii) will have as its aim 
to spread fear to the population or part thereof or to compel a 
government or organisation to do or abstain from doing a particular 
act, iii) with a special intent of promoting a political or otherwise 
ideological purpose, iv) without any exception as to the 
category/class of perpetrator v) provided that the conduct meets the 
proposed threshold of ‘internationality’. This proposed threshold, 
included in the STL Decision as an element of the customary 
definition of terrorism, should be determined not by the gravity of 
the act per se but by the extent to which it constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security. This extent, in its turn, is 
determined by a cross-border element, in terms of perpetrators, 
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victims or means of violence used, or direct or indirect State 
involvement.3 
The purpose of this thesis was not limited only to the suggestion 
of a potential definition for international terrorism to be used in the 
context of international criminal justice, but extended also to the 
affirmation that defining international crimes effectively 
presupposes a degree of balance between State sovereignty interests 
and cosmopolitan ideas. To this end, the crime of aggression as 
defined in the Kampala Resolution was used as a paradigm of how 
these concepts of State sovereignty and cosmopolitanism have or 
have not been balanced in the case of aggression, and whether this 
paradigm can give some insights with respect to how terrorism 
should or should not be defined. Chapter III proposed three lessons 
to be learnt from the Kampala definition of aggression, which 
according to the author’s view, are relevant in the context of 
defining international terrorism: i) the ‘leadership requirement’ 
clause in the definition is a manifestation of the acknowledgment 
that individuals found in a position to threaten States can and 
possibly should be prosecuted and punished at the international 
level, ii) the ‘manifest threshold’ demonstrates that the Kampala 
definition appears to provide little guidance to the ICC as to which 
aggression cases can eventually fall under its jurisdiction and finally 
iii) the provisions regulating the role of the Security Council in the 
adjudication of aggression cases show that cosmopolitan aspirations 
in the adjudication of international crimes can only be partially 
addressed without the explicit support of the Security Council. 
Combining these lessons with the abovementioned proposed 
definitional elements for international terrorism, some particularly 
useful conclusions can be drawn: firstly, the proposed element in the 
definition for terrorism that no exception on the category/class of 
                                                             
3
 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging STL-11-01/1 (16 February 2011) 
para 90. 
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the perpetrators should be included can be paralleled with the 
‘leadership clause’ requirement in the definition of aggression. On 
the one hand, under a textual approach, these clauses significantly 
differ in the sense that the proposed ‘no exception’ clause means 
that anyone, being a high-ranking official or a common individual, 
can constitute a potential perpetrator of an act of international 
terrorism while the ‘leadership requirement’ clause substantially 
limits the number of potential perpetrators of the crime of 
aggression only to political or military leaders. However, what the 
‘leadership requirement’ clause has to contribute in this respect is 
not that it allows for a limited number of individuals to be found 
accountable for aggression but for the acknowledgment that 
individuals can be indeed found accountable for a crime directed 
against a State. While the rest of the Article 5 crimes refer to crimes 
committed by individuals against individuals, the crime of 
aggression is first and foremost a crime committed by individuals 
against a State. The proposed definition of international terrorism 
has as subjective elements either the intention to create a state of 
terror among the population or part of it or to coerce the authorities 
of a State, or international authorities, to do or abstain from doing a 
particular act. It was also proposed that for both of these subjective 
elements, there should be a special intent on the part of the 
perpetrator to promote a certain political or otherwise ideological 
agenda aiming at disrupting peaceful political processes and social 
life. Thus, any acts committed with the mere purpose to create a 
state of terror or the mere purpose to coerce the authorities will not 
automatically fall into the definition if this special intent to target a 
State’s national security and stability is lacking. It follows therefore 
that a crime of international terrorism, as defined in this thesis, 
targets States (as well as individuals). The Kampala definition 
demonstrated that the ICC can be an appropriate forum for the 
prosecution of individuals that target States and this is a model to be 
adopted with respect to how the individual aspects of a crime of 
international terrorism should be also addressed.  
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With respect to the second lesson, it was also shown in Chapter 
III that the ‘manifest threshold’ does not help in reaching some 
degree of balance between State sovereignty and cosmopolitan 
ideals as it ultimately allows for a wide discretion on the part of the 
ICC to determine which cases will or will not fall under its 
jurisdiction, and finally to lean towards either a pro-cosmopolitan or 
a pro-State sovereignty approach. Instead, the proposed definition of 
terrorism includes another threshold which is not based on the 
gravity of the act but on the extent to which it constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security. Again, the link to the text of the 
UN Charter is unavoidable not the least because the characterisation 
of terrorist acts as threats to international peace and security is 
common in Security Council’s practice, which is also the only organ 
empowered to make such a determination. However, just as the 
Security Council is empowered to determine acts of aggression 
without being obliged to follow any legal rules or criteria, the same 
is equally true for any potential determination of an act of terrorism 
as a threat to international peace and security. In this respect, should 
the Kampala Amendments acquire the desired number of 
ratifications, it is doubtful that the Security Council will change its 
practice in light of the fact that any determination on the existence 
of an act of aggression will have legal consequences for the political 
or military leaders of the involved State(s). Therefore, similar 
complications might also be present if prosecutions of international 
terrorism take place only after a Security Council’s determination 
that a specific act constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security. For this reason, it was finally suggested that an act of 
terrorism can conceptually constitute a threat to international peace 
and security if it demonstrates either a cross-border element, in 
terms of perpetrators, victims or means of violence used, or direct or 
indirect State involvement. Thus the proposed threshold for an act 
of international terrorism to fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction differs 
from aggression’s ‘manifest threshold’, in that it does not introduce 
new and ambiguous language, such as the ‘manifest violation’ or the 
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criterion of character4 and is also in accord with the STL’s ruling on
the transnational element of a terrorism act as a part of the 
customary definition for terrorism. 
This unavoidable interplay between Security Council’s powers 
and ICC competences brings us to the third lesson derived of the 
Kampala definition.While Article 15bis of the Kampala Resolution 
appears to achieve a reasonable compromise between the primary 
role of the Security Council in international peace and security 
matters and the judicial autonomy of the ICC to initiate an 
aggression investigation, Chapter III has concluded that the overall 
impact of the provisions relating to this balancing of powers will 
finally favour Security Council’s priorities rather than international 
criminal justice purposes with respect to which (if any) aggression 
situations will warrant ICC’s intervention. The cosmopolitan theory 
reaches its maximum with Article 15bis (8) which provides for the 
Prosecutor’s competence to initiate an aggression investigation after 
the authorisation of the Pre-Trial Division, in case of Security 
Council’s inaction. However, this provision does not clear the way 
for the promotion of international criminal justice despite Security 
Council’s inaction or opposing view in a particular case; without 
Security Council support, the ICC will appear unable to make the 
most of its autonomy and its mandate to fight impunity will be 
severely undermined if this mandate collides with any differing 
views of the Security Council (or any of its permanent members) in 
a particular case. 
It was also discussed in Chapter III that this state of affairs will 
not be manifest exclusively in cases of aggression but it has already 
been manifest with respect to other cases before the ICC and will be 
manifest in case international terrorism becomes criminalised under 
the Rome Statute. While this thesis did not elaborate on the 
modalities of how Security Council’s powers and ICC competences 
4Kampala Resolution art 8bis. 
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should be balanced in case of prosecutions of international 
terrorism, it follows that, at best, these modalities cannot 
significantly differ from the modalities regulated by the Kampala 
Resolution with respect to aggression. The Security Council’s 
primary role with respect to international peace and security matters 
cannot be overlooked or rejected by the international criminal 
justice system. However, it is equally crucial for the current 
international criminal justice system to make full use of its 
competences and fulfil its mandate to the maximum extent possible.  
It is already known and very well understood that the competing 
relation between politics and law permeates all international 
developments, political and legal alike. The concepts of State 
sovereignty and cosmopolitanism were used as the most 
representative continuations of politics and law respectively in the 
context of international criminal justice. However, this ‘State 
sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism’ debate that was framed for the 
purposes of this thesis is actually one aspect of the much wider 
debate between politics and law. As such, according to the author’s 
understanding, any developments that have been, are, or will be 
advanced in the field of international law are the middle, minimum 
ground of agreement between these two opposing dynamics. These 
developments can be viewed in a dual perspective, both as the 
maximum concessions that politics can make to law and as the 
maximum control that law can exert on politics. Regardless of 
which perspective one chooses, the result is the same: all 
developments in international law are a mixture of political 
considerations and legal aspirations, which most of the time are 
improperly balanced. This thesis was drafted with the hope that, at 
least in the context of defining and prosecuting international 
terrorism, this balance can be achieved, not as a compromise 
between the two opposing dynamics, but as the outcome of a 
common effort to achieve a common end.  
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